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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation explores the potential and role of the Internet-based media in the 
Kyrgyz Republic’s political processes after the 2005 March Revolution. It uses a model of 
interaction between the government and citizens through various types of realities: the 
reality constructed and imposed by the state-controlled media, the reality created by 
alternative, independent sources of information online, and the realities experienced by 
citizens in their daily lives.  The model pulled together various theories from political 
science, sociology, psychology, and mass communication and focused on the exit-voice-
loyalty options available for the citizens in response to governance practices. 
The research project uses a mix of qualitative and quantitative research methods. 
The results of content analysis have shown that in coverage of the 2007 Constitutional 
Referendum, independent Internet-based media indeed constructed a reality alternative 
to the official propaganda imposed by state media and were more critical of the 
government in terms of good governance practices than the state media.  Further, the 
results of surveys and focus groups provide the evidence that Internet-based media play 
a significant role in shaping perceptions of good governance among politically 
interested Internet-based media users toward more negative evaluations of and higher 
levels of frustration with the government performance.  Finally, the Internet media use 
is associated with the higher levels of intent to leave the country (i.e., exercise the exit 
option) among the research participants with low political interest. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation project was designed to explore the role of new media in forming 
citizens’ perceptions of good governance in a post-Soviet republic of Kyrgyzstan, where 
a “color” revolution took place in 2005, following the 2003 Orange Revolution in the 
Ukraine and 2004 Rose Revolution in Georgia.  Grounded in the theories of democratic 
transition and consolidation, as well as in the ongoing debate on the Internet’s role in 
democratization, the research focuses on how the traditional and online media construct 
realities for citizens and attempt to shape their perceptions on the one hand and how the 
citizens process the media-constructed realities and create their own understanding of 
good governance on the other.   
The question of how these perceptions drive citizens’ views of their government’s 
performance and their own role and future in the country is the central focus of the 
study.  In addition, the project explores whether those who are more knowledgeable 
about politics thanks to their access to Internet-based media and participation in on-line 
discussions share the information with those who have no Internet access, i.e. whether 
they perform the role of opinion leaders. 
Using a mix of qualitative and quantitative research methods, such as content 
analysis, face-to-face and online surveys, observation of Internet users, and focus groups 
with both the users and non-users of Internet, the research attempts to answer a set of 
questions probing the perceptions of governance and how they relate to the 
participants’ political knowledge, beliefs and media use patterns.   
This research project is designed to produce results that will provide evidence for 
one of the opposing views of the Internet as a medium facilitating or impeding 
 2 
formation of the public sphere and democratization following the collapse of a semi-
authoritarian regime. 
According to the first view, the Internet has an advantage over traditional media as 
a more democratic and open medium with unrestricted, uncensored information.  
Therefore, those on-line media users who are interested in politics will be more aware of 
good governance characteristics and will be more critical in assessing their 
governments’ performance than the traditional media users.  If such users choose to 
voice their concerns and share their views with others who have no Internet access, they 
can become influential opinion leaders in both the online and off-line world. 
Supporters of the opposing view believe that the Internet is an elite medium 
widening the digital divide and impeding the democratic processes through 
fragmentation of audiences and users’ exclusion from the political debate in favor of 
non-political activities.  This view is widely spread and actively discussed in 
established, mature democracies where the information in the traditional media is free 
from the government’s direct control and multiplicity of sources provide wider choices 
for the media users.   
In contrast, the governments in transitional countries such as Kyrgyzstan still 
control most of the traditional media, and in particular widely accessible television 
channels.  Under such restrictions, the Internet users interested in politics and public 
affairs will be more knowledgeable in politics than the traditional media users almost by 
definition, simply by the virtue of having access to alternative information sources not 
controlled by the government.   
This logical assumption serves as a key hypothesis for this project prompting other 
relationships between the perceptions of government practices and performance, 
various realities and options available for key players – the government and the citizens.  
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The theoretical model developed specifically for this project and presented in Figure 2.2 
(see Chapter 2) synthesizes various theories and perspectives from political science, 
psychology, sociology, and mass communication.   
In essence, the model illustrates that in a fragile and weak democracy, the 
government projects and constructs the reality through the state media with the goal of 
maintaining a certain level of citizens’ loyalty and support for the government, at least 
so that the citizens do not protest against the government and demand its resignation.  
On the other hand, citizens live daily in their own experienced reality, which is much 
worse than what the government tries to convince them it is.   
If the gap between the two realities is wide, the citizens develop a certain level of 
frustration with the government that would translate into one of two options.  The first 
one is that including an attempt to change the situation by expressing their frustration 
through the means available to them, such as voting, active involvement in political 
organizations, especially opposing the government, and participation in protests and 
demonstrations against the government (the voice option). The second option involves 
searching for a better life elsewhere, i.e. to leave the country either temporarily or 
permanently (the exit option). 
This project looks at both how the reality is constructed through various types of 
media and how the citizens’ experienced reality connects or disconnects with the 
options available for them.  The project consists of two distinct parts of analysis.  The 
first part, presented in Chapter 1, is aimed at understanding how various types of 
media, in particular state and independent and print and online, construct the reality for 
the citizens, i.e. this is the analysis focused on the sender’s end.  The main theoretical 
foundation of the content analysis is the framing theory.  It allows for establishing that 
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through selection of various frames different types of media indeed construct realities so 
vastly different that they seem like perfect mirrors of each other. 
The second part of the analysis is focused on the receiving end – citizens – and 
attempts to tap into their experienced reality, evaluations of government performance 
and options available for them to change the reality.  This part is presented in Chapter 2.  
It is based on the theoretical model presented in Figure 2.2, briefly described above and 
elaborated upon in Section 2.2.5.  As for the methods, this part of analysis uses 
observations, surveys of traditional media users and Internet users, and focus groups 
with both traditional media users and Internet-based media users.  The results of this 
part of analysis show that the frustration with the government is indeed so high that the 
citizens are considering the options of exit more and more, less of the voice, and almost 
never loyalty, which is expressed in low evaluations of government performance. 
Finally, the Conclusions chapter brings everything together in the light of the 
theoretical model of the Government-Citizen interaction and options and presents some 
policy implications and recommendations. 
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 CHAPTER 1.  FRAMING A GOOD GOVERNANCE ISSUE: 
COVERAGE OF 2007 CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM BY 
KYRGYZSTAN’S PRINT AND INTERNET-BASED MEDIA  
 
1.1 Background 
On Sept. 19, 2007 the Kyrgyz Republic’s President Kurmanbek Bakiev announced a 
decree scheduling a national referendum for Oct. 21, 2007. The Referendum was to reject 
or approve two major pieces of legislation – a new Constitution draft and the Election 
Code.  The decision did not come completely unexpected because several days earlier, 
on September 14, the Constitutional Court had ruled void the previous Constitution 
versions adopted by the Parliament in October and November 2006 since they had not 
been subject to the Constitutional Court evaluation.  Still, many a president’s critic 
accused him of rushing the events and “declaring the Referendum on his own people 
like a war.”1 
The opponents formulated five main reasons against the Referendum as a means to 
approve the proposed legislation. The first reason was that since the Referendum format 
allowed no article-by-article voting on each proposed draft, it could only be used to 
approve the major changes in principle but not to introduce such complicated and 
sophisticated legislation as the Constitution and Election Code in their entirety. Second, 
the critics argued, the documents had not been discussed broadly earlier and one month 
was not enough for the citizens to study and evaluate them meaningfully.  Third, for the 
citizens to make an informed and intelligent decision, the drafts should be broadly and 
publicly discussed in comparison with not only the current legislation but also 
alternative and more progressive drafts, which would be impossible to do in the media 
                                                 
1 Avdeeva, E. (Sept. 21, 2007). ‘Hello to the Bakievs, or give me the Constitution I will vote for!’ Bely Parohod. 
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environment largely controlled by the state and pro-presidential circles.  Fourth, the 
referendum as a means for approving major legislative changes had been discredited by 
the previous president, Askar Akaev, and allowed too much room for manipulation and 
vote rigging.  Finally, the fifth and most important reason was that the Constitution 
draft submitted to the Referendum effectively expanded the president’s authority even 
beyond the 2003 “Akaev” Constitution, which had been often cited as one of the reasons 
for the 2005 “Tulip Revolution” (for the timeline of main events, see Appendix A). 
The president’s proponents, however, dismissed these arguments by formulating 
counter arguments aggressively promoted in the state media.  First, they maintained, 
the Referendum was the best way for the people to express their will directly and thus 
legitimize the drafts by giving them the vote of confidence; in addition, the Referendum 
was only to approve the drafts in principle and later they would be evaluated and 
amended as needed.  Second, the presidents’ supporters responded to the argument that 
there was not enough time for the citizens to make a decision, the constitutional reform 
had been discussed so much and so many drafts had been debated that any citizen now 
was an expert in constitutional matters, therefore one month would be more than 
enough to make up one’s mind.   Third, the legislative drafts will be published in all 
media and the media will be expected to provide space and opportunities for discussing 
them.  Fourth, no administrative resource will be used to force people to vote or to rig 
the referendum results, and both domestic and international observers will make sure 
that the referendum is conducted honestly and transparently.   
As for the main claim that the new Constitution draft expanded the presidential 
powers and could lead the country to enforcement of authoritarianism, the president’s 
political consultants counter argued that the amendments were not about consolidating 
the power but about taking ultimate and sole responsibility for the reforms, as well as 
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about better control over the various levels of the executive branch of power, especially 
the local government. 
These two interpretations of the presidential initiative so crucial for the country’s 
life illustrate two opposing approaches to good governance – one based on the true 
democratic participation and conscious expression of will by the people and the other 
based on the leader’s duty to take responsibility, single-mindedly make the decision for 
the entire nation and hone support for it by various means, including skilful and subtle 
manipulation of the public conscious.  
In the country where most of the traditional print and electronic media are 
controlled by the state either directly or through partial ownership, the first view is 
underrepresented in the public domain.  It should find a better venue for expression and 
discussion in the Internet-based media, which are largely open and independent of the 
state.  The goal of this project is to test this theoretical assumption.  Using both 
quantitative and qualitative content analysis of stories published on the Referendum 
and relating events, this part of the research project tests whether there are significant 
differences between Kyrgyz print and Internet media in covering such a crucial good 
governance issue as a referendum. 
1.2 Literature Review 
Since the goal of this chapter is to see how the print and Internet-based media 
framed the coverage of the referendum and surrounding events, a brief overview of the 
framing theory is necessary to set up the theoretical context. 
Perhaps the first scientific framing analysis in the history of mass communication 
was the 1920 Lippmann and Merz’s pioneering analysis of how The New York Times 
covered the 1917 Russian Revolution and subsequent events up to the spring of 1920.  
“The chief censor and the chief propagandist,” Lippmann and Merz argued, “were hope 
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and fear in the minds of reporters and editors” (p.3) that framed the coverage.  This 
hope and fear drove the newspaper staff to omit undesirable information and to rely on 
the opinions of government officials, self-proclaimed experts, and even anonymous 
sources clearly biased against the revolution and for the Bolsheviks’ defeat.  In addition, 
dependence on untrustworthy journalists whose “sympathies are too deeply engaged,” 
inadequate preparation of correspondents and the breach of “the time honored tradition 
of protecting news against editorials” (pp.41-42) misleadingly presented opinions as 
facts and violated the core professional standards.  Thus, Lippmann and Merz conclude, 
the New York Time’s coverage of the Russian Revolution uncovered serious problems 
in journalism as it was practiced at the time:  
…the professional standards of journalism are not high enough, and the 
discipline by which standards are maintained not strong enough, to carry the 
press triumphantly through a test so severe as that provided by the Russian 
Revolution. (p.42) 
 
 
In relation to Kyrgyzstan, a former Soviet republic with a lingering influence of 
Soviet journalism, it is useful to keep Lippmann and Merz’s study as a reference point 
because even though journalists today have better skills and means for fact-checking, 
they still have trouble setting aside their individual preferences, hopes and fears, 
especially in the media environment like Kyrgyzstan’s, where the standards of balanced 
and unbiased journalism are taking root slowly and opinion journalism still prevails. 
Lippmann and Merz’s study made a lasting contribution to the inquiry about 
international political communication (Hardt, 2002), but it will have been half a century 
before communication scholars returned to the issue of news framing.  Goffman (1974), 
who is often cited as a framing research originator, was first to conceptualize a frame as 
the device helping humans to construct and comprehend reality, to “locate, perceive, 
identify, and label a seemingly infinite number of concrete occurrences defined in its 
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limits” (p.21).  Many of the later definitions and research on news frames are based on 
this sociological approach to news as knowledge and focus on the frames as instruments 
for the newsmakers to present the knowledge to the publics.   
Tuchman (1978) talks of the news as “a window on the world” whose delineating 
frame may distort reality through selection of the view, its angle, distance from the 
window, the surrounding background, and other factors associated with the viewer 
such as ability to pay attention to fine detail, recognize connections between the 
elements, perceive the picture as a whole, etc. (p.1).  Clearly, the one who looks out the 
window (newsmaker) may distort the reality for those whom he/she describes the view 
to.  Gitlin (1980), whose definition of frames is considered to be one of the best and is 
widely cited in the framing literature, is more specific about how the newsmakers utilize 
frames to organize the reality: 
Media frames are persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and 
presentation, of selection, emphasis and inclusion, by which symbol handlers 
routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual. (p.7) 
 
 
Reese (2002) echoes Gitlin’s definition looking at the frames as “organizing principles 
that are socially shared and persistent over time that work symbolically to meaningfully 
structure the social world” (p.11, emphasis original).  In a similar way, Entman (2004) 
defines framing as “selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and 
making connections among them so as to promote a particular evaluation, 
interpretation, and/or solution” (p.5). He also adds a functional dimension to frames 
stating that frames perform “at least two of the following basic functions in covering 
political events, issues and actors: (1) defining effects or conditions as problematic; (2) 
identifying causes; (3) conveying a moral judgment; and (4) endorsing remedies of 
improvements” (p.5).  Finally, one of the most recent attempts to synthesize the framing 
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research and approaches produced a definition that is useful for this study as it relates 
to the issues of good governance: “Media frames are pervasive, durable sociocultural 
and professionally shaped constructs that convey ethnocentric, nationalistic elite views 
and largely reinforce the status quo” (Ross & Bantimaroudis, 2006, p.87). 
The last conceptualization of framing is particularly useful for this study as it will 
explore how the print media controlled by the state, i.e. by definition media reinforcing 
the status quo and the official viewpoint, tried to make sense of an important political 
event crucial for the country’s future.  These media’s influence on the general public is 
significant as the independent print papers have limited readerships and the online 
independent media are accessible only to 10-13 per cent of people with Internet access. 
For the purposes of this chapter, the newspapers and news agencies in Kyrgyzstan 
are categorized into print and online by the mode of production and availability for the 
readers, as well as into state-controlled, conformist, independent and foreign in terms of 
the amount of control the government is able to exert upon them. In relation to how the 
different types of media sources evaluate the referendum and government in general, 
the following model is at work: 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2.1.  Source Type and Evaluations of Referendum and Government 
 
As the model shows, the source type predetermines whether the Referendum will 
be evaluated as a negative or positive event.  Logically, a state-controlled newspaper 
Source type: online-print, 
state-independent 
Evaluation of Referendum: 
negative-positive 
Evaluation of Government: 
negative-positive 
 11 
will not evaluate the referendum, which is a state initiative, as a negative event, while 
independent media have more freedom to give their critical evaluations.  The online-
print mode of production plays a role here inasmuch as it roughly falls on the state-
independent division: most of the truly independent media in Kyrgyzstan are forced 
into the online world because the state controls the real world media market.  If 
independent papers are published, they try to stay away from politics and government 
(like newspaper Delo # that covers crime) or have very small circulation (like newspaper 
Bely Parohod with 3,000 printed copies), so they do not have a lot of impact in the real 
world, and the state-controlled and conformist newspapers will skew the reality for the 
majority of citizens who have no Internet access. 
Further, the evaluation of the Referendum determines the overall evaluation of 
government, which is always based on the material of the story relating to referendum.  
Basically, when the newspapers evaluate the government, i.e. try to put the Referendum 
into a bigger picture of democracy and a better governance system, it is inevitable that 
this evaluation is driven by the Referendum evaluation.  Thus, the source type will 
affect the overall evaluation of the government as well, both directly and indirectly. 
It may be argued that the overall evaluation of the government should in its turn 
drive the evaluation of the Referendum.  However, the source ownership a priori 
defines the government evaluation: it is difficult to imagine that a state-controlled 
newspaper would go against a government initiative without severe consequences for 
the editor and journalists (this relationship is represented by a dotted line in Figure 
1.2.1).  Given this caveat, the relationship will not be tested in the analysis.  The focus 
will be placed on how the media evaluate the Referendum and the government in a 
broader context, but still shaped by the Referendum and surrounding events.  
 12 
Based on the view of the Internet media as contributors to democratic processes 
and development of the public sphere under the conditions where the traditional media 
are controlled by the state, the following three hypotheses were formulated to test the 
differences between the state print and independent online media coverage of the 
referendum: 
Hypothesis 1: Compared to state print media, independent Internet-based media 
will be more critical and negative in their evaluation of (a) Constitutional 
Court/ Referendum decision and (b) the overall evaluation of the government 
actions in terms of good governance. 
Hypothesis 2: When reporting the referendum results, the independent and 
Internet-based media will (a) report lower turnout rates, (b) mention the 
violations, and (c) refer to the use of administrative resource more frequently 
than the print and state-controlled media. 
Hypothesis 3: In predicting future events, the independent online media will be 
more pessimistic about possible developments than the state print media. 
In addition, two research questions were formulated to explore the professional 
standards of original material in reporting, as well as qualitative frames that the media 
used to give detail and analysis of the political and public events surrounding the 
referendum: 
Research Question 1: Will there be any differences between the print and Internet-
based media in terms of originality of the material they tend to use to cover such 
a complicated and politically sensitive issue? 
Research Question 2: What frames are used to make sense of the events in terms of 
their meaning for the key political players – (a) the president, (b) the parliament, 
and (c) the people as carriers of democracy? 
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1.3 Method and Procedures 
This part of the research project uses both qualitative and quantitative content 
analysis of all stories obtained from the print and Internet-based sources in Kyrgyzstan 
covering the Referendum and relating events.  The sample period starts on September 
14, when the Constitutional Court made its decision invalidating the December 2006 
Constitution, and ends on October 31, after the Parliament was dissolved, the 
Government resigned and the coverage of the Referendum-related events diminished.   
1.3.1 Sampling Procedure 
In the first week after the Presidential decree on the Referendum was published, all 
printed newspapers available in the newspaper stands, both current and back issues, 
were perused for any stories relating to the Constitutional Court decision and the 
Referendum. Since most print papers have online versions, starting from the second 
week the stories were downloaded immediately after their publication on the websites. 
This comprehensive search produced 286 stories.  After a closer examination, 
stories shorter than 200 words were excluded because they did not contain any 
evaluations beyond brief factual reporting of events.  Such stories came mostly from the 
news agencies – independent 24.kg and state agency Kabar, only analytical stories from 
which were included into the sample. Further, reprints of numerous political addresses 
and statements in support of the Referendum made by various pro-presidential political 
parties and organizations that did not include any commentary or analysis by the source 
staff were excluded as well.  This data collection method produced a total of 212 stories 
for analysis (see Table 1.3.1).   
As the table shows, the largest number of stories from a single source is from the 
state paper Slovo Kyrgyzstana, followed by a conformist print newspaper MSN.  BPC has 
the largest number of stories among independent online sources (24), followed by 24.kg 
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with 21 stories. Analytical websites Fergana.ru and Centrasia.ru also provided a 
considerable number of stories, while other sources published 1-12 stories each. 
Table 1.3.1. Summary of Sources and Published Stories 
# Source Title Source Description Source URL # of 
stories  
1. 24.kg Online independent news agency www.24.kg 21 
2. AKI-Press Agency for Commercial Information, online 
business-oriented news agency 
www.akipress.com  11 
3. Bely Parohod2 Independent online newspaper with a printed 
version 
www.parohod.kg 12 
4. Bishkek Press 
Club 
Independent online news portal for and by 
journalists comparable to a news agency 
www.bpc.kg 24 
5. Centrasia.ru Non-governmental analytical Russian Internet 
portal covering events in former Soviet Union 
countries 
www.centrasia.ru 15 
6. Delo # Independent print newspaper focusing on crime 
and public safety issues 
delo.ktnet.kg/inde
x.shtml  
12 
7. Fergana.ru Moscow-based analytical portal covering Fergana 
valley (areas of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Tajikistan around Fergana city) 
www.ferghana.ru 17 
8. IWPR London-based news and analysis portal of Institute 
for War and Peace Reporting  
www.iwpr.net  4 
9. Kabar State online news agency www.kabar.kg 5 
10. Kommersant Russian top-quality financial daily newspaper of 
record 
http://www.kom
mersant.ru  
5 
11. Megapolis Print Bishkek city business newspaper  1 
12. Moskovsky 
Komsomolets v 
Kyrgyzstane 
Russian print tabloid with a special section for 
Kyrgyzstan produced by local staff independent of 
the Moscow office 
www.mk.kg 2 
13. MSN “Moya Stolitsa Novosti” - Bishkek City capital area 
print newspaper  
www.msn.kg 27 
14. Pr.kg Independent online newspaper with frequently 
updated news service similar to a news agency 
www.pr.kg 9 
15. Obschestveny 
Raiting 
Independent print newspaper affiliated with pr.kg  7 
16. Slovo 
Kyrgyzstana 
Official government print newspaper with national 
coverage 
www.sk.kg 34 
17. Tazar.kg Independent analytical website www.tazar.kg 6 
Total: 212 
                                                 
2 As of March 11, 2008 the paper comes out under the new name Bely Parus (www.parus.kg). 
 15 
1.3.2 Coding and Analysis Procedures 
A group of 22 AUCA mass communication students assisted in coding the stories 
using the coding sheets presented in Appendix B.  They coded a total of 42 (20 per cent) 
of the sample stories, which I also coded for inter-coder reliability test.  The inter-coder 
reliability coefficient for the quantified items was .82, while the agreement on qualitative 
frames was roughly estimated to be at 75 per cent, i.e. for most stories, two coders 
similarly identified at least three out of the four frames (items 3-6 in Coding Sheet 1).  
After the coding, the quantified items were run through descriptive statistics 
(frequencies and cross-tabulations).  To test Hypotheses 1, 3 and Research Question 1, 
ordered logistic regressions were used. Linear regressions were run to test Hypothesis 2 
for the subsample of 72 stories covering the referendum results.   
For the qualitative frames analysis (Research Question 2), all identified frames 
were grouped into larger thematic clusters, characterized as either “negative” (mostly 
used by independent sources) or “positive” (mostly used by pro-government sources), 
and compared for frequency of appearance and dominance.  
1.3.3 Sample Characteristics 
Figure 1.3.1 below presents the distribution of stories by dates and source type – 
online or print.  As it shows, the three highest spikes in the figure are around three 
dates: 1) September 19, when the Referendum was announced, 2) September 25, when 
several parties formed the movement “For Constitution, Reform, and Development” 
that became later the foundation for the pro-presidential party ‘Ak-Jol’, and 3) October 
20-24, when the Referendum results became known.   
During the entire period on the sample, online sources published 112 stories (53%), 
while print sources – 100 (47%), so the sample is split roughly equally between the 
online and print stories. 
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Figure 1.3.1. Distribution of Stories by Date and Source Type 
 
Further, the online sources were divided into groups based on the potential for 
their material to “spill over” into the off-line world.  In this sense, Internet newspaper 
such as Bely Parohod has the largest potential equal to any other print paper because it 
has its own print version (albeit with a small circulation of 3,000), the news agencies are 
in the middle because their materials are picked up by both online and print sources, 
and analytical websites have the lowest potential because they are usually read only by 
experts and “political junkies” with regular Internet access. 
All the sources were also categorized into four groups based on independence 
from the government: 1) state sources, such as official government newspaper Slovo 
Kyrgyzstana and news agency Kabar directly controlled by the government; 2) conformist 
sources controlled by the state through either partial ownership or an unofficial 
agreement, such as MSN newspaper; 3) independent sources that publish materials 
critical of the government, such as news agency 24.kg, newspapers Obschestvenny 
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Raiting, Delo #, and Bely Parohod, and analytical websites BPC and Tazar.kg; and 4) 
foreign independent sources, such as Russian newspaper Kommersant and analytical 
website Centrasia.ru. Newspaper MK-KG and analytical websites Fergana.ru and IWPR, 
although affiliated with foreign organizations, were categorized as independent local 
sources because they have desks in Bishkek run by the local staff and are quite 
independent in their editorial decisions. The distribution of stories in the sample by 
source independence and off-line impact potential is presented in Table 1.3.2, which also 
shows the variables’ coding schemes in brackets. 
As the table shows, stories from print newspapers represent all types of source 
independence, as well as stories from independent sources represent all types of off-line 
impact potential.  There are no stories from analytical websites and online papers in the 
state and conformist categories of source independence.  This may be at least partly 
explained by the fact that the government does not create online media because it is not 
particularly concerned about the impact on the Internet readership comprising only 
about 10-15% of the total population.  It also indirectly confirms that the Internet is a 
more open and independent space.   
Table 1.3.2.  Off-line Impact Potential by Source Independence 
Source Independence 
  
 Off-line Impact Potential 
State        
(1) 
Conformist 
(2) 
Independent 
(3) 
Foreign 
(4) Total 
(1) Print newspaper 34 27 22 5 88 
(2) Print version of online 
newspaper 0 0 12 0 12 
(3) News agency 5 11 21 0 37 
(4) Online paper 0 0 9 0 9 
(5) Analytical website 0 0 51 15 66 
Total 39 38 115 20 212 
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The largest number of stories come from independent analytical websites (51, or 24 
percent of the sample) and print state newspaper (34, or 16 percent).  The sample is also 
roughly equally split between the stories from print (100, or 47 percent) and online (112, 
or 53 percent) sources, while on the independence dimension the stories from 
independent local sources represent about 54 percent (115 stories) compared to 36 
percent (77 stories) from non-independent local sources.  
In summary, the three variables serving as “demographics” of the sample – story 
categorization by print/online mode of production, off-line impact potential, and source 
independence from the government control – show that the sample reflects the existing 
diversity in Kyrgyzstan’s newspaper market quite well and represents the range of 
media reporting, opinions and analyses available for the country’s readers.  The next 
section presents the key results and findings on how these media sources covered the 
events in terms of good governance. 
1.4 Results and Discussion 
1.4.1 Quantitative Content Analysis 
Hypothesis 1 was formulated to test whether the print and online media differ in 
how critically they evaluate the Constitutional Court decision, the referendum initiative, 
and relating government actions in terms of good governance.  Table 1.4.1 presents the 
results of the ordered logistic regression for evaluation of the Constitutional Court/ 
Referendum decision (coded as 1=negative, 2=neutral, 3=positive) by source online/ 
print type (coded 0=print, 1=online) and independence from the state. For all variables 
and their coding schemes, see Appendix D. 
As the table shows, the source being print rather than online has only a marginally 
significant positive association with the government action evaluation.  However, the 
source independence is a better predictor: in comparison to the foreign sources that are 
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serving as a base category here3, as the source moves to state-controlled, the expected 
ordered log odds increases by 2.533 as the evaluation decision moves from negative to 
neutral to positive.  Thus, in comparison to foreign sources, the state-controlled and 
conformist sources are more likely to evaluate the government decisions positively. 
Table 1.4.1. Evaluation of Constitutional Court/Referendum Decision 
Independent (location) variables Estimate St. Error Wald 
State-controlled sources 2.533*** .612 17.133 
“Conformist” sources 1.508** .558 7.293 
Independent sources -.188 .461 .684 
Print source .556 .308 .071 
(Threshold 1) -.556 .437 1.619 
(Threshold 2) 1.790* .461 3.261 
Model summary N = 212, Cox & Snell Pseudo R2 = .292, Χ2 = 73.273*** 
*p < .05,  **p < .01,  ***p < .001 
 
Likewise, the “conformist” sources have a significant positive effect on the decision 
evaluation.  The independent sources have the hypothesized negative association, but 
their influence is not statistically significant.  Thus, the sample provides partial support 
to Hypothesis 1(a), suggesting that source independence is a better predictor of how 
negatively or positively the government decision is evaluated than the source being 
online or print. 
Hypothesis 1(b) is tested using the same two demographic characteristics of the 
sample – source independence and print/online nature.  However, since a large part of 
the overall evaluation of the government actions (coded from 1 – strongly negative to 5 – 
strongly positive) includes evaluation of the Constitutional Court/Referendum decision, 
it is also included into the model as an independent variable. 
                                                 
3 I have also run ordered logistic regression models where the state-controlled sources were taken as a reference 
category, but they did not perform as well as the models with the foreign sources as the base. 
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Table 1.4.2. Evaluation of Government Actions in Terms of Good Governance 
Independent (location) variables Estimate St. Error Wald 
State-controlled sources 3.108*** .659 22.228 
“Conformist” sources 2.140*** .604 12.561 
Independent sources .909* .490 4.537 
Print source -.507* .318 3.232 
CC/Referendum negative evaluation -5.585*** .563 98.284 
CC/Referendum neutral evaluation -3.208*** .456 49.421 
(Threshold 1) -3.848*** .660 33.977 
(Threshold 2) -2.270*** .653 12.069 
(Threshold 3) -.831 .638 1.692 
(Threshold 4) 1.025* .595 2.969 
Model summary N = 212, Cox & Snell Pseudo R2 = .652,         
Χ2 = 223.711*** 
*p < .05,  **p < .01,  ***p < .001 
 
As the results presented in Table 1.4.2 for one-tailed test show, the source being 
print or online effects the overall evaluation of the government action in the expected 
direction: as the source moves to the online type, the expected ordered log odds 
increases by -.507 for every category of evaluation, i.e. becomes more negative. The 
source independence also has a significant positive effect for all types of sources, 
suggesting that their overall evaluation of government actions is likely to be more 
positive than that of the foreign sources that serve as a base category in the model. 
The strongest predictor is the evaluation of the Constitutional Court/Referendum 
decision, and this relationship is in the expected direction: negative and neutral 
evaluations of these decisions greatly increase the likelihood of the overall negative 
evaluation of the government actions discussed in the story. 
Thus, both ordered logistic regression analyses presented in Tables 1.4.1 and 1.4.2 
provide sufficient support for Hypothesis 1, suggesting that independence from 
government control is a strong predictor of how critically the source will cover the 
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government actions.  Characterization of sources in terms of whether they are online or 
print has a significant effect on the overall evaluation of the government actions. 
Hypothesis 2 was tested with OLS regressions on the subsample of stories 
published on and after October 21, when the referendum results became available, 
which includes 72 stories.  In Hypothesis 2(a), the dependent variable is the reported 
turnout rate, coded as 1=the officially reported rate, 0=lower rate (see Table 1.4.3).  Of 
the 72 subsample stories, about a half (35 stories) mentioned the turnout rate, and of 
those, 26 stories stated or suggested that the turnout rate was much lower than what the 
Central Elections Committee announced officially, i.e. 82 per cent of the population 
showing up at the polling stations. 
Table 1.4.3. Reporting of Turnout Rates 
Independent variables B St. Error t 
Off-line impact potential .029 .033 .870 
Source type: online-print -.044 .105 -.422 
Source independence from state control -.107** .038 -2.852 
Overall evaluation of government actions .147*** .015 9.935 
(Constant) .056 .142 .392 
Model summary N = 35, R2 = .908, F = 73.604*** 
*p < .05,  **p < .01,  ***p < .001 
 
Table 1.4.3 shows that the reporting turnout rate is strongly predicted by the 
overall evaluation of the government actions and independence of the source from state 
control.  Both variables’ impact is in the expected direction, as turnout rate is coded 
reversely: as the source becomes more independent, the turnout rate moves away from 
the officially reported data by .107 units.  At the same time, as the overall evaluation of 
the government actions moves from negative to positive by 1 unit, the turnout rate 
increases toward the officially reported data by .147 units.  Neither the story source type 
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on the online/print dimension nor the off-line impact potential play a significant role in 
determining how the turnout rate is reported. 
Proceeding to Hypothesis 2(b), 42 of the 72 stories in the subsample discussed the 
violations and irregularities during the Referendum. Among them, 18 reported the 
official data that the violations were insignificant and did not influence the referendum 
outcome, and 24 reported the violations observed during the referendum either by their 
own staff (2 stories) or documented by NGOs and independent observers (22 stories).  
Table 1.4.4 reports the results of OLS regression analysis for this dependent variable, 
coded as 0=no violations reported, 1=violations and irregularities reported. 
Table 1.4.4. Reporting of Violations During the Referendum 
Independent variables B St. Error t 
Off-line impact potential -.034 .099 -.349 
Source type: online-print .085 .321 .264 
Source independence from state control .154 .129 1.190 
Overall evaluation of government actions -.096* .041 -2.366 
(Constant) .585 .416 1.408 
Model summary N = 42, R2 = .351, F = 5.009** 
*p < .05,  **p < .01,  ***p < .001 
 
In this model, only one of the independent variables – overall evaluation of the 
government actions – is a significant predictor of whether the violations were reported 
or not.  The relationship is also in the expected direction: as the overall evaluation of 
government actions moves from negative to positive by one unit, the reporting of 
violations decreases by .096 units.   
As for the types of violations reported, 18 stories mentioned multiple voting by the 
same people, usually transported from one polling station to another by the local 
government bodies, mass stuffing of ballots by one person, usually a local government 
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representative in the precinct election commission; 10 stories mentioned abuse of the 
migrant voters (citizens of Kyrgyzstan who work in Russia and Kazakhstan) as well as 
pressure on those who work or study in government offices and institutions; and 12 
stories mentioned threats to and obstructions for the work of independent observers. 
As for the reporting of the use of administrative resource (Hypothesis 2(c)), a total 
of 30 stories reported that it was used in one degree or another. Various types of 
reported administrative resource violation varied from the poor voter lists with 
numerous “dead souls” whose vote was easily manipulated, to interference by the 
precinct election commission chairs, transportation of voters to the polling stations, and 
irregularities in counting results.   
Table 1.4.5 presents the results from an OLS regression model where reporting of 
the use of administrative resource is a dependent variable, coded 0=no administrative 
resource use reported, 1=reported. 
Table 1.4.5. Reporting of Use of Administrative Resource During the Referendum 
Independent variables B St. Error t 
Off-line impact potential -.202** .068 -2.983 
Source type: online-print .723** .228 3.175 
Source independence from state control .037 .077 .480 
Overall evaluation of government actions -.107*** .077 -4.263 
(Constant) .866*** .252 3.431 
Model summary N = 72, R2 = .377, F = 10.136*** 
*p < .05,  **p < .01,  ***p < .001 
 
As the results show, in this regression model only one independent variable has no 
significant impact – independence of the source from the state control.  All the other 
variables are significant and in the expected direction: as the source becomes online and 
its off-line impact potential decreases, the reporting of the use of administrative resource 
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increases by .723 and .202 units respectively.  In addition, as the story’s overall 
evaluation of the government’s actions moves from negative to positive by one unit, its 
reporting of the use of administrative resource decreases by .107 units. 
Thus, from all three regression models above it may be concluded that Hypothesis 
2 is supported partially: a) source independence from government control is a better 
predictor for reporting lower turnout rates than whether the source is print or Internet-
based as it was hypothesized; b) overall evaluation of the government action predicts 
whether the source reported the violations during the Referendum better than any 
“demographic” variable of the subsample; and c) as it was hypothesized, online media 
indeed reported use of administrative resource more often than print media, but two 
other variables – offline impact potential and overall evaluation of the government 
actions are strong predictors of reporting administrative resource as well. 
Hypothesis 3 was formulated to see if there are differences in how the state print 
sources and independent Internet-based sources predict the future events and evaluate 
possible developments.  Of the 212 stories in the sample, 124 made some kind of 
prediction as to how the events will develop in the future, and of them 59 (47.6 per cent) 
stories took the pessimistic tone, 26 – neutral, and 39 (31.5 per cent) – optimistic.   
The results for the ordered logistic regression analysis for the evaluation of possible 
developments as pessimistic (coded 1), neutral (2) or optimistic (3) by source types are 
presented in Table 1.4.6.  As the results in Model 1 show, independence of the source 
matters in presenting the future scenarios as pessimistic or optimistic.  The state and 
conformist sources have an expected positive association with the evaluation of possible 
developments: as the source becomes state or conformist, the odds log ratio of the 
prediction becomes more optimistic compared to foreign sources, which serve as a base 
category in this model.   
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Even though the print or Internet-based character of the source does not have a 
significant effect, it is also in the expected direction.  Besides, for the purpose of this 
project the first finding, i.e. the state and conformist sources producing more optimistic 
predictions, is more important as these sources have more influence due to their 
outreach capacity in the real world. 
Table 1.4.6. Evaluation of Possible Developments as Optimistic or Pessimistic 
Model 1 Model 2 Independent (location) 
variables Estimate SE Wald Estimate SE Wald 
State-controlled sources 2.509** .792 10.024 -.079 .947 .007 
“Conformist” sources 1.597* .729 4.806 -1.021 .964 1.122 
Independent sources .057 .500 .013 -.757 .580 1.701 
Print source -.166 .384 .186 .082 .487 .029 
Strongly negative evaluation of 
government actions 
   -5.022*** .813 38.181 
Negative evaluation of 
government actions 
   -3.112*** .745 17.439 
Neutral evaluation of 
government actions 
   -2.360** .762 9.602 
Positive evaluation of 
government actions 
   -1.234^ .708 3.041 
(Threshold 1) .268 .461 .339 -3.551*** .874 16.504 
(Threshold 2) 1.299** .478 7.390 -1.985* .818 5.890 
Model summary N = 124, Cox & Snell Pseudo 
R2 = .167,    Χ2 = 22.663*** 
N = 124, Cox & Snell Pseudo 
R2 = .473,    Χ2 = 79.382*** 
^p<.10,  *p < .05,  **p < .01,  ***p < .001 
 
When the overall evaluation of government actions is introduced as an 
independent variable in Model 2, source independence and online/print type variables 
are statistically not significant.  However, since it was earlier established (see Table 
1.4.2) that both these variables have a significant effect on the overall evaluation of 
government actions, they have indirect effects on the evaluation of possible future 
events as well.  Compared to the strongly positive evaluation of government actions 
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(base category in the model), the remaining degrees of evaluation have a negative effect 
on prediction of future events as optimistic or pessimistic, which is expected.   
To give an idea of how pessimistic and optimistic scenarios differ, two quotes 
below represent an independent and a conformist source’s evaluation, respectively: 
Two scenarios are possible.  First, the opposition will give up and put up with 
the authoritarian stability, continuing economic stagnation and the "Asian mode of 
production" in its pure form. Second, the opposition will organize protests and 
resume the pseudo-democratic chaos that our NGOs and some political scientists 
are so proud of, but the normal people cannot live in. Two choices, one worse than 
the other.  
Interview with political scientist Alexandr Knyazev, Sept.24, 2007, Delo # 
 
It is doubtful, of course, that an average citizen will immediately feel all the 
advantages of leaving under new constitution. However I want to believe that we 
will be able to tell our main law 'good-bye' in our everyday life, and to bid 
farewell to demonstrations, protests, and Maidans. And in their turn our sky-
dwellers will finally deal with the economy separately from politics.  
“Time Will Not Wait," Oct.19, 2007, MSN 
 
 
As the later qualitative content analysis will show, these quotes are representative 
of the general “authoritarianism – sole responsibility” and “uncertainty – better life” 
frames in relation to the key players: the president, the parliament, and the people. 
Finally, Research Question 1 was formulated to see if the originality of material 
depends on the type of source.  This question was prompted by the fact that online 
sources are often accused of simply reprinting materials that appeared in other media.  
In many cases they do indeed reprint material from other sources because they lack staff 
and resources, including the sources of information, to come up with their own, 
original, material.  However, in many cases they add their own commentary and 
analysis to the borrowed material. 
To answer Research Question 1, the two key “demographic” variables – source 
independence of the state control and being print or online – were used as independent 
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variables in the multinomial logistic regression model where the originality of material 
is a dependent variable, coded as 1=borrowed, reprinted material, 2=borrowed material 
with own comment or analysis, and 3=mostly original material.  Borrowed, reprinted 
material serves as a base category in this multinomial regression. 
The results of the regression model presented in Table 1.4.7 show that compared to 
the foreign sources, both conformist and independent sources are more likely to publish 
original stories.  The source being state-controlled has no significant effect, but also has a 
positive association with the original material, while negative association – with 
borrowed material with commentary.  The online sources are likely to publish both 
borrowed material with commentary and original material. 
Table 1.4.7. Originality of Material by Key Sample Characteristics 
Borrowed Material with 
Commentary 
Original Material  
 
Independent variables B SE Wald B SE Wald 
State-controlled sources -.075 .908 .007 .329 .755 .190 
“Conformist” sources .853 .886 .927 1.451* .746 3.777 
Independent sources .741 .764 .941 2.261*** .630 12.858 
Online sources 1.695** .620 7.473 2.071*** .499 17.231 
(Intercept) -1.784** .690 6.690 -1.442* .593 5.917 
Model summary N = 212,   Cox & Snell Pseudo R2 = .173,   Χ2 = 40.382*** 
^p<.10,  *p < .05,  **p < .01,  ***p < .001 
 
These models suggest that all types of sources are likely to publish original 
material. Thus, originality of material used in stories may depend more on such factors 
as professionalism of the staff and access to data sources than independence from the 
state control or whether the source is print or Internet-based.  Further exploration of this 
issue, which is beyond this project, requires classification of sources by their staff 
capacity and access to information sources. 
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1.4.2 Qualitative Content Analysis 
Thematic clusters found in the three categories of qualitative frames under this 
study revealed that every frame the independent sources used in an attempt to make 
sense of what the government decisions, initiatives and actions meant for the key actors 
had its counterpart in the pro-government and conformist sources.  This is clearly seen 
in the frames explaining what the Constitutional Court decision and the referendum 
meant for President Bakiev.  Bek Orosaliev, Kommersant’s stringer in Kyrgyzstan, 
presents a neutral stance that can serve as a reference point: 
…in the fall [after the failed and suppressed opposition protests in April 2007], 
Kyrgyzstan's president decided to enforce his success by finishing off the current 
parliament that had acted many times against him. With a hint from the 
presidential administration, the Constitutional Court voided both Constitutions 
earlier adopted by the parliament. The head of the state has taken advantage of the 
authority returned to him under the old constitution by having initiated a 
referendum on constitutional amendments that would enforce the presidential 
authority and fully reform parliamentarianism in the country. Following the 
example of Russia and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz parliamentarians will now be elected 
exclusively by party lists and very few people doubt that the majority of seats will 
be taken by the presidential party.  
“Kurmanbek Bakiev showed Kyrgyzstan a 'Bright Way',”4 Oct.16, 2007, 
Kommersant 
 
Here, the paper, given its foreign status, takes a detached and non-judgmental 
stance toward the events, however, making a clear hint that Bakiev’s actions lead to a 
more authoritarian government system.  The domestic independent sources are more 
open in stating that authoritarianism was looming over the country.  They often do it 
indirectly, through the interviews and quotes from experts and public figures, which 
gives a certain credibility and ‘insurance’ in a political environment where alternative 
views can be persecuted by the government: 
                                                 
4 Play on words: in Kyrgyz, “Ak-Jol,” the name of the party Bakiev consolidated shortly before the referendum 
for the parliamentary elections, means “Bright/Clear Way.” 
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“The haste around the referendum is indicative of the fact that they [the 
authorities] simply want to get a super presidential constitution draft and secure 
their power. I am afraid that they will deceive only themselves, just like Akaev did 
in his time… With every passing day, we are shocked at how our authorities 
devolve, and this concerns the president himself. He says one thing, does the 
opposite, plans a third thing, and the outcome is always very complicated.“ 
Interview with an NGO leader Asiya Sasykbaeva, Sept.26, 2007, BPC 
 
The authorities seem to have completely forgotten that the difference between 
the De Gaulle's referendum in France and a referendum a la-post-Soviet-Asian 
style is like the one between the ground and the sky. We are left with nothing but 
to see the proof of the wisdom "referendum is a dictator's tool." And this is why 
the outcome of the newly declared Kyrgyz referendum is predetermined. 
“Under the Banner of Pack Leadership,” Oct.1, 2007, Delo # 
 
The president's supporters and the opposition that switched camps are building 
with their own hands a regime of authoritarian power, destroying the future of 
their country and their people, depriving them of the prospect for truly 
democratic development.  
"In Kyrgyzstan They Want to Use the Sweet Power," Oct.10, 2007, Tazar.kg 
 
This frame’s variations include the suggestions that Bakiev was building a 
monarchy, kingdom, dictatorship, or façade democracy (see Table 1.4.8 for the summary 
of frames relating to the president). Overall, this frame was most widely used by the 
regime opponents and is found in 32 stories. 
The counter frame used by the president’s supporters promoted the ideas that the 
president was moving toward “enlightened authoritarianism,” sovereign democracy 
similar to Russia and Kazakhstan, and strengthening of the state: 
Kazakhstan’s and Russia's realities, where the presidents head the strongest 
parties, show that this results into very good outcomes, both in economics and 
other areas. This is why I believe Kyrgyzstan needs a presidential party. 
Interview with parliament member Keldibekov, Sept.21, 2007, BPC 
 
Kurmanbek Bakiev is becoming a president by definition, acquiring the 
qualities and features of a leader, the main of which is the ability to take 
responsibility for everything happening in the country. Two years of uncertainty, 
extremes, doubts and confusion in mind and action have ended. A cold realization 
of the basics of history has come – the path from totalitarianism to democracy lies 
through strict authoritarianism… Enlightened authoritarianism is better than 
feudalism.  
“Steps the Whole Country Was Waiting For,” Oct.5, 2007, MSN 
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The last quote is also illustrative of a complementary frame relating to the threat of 
authoritarianism.  Where the president’s opponents were concerned about him 
consolidating authority and usurping power, his supporters talked about consolidation 
of society and taking full responsibility into his hands for the reforms and everything 
that was happening in the country.  Below are two quotes from both sides: 
Parliamentarian Sariev commented [on the new Constitution draft], "If we 
adopt the Constitution offered by the President, we will receive a strong head of 
the state with consolidated powers, who may become a dictator as time passes. 
Today, the main task is to adopt a conciliatory Constitution that would satisfy the 
key political players of the country."  
"New Constitution: Road to Dictatorship?" Oct.1, 2007, Oasis story on 
Centrasia.ru 
 
The decision to conduct a referendum on the constitutional reform is the only 
correct one. Today the head of the state has taken full responsibility upon himself 
during this complicated stage for Kyrgyzstan when we found ourselves in the 
judicial dead-end… I hope that the people's vote will finally put a stop to the 
pulling of the rope, when the parliament, instead of adopting good laws, is 
involved in relationship management.  
Interview with Issyk-Kul governor Isaev, Sept.21, 2007, Slovo Kyrgyzstana 
 
 
This longing for sole responsibility is deeply rooted in the authoritarian rule and is 
the legacy of the Soviet style of governance.  As MSN’s editorial put it in an attempt to 
explain why Kyrgyzstan’s citizens will vote for the president’s version of Constitution, 
"The people will vote for one-person responsibility for what is happening in the country. 
The long historical memory and healthy instinct prompt to the people that the collective 
responsibility is just universal irresponsibility" (“Steps the Whole Country Was Waiting 
for,” Oct.5, 2007).  
However, what the president’s proponents failed to mention is that such a 
responsibility is a heavy burden for a head of the state that has slowing economic 
growth and stalled reforms, complicated by high levels of corruption. Lawyer Gulnara 
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Iskakova, an expert in constitutional law and an active member of the Women in Politics 
network, has formulated this clearly: 
The president does not understand that his political technologists, who are 
staying in the shadow, have put a heaviest historical burden on him. The society 
will know: Bakiev has taken responsibility for EVERYTHING upon himself, and 
the curtailing of democracy and violation of freedoms and rights from now on will 
be the responsibility of one person. Will he be able to carry this burden, including 
struggling economy, in an economically poor country? And what is the society left 
with, when it is deprived of an opportunity to influence the power through 
democratic means? - To either keep silent or ... resist in some other ways. 
Interview with lawyer Gulnara Iskakova, Oct.24, 2007, Delo # 
 
 
Another persistent frame that appeared in many stories relates to the connection 
between the politics and economy.  The president and his proponents insisted that the 
2.5 years of political struggles between the government and opposition after March 2005 
had taken attention away from the economic problems.  MSN, for example, as well as 
Slovo Kyrgyzstana, quoted President Bakiev as he was voting in the referendum:  
During the last two years of the political chaos we've accumulated a number of 
serious economic problems. Wherever we look, we have problems: we need to 
repair roads, to build schools in remote areas, to rehabilitate the factories, and to 
increase pensions and salaries. And when do we have time to deal with this all, if 
our dear bureaucrats are involved only in political speculations and useless 
debates? This is why I believe that the referendum will put a stop, and after the 
adoption of the main law, which no one will be able to tailor for themselves any 
more, will start working on the economy. There's no other way, we have already 
lost a lot of time... This is why pulling the rope should end with the adoption of 
the Constitution. Where can the economy be developed successfully? Only in the 
countries where there is political stability. We are about to realize a lot of major 
projects, but we can implement them only under the conditions of political calm. 
“’Yes’ from the People,” Oct. 23, 2007, MSN 
 
 
Earlier, Slovo Kyrgyzstana published an interview with parliamentarian Tagaev, who 
formulated the same idea in more straightforward terms: 
It is high time for the executive power to start working for development and, 
implementing the President's instructions, develop the economy not on paper, but 
in reality. We've had enough of it! Enough political games, it's time to work.  
Quoted interview to 24.kg, Sept.21, 2007, Slovo Kyrgyzstana 
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To this, the independent newspaper Bely Parohod’s chief editor Elena Avdeeva 
answered in a sarcastic and poignant way, addressing her appeal to President Bakiev: 
Please do [deal with economy]! Our father, hope and foundation of the state, 
please deal with economy! This is the only thing we are praying for you to do. So 
why are you deviating again: declared a referendum, decided to dissolve the 
parliament and elect a new one. This is pure politics, is it not? Am I mistaken? – 
Oh, I am sorry. It was the president who said, "As soon as we conduct the 
referendum, the economy will rise." What does this mean? Is our economy a little 
trained doggy? It does everything on command, "Economy, sit! Economy, rise!" 
And if it does so, why didn't you command it to rise earlier? What have you been 
waiting for? – Ah, Referendum.  Yes, mister president, you indeed should be 
dealing with the economy rather than politics...  
“I am always thinking about my people,” Oct.1, 2007, Bely Parohod 
 
 
Here, a counter frame is expressed: the president’s inability to handle the 
opposition, blaming it for everything wrong that is happening in the country, including 
the price rise and the shortage of food products, as well as the executive power’s 
inability to improve the economy and people’s well-being.   
This frame also echoes another frame that is used to show that by the decision to 
conduct a referendum, the president has caught the opposition off guard and aims at 
weakening and eliminating his political opponents, as political analyst Ibraimov is 
quoted in a Centraisa.ru story:  
The president’s last step is a well-planned action to strengthen his position 
when the opposition is split into fractions and unable to fight him back… 
Referenda were always used in Kyrgyzstan as a means to promote the 
[government's] interests under the pretext of the people's well-being. 
“New Round of Constitutional Stand-off,” Oct.1, 2007 
 
 
To this, the president’s proponents would answer that eliminating unconstructive 
radical opposition will create a better environment for coordination and cooperation 
with other branches of power, which ultimately will benefit the people of Kyrgyzstan.  
Parliamentarian Tagaev’s quote is illustrative of this point of view:  
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Kyrgyzstan’s president has finished with those who were involved in political 
plotting and created tensions between the branches of power… Submitting the 
Constitution issue to a referendum is a logical last step in a long-overdue solution 
of this important problem [constitutional reform]. Let the people decide how we 
will live in the future.   
“The Plotting Will Finally End,” Sept.21, 2007, Slovo Kyrgyzstana 
 
 
Another persistent frame that is used intensively by the president’s opponents 
relates to local governance and is constructed in response to the accusations that in the 
new Constitution draft the president is expanding his powers to appointing key 
national-level and local government officers, thus building a vertical power structure.  
Again, an MSN’s editorial addressed this criticism in the following way: 
…the constitutional changes offered by Kurmanbek Bakiev give us all a chance 
to develop not only a new attitude to local government, but also to make a serious 
step toward building a real (and not declared by some political parties) civil 
society.  If we develop the interest in the actions of local government, the wish to 
control and ask of the local government, if every one of us knows that the local 
government is accountable to the people, there will be hope for developing 
genuine interest in big politics, and in the end – in participation of currently 
passive majority of our citizens in all the constructive political processes of the 
renewed Kyrgyzstan. And this, you have to agree, is one of the main features of a 
true rather than protest-driven democracy. 
“Local Self-Government or Small-Place Kings? The Choice Is Near,” Oct.12, 2007  
 
 
This passage sheds some light on why the whole idea of the referendum could 
appeal to the people who lack information about democratic practices and who 
developed fatigue from the “protest-driven” democracy.  The March 2005 Revolution 
was followed by a two-night large-scale looting of the capital city, which scared the 
Bishkek residents and ultimately devalued the meaning of the revolution itself.  Looting 
became engraved in their memories to the extent that on the Internet political sites the 
Revolution Day, which was declared a national holiday in March 2008, is often referred 
to as “The Looter’s Day.”  At the backdrop of this fear, any promise of stability and end 
to political battles would “buy” a concerned citizen’s vote. 
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Another frame that needs to be mentioned is the president’s confidence with his 
own people.  The oppositional leaders such as parliamentarian and former Speaker 
Omurbek Tekebaev were sure that President Bakiev was rushing the referendum 
because he was losing the support base among the citizens:  
“The president is losing people's support with every passing day. He wants to 
capitalize on his advantage before the New Year's and to secure his political 
future. If he receives the majority in the Parliament in one month, he will be able 
to avoid direct [presidential] election in 2010” 
"New Constitution: Road to Dictatorship?" Oct.1, 2007, Oasis story on Centrasia.ru 
 
 
The state and conformist sources responded to this by citing President Bakiev 
himself referring to the people’s wishes and desires.  The interview was taken when 
Bakiev was casting his vote in the referendum: 
"…[in my trips around the country] I have seen that the people are tired of 
politics. They demand, sometimes with reproach, that the constitutional reform 
must be completed. But you know the situation that we had during these two 
years while we were discussing the draft. At present everyone understands that 
there is no reason to delay this process anymore, and I believe that Kyrgyzstanis 
will show what they think during the referendum. I am deeply grateful to the 
people for their support of the state policy."  
“The Weather is Stable at the Referendum,” Oct. 23, 2007, Slovo Kyrgyzstana 
 
 
The president’s proponents would also say Bakiev came forward with the 
referendum initiative because he cared for the people and wanted to fulfill the promise 
of the constitutional reform that will result into better democracy:  
“When I meet the region citizens, they tell me that the referendum is a 
necessity. The participants of such meetings lay great hopes on parliamentary 
elections by party lists that will end tribalism and regionalism in the parliament, 
will make the electoral process more open and prevent taking the political 
conflicts into the streets.” 
Interview with Jalal-Abad governor Aidaraliev, Oct.5, 2007 Slovo Kyrgyzstana 
 
 
Another claim made by the president’s proponents in relation to his level of 
confidence with the people is that by putting the trust in the people through the 
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referendum President Bakiev in fact is confident that they will support his initiatives, 
which also shows his strength as the country’s leader and strategist: 
We've been waiting for the president to make these steps for a long time, and, 
having read the draft constitution, I cannot hide my satisfaction because the ideals 
of our Revolution have not been destroyed. The president has finally steered to the 
right path of democratization… After the Constitutional Court decision, we cannot 
just sit and wonder which constitution will govern our lives. We have found 
ourselves in a judicial vacuum, and this can cause various negative consequences. 
So I believe that the speedy referendum was an absolutely correct decision… The 
president becomes a growing, understanding person moving forward into the 
future. The last 2.5 years taught him a good political lesson and as I understand he 
wants to remain in history. He wants to introduce real changes toward 
development and democratization of the society. 
Interview with Rosa Otunbaeva, Sept.20, 2007, BPC 
 
 
This statement comes Rosa Otunbaeva, one of the March 2005 Revolution leaders, 
who was after the revolution appointed the Minister of Foreign Affairs but then parted 
ways with the president and became a co-leader of an opposition party.  While some 
analysts were surprised by her favorable assessment of the Referendum initiative, others 
said that it was not totally unexpected.  In December 2007 parliamentary elections 
Otunbaeva became a parliament member from the Social Democratic Party of 
Kyrgyzstan (SDPK).  The party used to be in opposition to the president but ultimately 
joined the ranks of parties that supported the idea of the referendum from the time it 
was announced.   
Otunbaeva received her spot on the SDPK list after one of the party leaders was 
disqualified for allegedly having a double citizenship with Kazakhstan. As one of the 
newspaper’s editors put it,5 “after all, Kyrgyz politics is more about deals and bargains 
rather than promoting true democratic values and principles.” 
                                                 
5 Personal interview, December 17, 2007. The editor agreed to give an interview under the condition of 
confidentiality. 
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Table 1.4.8.  Frames Relating to President Bakiev’s Actions and Motivations 
# Negative frame Number 
of stories 
found in 
Positive frame Number 
of stories 
found in 
1. Aiming at creating a “pocket” 
parliament through 
(a) Creating own party that 
will get the majority of seats in 
the parliament and follow 
presidential orders 
6 
 
11 
Creating a responsible, 
representative and supportive 
parliament through  
(a) Creating a party of and for the 
people, a party of supporters that 
will implement presidential policies 
and set up good order in society 
4 
 
 
5 
2. Creating authoritarianism, 
super-presidentialism, 
monarchy, dictatorship, or 
“façade” democracy 
32 Moving to “enlightened 
authoritarianism,“ “sovereign” 
democracy, strengthening the state, 
bringing security and stability 
14 
3. Consolidating more power, 
usurping power 
17 Consolidating the society, taking 
responsibility into one’s hands 
18 
4. Tailoring the constitution for 
own needs 
5 Completing the long-overdue 
constitutional reform 
9 
5. Weakening and eliminating 
political opposition 
8 Creating opportunities for better 
coordination and cooperation with 
other branches of power, eliminating 
unconstructive radical opposition 
6 
6. Building vertical power 
structure, acquiring more 
control over local government 
4 Improving local governance through 
stronger and more accountable local 
executive bodies that will meet the 
people’s needs  
14 
7. Rushing events out of despair 
to stay in power in anticipation 
of harder economic times; 
losing support among people 
4 Speeding up the reform to fulfill the 
promise to the people; growing as a 
leader and strategist 
8 
8. Unable to tolerate and work 
with the opposition, to 
respond to criticism and to 
improve the people’s well-
being 
6 Putting an end to political conflicts 
so that attention and effort can be 
focused on economics 
8 
9. Manipulating the trust of the 
people by asking to approve 
overly complex legislation 
4 Soliciting support for initiatives and 
legitimization of the new 
Constitution draft from the people 
who elected him 
6 
10. Game metaphor: preventive 
strike, distraction maneuver 
2 Getting ahead in the game, making a 
quicker move, outwitting the 
opposition 
3 
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Finally, one more frame that deserves a closer look is the opposition’s projections 
that President Bakiev was going to create a “pocket,” easy-to-manipulate parliament 
through establishing his own presidential party that would take the majority of seats in 
the new parliamentary elections.  As the leader of the United Front Opposition 
Movement Felix Kulov stated at a press conference after the referendum, 
The referendum and its preceding events showed that the presidential 
administration bet the bank. If they get less than 50 per cent of votes, the 
opposition forces in the new parliament will raise the issue of a pre-term 
presidential election, since the new Constitution expands the president's authority. 
This is why it is necessary [for the presidential party] to get the majority of votes, 
to block any decisions by the opposition if it gets to the parliament. Therefore, the 
issue of getting more than 50 per cent of votes for the executive power is the issue 
of life and death. 
"’Ar-Namys’ Party Will Run for Parliament, Possibly with Another Party," 
Oct.23, 2007, AKI-Press 
 
 
Political journalist Semetei Amanbekov also expressed the widely shared concern 
about the upcoming parliamentary elections, but went further to draw a parallel 
between President Bakiev’s actions and the pre-revolutionary events in 2005: 
The party in power will get the most seats in the new parliament. Those in the 
opposition who did not switch camps will not be let into the parliament. This 
means that in our time when everything is sold and bought, representatives of 
major businesses will get into the legislature (again!). This situation is similar to 
the parliamentary elections in 2005. At that time the experiment resulted into 
multitude of opposition protests and the March 24, 2005 coup with the complete 
failure of the previous regime. Will the situation repeat this time? 
"Will Bakiev become his own party's general secretary and Kyrgyzbashi of all 
Kyrgyz people?" Sept 21, 2007, Komsomolskaya Pravda in Kyrgyzstan 
 
 
The state and conformist newspapers dismissed these concerns again by quoting 
President Bakiev, this time from his program speech at the founding congress of the Ak-
Jol party on October 15, 2007: 
The party's name has two main meanings: first of all we created a party of the 
people and for the people. I see this as your role and mine. The second meaning is 
movement forward, aimed at development and future of Kyrgyzstan. I am sure 
that our path will be clear and bright and will lead our country to great prosperity. 
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We need a party exactly like this. You know that we have over 100 parties. But 
what of them? Among them, there are very few that would be brave enough to 
take responsibility for everything that happens.  
"Clear Path You Are Taking, Comrades!" Oct.16, 2007, MSN 
 
At best, everyone is simply criticizing the executive power and our mistakes. 
And who will and should make things happen? Until today, there was no political 
force in the country that would undertake the work, achieve the goals and meet 
the challenges the country faces. This is why I myself made a decision to create it 
as a new political force, a party of creation, responsibility and action. 
“President’s Speech at Ak-Jol Founding Congress,” Oct.15, 2007, Slovo Kyrgyzstana 
 
 
The message here is clear: a new party, of the people and for the people is needed 
to move the country forward.  Given how the party was created, from the name 
announcement through founding congress to legal registration in one day, and how 
quickly it expanded its membership in less then a week before the Referendum, no one 
doubted that it would indeed take the majority of seats in the new parliament.   
One peculiarity of Kyrgyzstan’s journalism should help put all these various 
frames into a perspective.  The concept of balanced stories has not taken root in local 
newspapers, and this is why the coverage usually presents only one side of the story.  
Moreover, as the analysis above shows, the newspapers prefer to quote directly the 
experts and public figures they interview or record at press conferences, without much 
elaboration or analysis of what is being said.  
They do this because they operate in a highly sensitive political environment, 
under the constant pressure of libel law and accusations of inaccuracy.  If they present 
the other side’s viewpoint, they usually do it in a sarcastic and mocking tone.  One last 
example of a frame relating to President Bakiev is illustrative of this misbalance.  In an 
editorial, MSN attempted to summarize all the opposition’s claims and concerns about 
the Constitution draft:  
The most criticism is around the [draft constitution’s] article on parliamentary 
elections and power of the executive and legislature, i.e. president and parliament. 
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The parliamentarians, already caught in the pre-election fever, maintain that the 
draft Constitution submitted to the Referendum will turn Kyrgyzstan toward 
dictatorship and away from democracy.  To sum up all the claims and statements 
of the opposition, the following picture emerges: we are under a threat of a one-
party state headed by an autocrat plus absolutely spineless government and 
"pocket" parliament. 
Moreover, as they claim, we have such weak parties that they will not be able to 
compete meaningfully for the electorate’s votes, and for prevalence in the 
parliament. This is why it is too early to form the parliament by party lists only. 
When such statements are uttered, and, as a rule, by the opposition that wanted to 
get everyone "down with," [from the power structures] it is extremely surprising. 
 "Uncertainty Does Not Work," Sept.28, 2007, MSN 
 
 
Using a mocking and sarcastic tone, the editorial simply laundry lists the key 
concerns discussed in this framing analysis earlier, without giving them any due 
consideration or benefit of analysis, bluntly dismissing them as “surprising” and 
laughable.  This journalistic “device” is widely used in Kyrgyzstan’s journalism by both 
oppositional and pro-governmental sources, and the readers are left with their own 
judgment (or lop-sided information, in case when they have no access to alternative 
sources of view) to decide whose wit is on top of the situation. 
As for the frames relating to the Parliament, here the most prevailing frame was 
neutral, simply stating that the Constitutional Court decision renders the parliament 
illegitimate.  This frame was used by both the state and independent sources, and of 150 
stories in the sample that tried to make sense of what the decision meant for the 
Parliament, 78 used the neutral frame (see Table 1.4.9).   
In their analysis, all sources using the neutral frame were unanimous in the 
opinion that if the Referendum approved Bakiev’s Constitution draft, the pre-term 
Parliament’s dissolution and new parliamentary elections would be inevitable.  To 
understand the neutrality of the frame, it is necessary to remember that this parliament 
had been elected under the first president, Askar Akaev, and in many ways was the 
reason for the March 2005 revolution.  It was always referred to as “Akaev parliament” 
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and perceived as unconstructive and self-serving, comprised of businessmen6 and mafia 
who had bought their seats and manipulated the voting process. This also explains why 
six stories in the sample used a strongly negative frame stating that the parliament 
poorly represented the people and deserved to be dissolved.  As one of the political 
activists of a younger generation and member of Social Democratic Party Edil Baisalov 
noted after the parliament was dissolved upon the results of the referendum,  
The parliament's dissolution was absolutely predictable and did not come 
unexpected. To be honest, no one in Kyrgyzstan is crying about this parliament. 
Of course, I feel bad for some deputies, among them there were many of my good 
comrades, many a good parliamentary star, and I don't think all of them will come 
back to parliament. However this Parliament buried itself in December last year, 
and the fact that it was dissolved and not self-dissolved is the result of its actions 
last year. They should have announced pre-term parliamentary elections then or 
fought for the November constitution with everything they had. This disgraceful 
end was predicted last December. Already at that time people said that it [the 
parliament] was incompetent and morally and politically bankrupt. 
Interview with Baislalov, Oct.22, 2007, BPC 
 
 
What Baisalov means here is that when the Parliament bargained with the 
presidential administration under the threat of dissolution in December 2007, it gave in 
to the self-preservation instinct rather than the interests of the people it was supposed to 
represent.  As a result, the parliament lost its trust and credibility with the people.   
However, many analysts argued there were still groups in the parliament that 
actively opposed the president, and such opposition was valuable simply because it 
existed, if nothing else.  As an opposition parliament member put it, the parliament’s 
dissolution created political uncertainty and the situation where the president had 
unlimited power since he would perform the legislative function as well in the absence 
of a parliament: 
                                                 
6 This was also the only of four Kyrgyz parliaments since independence that had no women in it.  
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“Now our president is the tsar and God, because his decree will be the highest 
law in the land, superseding the Constitution. The actions and decision by the 
head of the state will fully depend on his whim, on what kind of mood he has in 
the morning or evening. Today, the president's options are limited only by his 
fantasies. We may see some totally unexpected actions...” 
Interview with Parliament member Alymbekov, Oct.27, 2007, BPC 
 
 
In response to this, the pro-presidential minds kept saying that the political 
uncertainty was only temporary and elimination of this uncertainty was the reason to 
conduct parliamentary elections as soon as possible.  This situation was actually 
favorable, they would say, because it cleared the field for new political players, i.e. the 
parties that were going to run for parliament. Moreover, because after the Referendum’s 
approval of the Election Code the parliamentary elections will be based on party lists, 
the country and the people now had a chance at better legislature: 
Kyrgyzstanis now have a chance to change everything for the better. The recent 
unification of the political forces of the country and the upcoming elections by 
party lists will inevitably filter out "the political nutshells" and will bring into the 
Parliament (and local bodies) not the populists and dilettantes as it happened 
often before, but professionals aimed at a comprehensive reform of the economy. 
"We've Made Our Choice, It's Time to Get to Work," Oct.24, 2007, Slovo 
Kyrgyzstana 
 
 
Not everyone, however, shared this optimism.  The reason largely was that with 
the use of the notorious administrative resource, the presidential Ak-Jol party expanded 
its membership aggressively, often by forcing government employees to join.  It was 
also favored by all executive levels that had control over the parliamentary election 
campaign, starting from venues for meetings with the electorate and ending with air 
time on radio and TV and printing of party publications in state-run print shops. 
Many president’s critics said that the parties from the very beginning had an 
unequal start, and projected that Ak-Jol would take the majority of the seats in the 
parliament, with the help of the administrative resource: 
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Ak-Jol and other two or three pro-presidential parties may receive a majority in 
the parliament. At least, the executive power is sure it will achieve this. As you 
saw, the referendum showed 80 per cent turnout, but there are not that many 
people in Kyrgyzstan now. I thought they'd do 60-65 per cent, but they aimed 
higher and produced 80 per cent! 
Interview with Ata-Meken party leader Chotonov, Oct.22, 2007, BPC 
 
 
For the most part, the president’s supporters would ignore these projections and 
shift focus to the new opportunities that the Electoral Code provided for the parties.  
Table 1.4.9.  Frames Explaining What Constitutional Court/Referendum Decisions 
Mean for the Parliament 
# Negative frame Number 
of stories 
found in 
Positive frame Number 
of stories 
found in 
1. Neutral frame: the Constitutional Court and Referendum decisions make the current 
parliament illegitimate; pre-term dissolution and new elections are therefore 
inevitable 
78 
2. Parliament becomes illegitimate, 
political uncertainty 
4 Uncertainty is temporary, gives a 
chance for a better legislature 
18 
3. Unequal conditions at start, one 
party will get it all 
11 Competition among parties, party 
pluralism, stronger individual 
parties 
8 
4. Elections will be even more 
rigged than the Referendum 
3 End of tribalism and regionalism in 
parliament elections on individual 
tickets 
5 
5. Parliament will lose its powers, 
will play by Bakiev’s rules 
12 Parliament will share responsibility, 
improve local governance 
5 
6. Parliament poorly represented 
people in the first place, 
deserved to be dissolved 
6 Total stories with both negative and 
positive frames 
150 
 
 
Since the elections will be proportionate and based on party lists, the president’s 
supporters maintained, it will allow for better competition among parties, party 
pluralism, and strengthening and maturation of existing parties.  As the Movement for 
Constitutional Reform and Development put it in its triumphant and optimistic address 
to the nation immediately after the Referendum,  
 43 
October 21 Referendum and the constitutional reform have set the country's 
course for the future.  Now we all together will be able to direct our abilities and 
energy for the development of the economy and the country's movement forward. 
We want and we need to create party pluralism, support the responsible and 
effective executive, achieve consolidation of all political forces and the society. 
Oct.23, 2007, Slovo Kyrgyzstana 
 
 
Again, the president’s opponents did not share this optimism, concerned about the 
openness and transparency of the upcoming elections.  As parliamentarian Baibolov 
warned, the power of administrative resource could create an even more authoritarian 
regime, unless all protest electorate united and voted against Ak-Jol: 
Much depends on what kind of elections we will have. If the elections were 
democratic and open, the opposition would get 80 per cent of the parliament seats. 
But in our conditions, when a hammer is the authorities’ main tool, the situation 
will develop differently. Most probably, the Kyrgyz tolerant mentality will allow 
the authoritarian regime to exist for some time. If the protest electorate does not 
unite to act as one front, we’ll have problems. 
Interview with parliamentarian Baibolov, Sept.21, 2007, 24.kg 
 
 
Another frame where both camps agreed is that electing parliamentarians by party 
lists would produce a better legislature.  Several parties, both supporting and opposing 
the presidential policies, came together in the following statement: 
Elections by a majority vote in single-ticket districts have resulted into 
flourishing of clan interests and strengthening of regionalism, unrestrained 
ambitions of certain politicians. Taking this into account, we, representatives of 
political parties, despite the diversity of opinions and views, are united in our 
support for the timely implementation of the Referendum and urgency of the 
issues it is to resolve.  
“Several Political Parties Support the Idea of Referendum,” Sept.25, 2007, 
Fergana.ru 
 
 
The party-lists proportionate representation seemed better than the previous 
single-mandate system with its wide-spread vote-buying, pressure on the members of 
the same clan, and regionalism. However, after the Referendum president’s opponents 
doubted that the new electoral system will fix the election problems like a magic wand.  
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On the contrary, as an independent journalist Oleg Pankratov noted, with the extent of 
the administrative resource the executive power utilized to get the Referendum 
approval, it became clear that the opposition already lost the parliamentary elections: 
This new 'success' of the president and his team should be a good lesson for the 
opposition. The opposition leaders’ naïveté starts to bore already. All opposition 
parties let the referendum 'fly by' in the hope to retaliate at the parliamentary 
elections. However, the referendum was not only a way to legitimize 
authoritarianism. This was a rehearsal for the parliamentary elections. Obvious 
shortcomings visible even to unsophisticated ordinary people will be carefully 
polished.  At the parliamentary elections the script will be more elaborate, the 
actors will hone their skills and roles, and the administrative resource at work will 
look like 'the triumph of democracy and truly authentic expression of the people's 
will.' So, dear opposition representatives, get ready for the next failure!   
“Preliminary results of the referendum. Projections or…,” Oct. 22, 07, 
Centrasia.ru  
 
 
This gloomy projection came true when the presidential Ak-Jol party took 71 (78 
per cent) of the 90 seats in the new parliament as a result of December 16, 2007 elections. 
The remaining frame listed in Table 1.4.9 (Item 5) closely relates to the 
“authoritarianism – sole responsibility” frame discussed earlier. The differences are that 
it is focused on the parliament rather than on the president and that in both the negative 
and positive frame the parliament is given a secondary role, whether it is to merely 
validate the president’s policies or to share the responsibility with him. 
To summarize, the frames relating to the parliament were not as strong, intense 
and polarized as the frames relating to the president.  This is partly due to the fact that 
from the very beginning the parliament was thought of as the one the country was stuck 
with because of the legal complexities after the March 2005 Revolution, but it never 
represented the people well.  This is why when the parliament was dissolved after the 
referendum, very few experts went beyond discussing the individual personalities and 
the parliament-president stand-off.  One of such experts was a constitutional lawyer 
Gulnara Iskakova: 
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The parliament's dissolution is a result of a serious political crisis… and in our 
case – the power struggle against Bakiev and his political whim… Parliamentary 
elections by party lists will not be a step toward democratization and stability, but 
more tightening the screws… On the grand scale of things, all our constitutional 
struggles were about one dilemma: whether the president shares the access to 
power (i.e., to economic resources as well) or he does not share with anybody. He 
has chosen the second. But the people would have been better off with the first. 
Interview with Gulanara Iskakova, Oct.24, 2007, Delo # 
 
 
Iskakova correctly pointed out that the dissolution was a structural crisis that 
would effect the Kyrgyz democracy overall and a power-sharing agreement between the 
president and Ak-Jol party. Indeed, as the recent events show, the parliament simply 
performs the function of validating presidential administrations’ decisions. For instance, 
on April 10, 2008, the Parliament ratified the border agreement with Kazakhstan, 
according to which some of the Kyrgyz lands will be given to the neighboring republic.  
This decision was made amidst protests from the non-Ak-Jol party members and was 
met with the indignation by many experts and citizens on various Internet forums. 
Finally, the frames relating to the people and democracy were fewer to be found.  
Of the total 212 sample stories, 93 tried to make sense of what the referendum initiative 
meant for the people (see Table 1.4.9).  Of the four frames, two (Items 3 and 4) were the 
variations of the frames discussed earlier in this analysis relating to authoritarianism 
and party pluralism.  The most important two frames that were persistent in the stories 
and different from the frames discussed earlier were (1) the ability of the people to 
navigate in the complex political environment and make an intelligent, educated 
decision at the Referendum and (2) people’s function as the ultimate carriers of 
democracy (see Items 1 and 2 in Table 1.4.10).  These frames deserve closer analysis. 
In the first case, the human rights activists were concerned that Kyrgyzstanis had 
neither enough time to study the draft legislation nor sufficient expertise to understand 
its complexities.  A number of NGOs have put together an address to President Bakiev 
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with a request to postpone the referendum for a later date because "The people of the 
Kyrgyz Republic, as the only carrier of power, must have all opportunities to discuss the 
Constitution and the Election Code drafts and make a conscious and intelligent choice of 
the system of governance."7 As the Director of Citizens Against Corruption Center 
Ismailova stated, the rushed presidential decision threatened the entire democratic 
system in Kyrgyzstan, having put a heavy decision-making burden on the people: 
How is it possible to have a referendum where the citizens of Kyrgyzstan are 
supposed to say literally 'yes' or 'no' on the entire new Constitution draft and 
Election Code? There’s nothing like this in any country of the world. Of course the 
procedures are violated. A referendum with no democracy is a violation of the 
standards for honest, transparent procedures for adoption of the new constitution. 
Why is the highest power of the country not meeting its international obligations, 
ignores opinion of the public and does not consult with all interested parties, but 
simply imposes a referendum? This is a clear threat to the political pluralism, 
development of pluralism, democratic parliamentarianism and civil society. 
“Deuche Welle: Kyrgyzstan is not ready for Referendum,” Oct.4, 2007, Centrasia.ru 
 
 
Again, the president’s supporters responded to this with the trusted device – the 
use of sarcasm and mockery: 
…perpetually disagreeing human rights advocates and some oppositionists 
who survived the political battles loudly maintain that it is not proper to make the 
people vote on the Constitution and Election Code. Allegedly, the ordinary people 
will not be able to understand the legal 'forest' and to find a way out of the 
constitutional maze, while even sophisticated scientists and legal experts are still 
lost among the three threes. And in general, this is not for the people to decide. 
…But… as it turns out Kyrgyzstanis (the voters comprise about 3.5 million not 
taking into account the citizens of Kyrgyzstan who work and reside abroad), worn 
out by endless street Maidans, will be happy to go in neat lines to the Referendum 
and vote for the Constitution favored by the politicians, lest to be swept by the 
protest psychosis again. 
 “Constitution? There is no alternative,” Oct.2, 2007, MSN 
 
 
They also quoted President Bakiev to point out what was obvious to them but not 
to the president’s opponents:  
                                                 
7 "Civil society requests to recall President Bakiev's Decree on Referendum," Sept.21, 2007, 24.kg 
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This draft Constitution has been born in suffering, and there is enough time for 
the people to study it before the Referendum. We've been discussing this for two 
years now, people are already in the know  
“Bakiev: I Will Not Stay President a Single Day Beyond My Term,” Sept.24, 
2007, Obschestvenny Rating 
 
 
This widely-shared belief by the president’s supporters that the people have been 
following the debate around the constitutional reform was, however, overestimated: as 
the exit polls at the Referendum showed, most people did not know what the changes in 
the Constitution were about, they simply voted “for” because they wanted peace and 
stability.  As the OSCE/ODIHR report on the pre-term parliamentary election stated, 
The conduct of the referendum was criticized by domestic observers and 
representatives of the international community in Bishkek. Observers also said 
that the contents of the documents adopted by referendum were largely unknown 
to citizens (OSCE/ODIHR, Nov. 2008, p.3). 
 
 
However, the president’s supporters insisted a broad discussion of the constitution 
draft was not necessary because it had been discussed enough.  More important, in their 
opinion, was that the people were given a chance to end the political battles and 
instability, as well as to participate in shaping the system of governance (Frame 2):  
For the people, it is important to put a stop to the [political] arguments. They do 
not care who will be in power. They prefer one ruler, not the crowd that has so 
many varying opinions that it is impossible to reach a compromise. A citizen 
desires to get a law providing a mechanism for its realization. The people want to 
be sure that the authority they delegated to their government representatives can 
be revoked using the law rather than the street power.  For example, currently the 
Kyrgyz representatives are simply impossible to recall. Only to take out by force. 
But to say good-bye to their representatives should be, just as Ostap Bender 
advised, similar to parting with money – easy and without moans. Especially 
because our life is such that the laws for the common good are written by one 
category of people while the others have to live by them. 
“Law?-Here's the law! The country before the referendum,” Oct.1, 2007, Kabar 
 
 
There is a subtle irony that this passage quotes Ostap Bender, a fictional character 
from a satirical Soviet novel, who was and is still considered to be an unsurpassed 
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master of elegant and refined charlatanism.  Not to read too deep into the meaning, the 
question a critical reader would ask is to what extent the government is willing and able 
to fool, similarly to Ostap Bender, its own people.  Another question is why the author is 
concerned about no mechanism to recall the parliament members, but fails to mention 
that no Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic had a mechanism to impeach the president. 
Of course, the president’s proponents also knew how to use the “correct” rhetoric 
of citizen participation, without evoking the double reading of what is being said. Here 
is an example from a report on the referendum process, where a very optimistic mayor 
of Bishkek Daniar Usenov happily reported no violations observed in the city and 
proceeded to make this up-beat statement: 
This issue [constitutional reform] should have been resolved a long time ago. 
The constitutional process has been long overdue, and the main law of the country 
has been turned into a subject of political bargaining in the race for political scores. 
In the end, the people is the only source of the state power, not a handful of 
politicians, and only the people will decide which Constitution will govern and 
develop the country. 
“’Yes’ from the People,” Oct.23, 2007, MSN 
 
 
More sober independent journalists, however, correctly predicted that people will 
be used again as a toy in the political games and will be deceived by the endless 
promises of better life.  As Elena Avdeeva, chief editor of Bely Parohod, noted in one of 
her editorials after the Referendum and in anticipation of the parliamentary elections, 
ultimately nothing will change, if not become worse because of the worsening economic 
situation and failed state policies: 
Both you, my dear and much-suffering people, and I will have to wait just a 
little bit more [till parliamentary elections]. Well, we'll wait. Although you and I 
won't be asked about anything any more, they have already decided everything. 
The Parliamentary elections will be announced valid with 75 per cent turnout. 
And of course, you, my people, will vote in the 'overwhelming majority' for the 
presidential party. Who will suppress whom in this – the answer is clear… 
Presidential dictatorship will be declared the people's will.  
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And you, my people, will not be surprised, or at least you won't be thinking 
about that. Because in the winter there will be no gas and power in the country... 
“Migrating Eagles, or When Is the Abroad Going to Help Kyrgyzstan?” Oct.24, 
2007, Bely Parohod 
 
 
At the end of the article, Avdeeva concludes that the government of Kyrgyzstan 
had mismanaged the country so badly and drove it into such a serious crisis that only an 
immediate and urgent interference by the international community could help recover 
the situation (hence the title). 
Table 1.4.10.  Frames Explaining What Constitutional Court/Referendum Decisions 
Mean for the People and Democracy 
# Negative frame Number 
of stories 
found in 
Positive frame Number 
of stories 
found in 
1. Not enough time to study the 
Constitution draft; no expertise 
to evaluate its advantages and 
shortcomings 
9 People do not need much time, since 
the constitutional reform and the 
draft has been discussed for 2.5 
years; expertise not needed as only 
approval in principle is solicited 
4 
2. People are easy to manipulate, 
which showed in the rigged 
referendum; treated as a toy in 
political games; the government 
betrayed the people’s trust, 
threw a direct challenge to them 
26 People are given a chance to decide 
and participate in governance, to 
exercise their ultimate power as 
carries of democracy; thus the 
government shows the highest level 
of trust in the people 
16 
3. After the referendum: worse 
life, increased poverty, 
increased displeasure with 
government 
11 Improved life, stable political and 
economic development, unification 
of society 
13 
4. Fatigued of uncertainty, political 
battles and stand-offs, people 
will vote for anything 
6 End of political battles will bring 
better representation in parliament, 
people will make conscious choices 
of candidates from the political 
parties 
8 
Total: 93 
 
 
While Avdeeva was criticized from all sides, including the opposition, that her 
appeal was undermining the sovereignty of Kyrgyzstan as an independent country, her 
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sharp observation on the power of manipulation (“presidential dictatorship will be 
declared the people’s will”) is valuable, especially because hers was the only newspaper 
that transmitted it into the open, off-line world of Kyrgyzstan’s politics and public life. 
To summarize, this analysis of what a specific government decision (Referendum 
initiative) means for the key players – the president, the parliament, and the people – 
shows that the media coverage was extremely polarized and almost perfectly mirrored: 
for every negative frame from the president’s opponents, his supporters produced a 
rough equivalent on the positive side.  The differences were in the emphasis and 
intensity of each frame, as well as in the message dominance and frequency of use. 
To leave off this part of the analysis, I would like to conclude with a quote from a 
political analyst Tamerlan Ibraimov, who was among the very few able to maintain a 
detached and fair point of view on the Kyrgyz governments’ political short-sidedness: 
…the proposed [Constitution] draft reflects the state of things in this very short 
period of time. It gives considerable powers to the president, creates obstacles for 
opposition and does not allow any of the branches of power to balance the 
others… It does not reflect the real composition and disposition of political forces, 
if we look into the country's future even half a year ahead. There are significant 
power forces disagreeing with the draft and they will fight for their position. Their 
opinion was not taken into account, and this is a source of future conflicts. 
“Constitutional Reform in Kyrgyzstan Is a Crisis We Cannot Overcome,” 
Oct.10, 2007 24.kg 
 
 
Ibraimov’s predictions seem to be coming true: four months after the 
parliamentary elections, the government of Kyrgyzstan has not been able to resolve the 
energy crisis and to improve the economy, the parliament is simply ratifying the 
president’s decisions on border agreements and privatization of important 
infrastructural assets, and the opposition is gaining its momentum in gathering the 
largest organized congresses of people’s delegates from various regions of the country 
since before the March 2005 Revolution.  
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1.5 Conclusions 
This chapter presented a content analysis of the media messages covering a 
decision of the president of Kyrgyzstan to enlist support of his nation in adopting a 
crucial piece of legislation.  The new legislation – a new version of the Constitution and 
the Election Code – on the one hand effectively restored the parliamentary system 
through reinstating elections by party lists, but on the other hand expanded the 
president’s authority to appoint key positions in the government and to form his own 
party that later became a majority party in the parliament.  In a country like Kyrgyzstan, 
where democracy has not taken deep root yet, such decisions may result into negative 
consequences and a slide to authoritarianism.   
The media, with their power to shape perceptions of such events for the people, 
play a crucial role in whether the president’s decision will be supported.  The 
government controls, directly or indirectly, most of the media space in Kyrgyzstan, and 
the logical assumption of this research project was that the online media, which remain 
largely free of government control, would be more critical in their evaluations of the 
president’s initiatives in terms of good governance practices. 
The findings from the analysis of 212 media stories covering the referendum and 
relating events have shown that the mode of production – print or online – defines how 
critically the media in general evaluated the government actions in terms of good 
governance, but not the evaluation of the Constitutional Court/Referendum decision.  
However, a much stronger predictor of both overall evaluation of government actions 
and specific assessment of the Constitutional Court/Referendum decision is the source 
independence from the government control.  This is not surprising and does not 
contradict logic – an independent source, print or online, is expected to take a more 
critical stance towards the government by definition.   
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Another significant finding from this research project is that the state-controlled 
and conformist media were more likely to give positive evaluations of the president’s 
initiatives, thus reinforcing the status quo, according to Ross & Bantimaroudis (2006) 
function of framing.  This is extremely important in the environment where the 
independent media are cornered into a very small niche and have a much lower impact 
than the state and conformist sources that traditionally have larger readerships.  It is, 
perhaps, these sources’ visibility and domination in the public domain that at least 
partly explain why the citizens of Kyrgyzstan supported the president’s initiative 
through the referendum – they were simply not exposed to alternative interpretations 
and explanations.  And those who were, preferred not to vote at all, having given up 
their vote to the skillful use of the notorious administrative resource. 
Interestingly enough, it is the reporting of the use of administrative resource, i.e. 
the ability of the executive bodies to influence the outcome of elections in various forms, 
that supported the initial hypotheses of this paper: the online sources and sources with 
lower off-line impact potential were more likely to report the administrative resource 
use. Since this is a most serious violation that took place during the referendum, it went 
largely unreported for the print media audiences.  This means that the online media do 
demonstrate higher potential for critical evaluation of the government actions in light of 
good governance, especially when its principles are violated. 
The key policy implication of this research is that independent media and 
independent media online in particular should be supported and developed in countries 
like Kyrgyzstan to provide alternative voices critically evaluating the government 
actions and initiatives in terms of good governance practices.  Even though the online 
media impact is currently much lower than the print media, with the number of Internet 
users steadily growing this may be an effective way for the opposition to influence the 
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public, especially if the Internet users are willing to share the information they receive 
online with those who do not have access.  Future research, however, should be 
conducted on to what extent the Internet users are interested in exerting such influence: 
many studies have shown that in general, the Internet users’ motivation to participate in 
politics in post-Soviet emerging democracies is quite low. 
The qualitative analysis of frames covering the referendum also confirmed that the 
state print newspapers that dominate the media market in Kyrgyzstan have constructed 
a totally opposite image of the decision to conduct the referendum and what it meant 
for good governance than the independent media, which mostly operate online.  Thus, 
the alternative reality of the threats of authoritarianism constructed by the independent 
media was available mostly for those citizens who have the Internet access.  This 
difference in the “realities” constructed by independent and state media is central to the 
thesis of this project (see Figure 2.2.2). 
A limitation of this content analysis project is that it did not capture the coverage of 
the referendum and relating events and issues by the Kyrgyz-language press.  
Newspapers and websites in Kyrgyz are becoming more and more influencial and 
visible, and their interpretation of events is not necessarily similar to the Russian-
language press.  A comparative analysis of media messages in Russian and Kyrgyz 
would be the next logical step for this study. 
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 CHAPTER 2. PERCEPTIONS OF GOOD GOVERNANCE AMONG THE 
TRADITIONAL AND INTERNET-BASED MEDIA USERS IN 
KYRGYZSTAN 
 
2.1 Background and Definitions 
After the breakdown of the Warsaw Pact and collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
newly independent post-communist countries had to choose a model for future 
development.  All of them proclaimed that their goal was to build a democracy with the 
understanding that it would take several years of transition to liberalize the economy 
and set up the necessary political, social and judiciary institutions and practices.8 Almost 
20 years later, only a handful of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe, as well as 
the post-Soviet Baltic republics9 can claim that they have achieved this goal, having 
consolidated their democracies.  Others, including the countries of interest for this 
research project, are still in the period of transition with varying degrees of democratic 
reforms and successes. 
For the purposes of this study, the classical definitions of democracy and 
consolidated democracy will be used, even though the latter has been recently contested 
(but not refuted) on two grounds.  First, the critics of consolidation maintain, there may 
be different varieties of consolidated democracies that do not fit one definition.  Second, 
the accepted definitions of consolidation have created certain “illusions” about the 
process without providing clear theoretical and practical policy mechanisms for an 
                                                 
8 Freedom House, a US-based NGO, evaluates freedom in all countries of the world on several dimensions, 
including political rights, civil liberties, development of civil society and independent press, corruption, etc.  It 
issues an annual report, Nations in Transit, specifically designated to the countries in transition, i.e. 29 countries 
that appeared on the world map after the collapse of the Soviet Union and breakdown of Yugoslavia and 
Czechoslovakia.  According to the report, which provides a careful analysis of the countries’ legal and 
governance systems, all 29 are proclaimed constitutional democracies. 
9  These countries’ achievements in democratization were recognized with the European Union membership: 
Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
 55 
institutionalized electoral democracy to become a consolidated democracy (O’Donnell, 
2001, pp.124-125).  This debate, however, is beyond the scope of this project for which 
the notion of consolidation is still useful. 
2.1.1.  Definitions 
The definition of democracy that this study is based upon was formulated by one of 
the leading modern theorists of democracy Juan Linz, who adopted Robert Dahl’s 
classical attributes of polyarchy10 and incorporated complex ideas and realities of 
modern democratic regimes.  According to this definition, a regime can be regarded 
democratic when  
… it allows for free formulation of political preferences, through the use of basic 
freedoms of association, information and communication, for the purpose of free 
competition between leaders to validate at regular intervals by nonviolent means 
their claim to rule… without excluding any effective political office from that 
competition or prohibiting any members of the political community from 
expressing their preference (1975, pp.182-83). 
 
This demanding definition of democracy was developed shortly before the third 
wave of global democratization, which started in the last quarter of the 20th century in 
Latin America, and before the democratic theory caught up on the fact that even 
seemingly established and institutionalized democracies (Chile and Brasil, for example) 
can break down and experience enduring crises. 
To close the gap, the younger generation of transitologists (i.e., theorists and 
scholars of democratic transition) took Linz’s definition further, having added the 
consolidation dimension.  Consolidation refers to stabilization, routinization, 
institutionalization, and legitimization of such political behavior patterns that would 
                                                 
10 The essential six attributes of polyarchy, as refined in Dalh’s most recent work “On Democracy,” include the 
following: 1) elected representatives, 2) free, fair and frequent elections, 3) freedom of expression, 4) alternative 
information, 5) associational autonomy, and 6) inclusive citizenship. (1998, p.93). 
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prevent internal breakdowns of democracies and their reversals to an authoritarian rule.  
Specifically, a democratic regime is considered consolidated when  
…all politically significant groups regard its key political institutions as the 
only legitimate framework for political contestation, and adhere to the democratic 
rules of the game (Cunther, Diamondouros, & Puhle, 2001, p.133). 
 
 
The concept of consolidation became so widely accepted in the modern democratic 
theory that it provided a key dimension for the typology of political systems ranging 
from consolidated autocracies to consolidated democracies. This typology is used for 
international assessments of the status of democracy in the world by organizations like 
Freedom House and United Nations (see Figure 2.2.1 below). 
The typology implies that the ideal movement of any country in transition from a 
totalitarian or authoritarian rule should be toward a consolidated democracy. As it was 
already pointed out, most of the countries of the former Soviet Union, except for the 
Baltic states, have made little progress in this direction.  Moreover, countries like Russia, 
Kazakhstan and Belarus have slid into authoritarian modes.  Their leaders have been 
using the concept of a managed democracy as a justification for their undemocratic 
practices.  However, the conviction that a managed democracy is a viable temporary 
option for a country in transition has produced less impression on the outside observers 
than on these governments’ own citizens.11  Belarus, for instance, often referred to as the 
last dictatorship in Europe,12 has not managed to convince its European neighbors that it 
has established an electoral democracy even with its institution of regular popular 
                                                 
11 Kazakhstan and Belarus have been consistently ranked as “not free” in the Freedom House report Freedom in 
the World since 1994 and 1996 respectively and categorized as consolidated autocracies.  Russia has been 
downgraded from a long-term “partly free” status (it has been characterized as a semi-consolidated autocracy 
since 1999) to a “not free” consolidated autocracy in 2005. 
12 For an illustration, see country reports on Belarus from the French NGO “Reporters without Borders” at 
http://www.rsf.org. 
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elections.  And in Russia, the Public Chamber called upon the government to establish 
Russia’s own monitoring system to evaluate the state of freedom in Western countries 
after Freedom House downgraded the country to the “not free” status in 2005. 
To understand how and why managed democracy works in the post-Soviet space, 
it is necessary to give a brief overview of the concept and its definition. 
2.1.2.   Managed Democracy for Semi-Consolidated Authoritarian Regimes? 
The origin of the term “managed democracy” is difficult to trace, but it is most 
widely associated with Indonesia’s Gen. Suharno, to whom the concept is often 
attributed.13 In essence, managed democracy is a regime with all formally attributable 
democratic institutions, such as separate legislative, judiciary, and executive powers; 
regular contested elections and other forms of participation like referenda; diverse and 
private press; developed civil liberties such as freedom to travel, etc.  At the same time, 
this type of regime is authoritarian at the core as it allows only limited and carefully 
controlled autonomy of democratic institutions (Pribylovsky, 2005).  The public sphere 
in managed democracies is controlled through ownership and guidance of media. 
Russia, which still determines and influences many political and economic 
processes in the former Soviet republics, revived the concept of managed democracy 
with President Putin’s rise to power in 2000.  It was subsequently embraced by other 
countries’ long-term leaders who had solidified their super-presidential regimes – 
President Lukashenka of Belarus, President Kuchma of the Ukraine, President 
Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan, President Shevardnadze of Georgia, President Aliev of 
Azrbaijan, and President Akaev of Kyrgyzstan.  
                                                 
13 A series of analytical articles on the Russian website “Democracy under Siege” (http://osada.sova-
center.ru/) explain the term’s etymology and provide a good overview of the history and principles of 
managed (“guided” in some other references) democracy. 
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The popular rationale behind managed democracy is that people in the post-Soviet 
countries, who had been suppressed under the totalitarian rule for over 70 years, are 
incapable of quickly changing their dependent mentality and becoming mature and 
responsible, self-governing citizens.  Therefore, someone who legitimately represents 
them should have the temporary authority to guide the citizens in the process of 
democratic decision-making and to manage effective development of the fragile 
democratic institutions.14 
It should be noted that consolidation of power under the executive in these 
countries started much earlier than Putin’s rise to power.  President Akaev, for example, 
started to change the Constitution to shift more powers from the legislature to the 
executive as early as in 1994.  As Nichol (2007) points out, Akaev complained in 1994 
that the first post-independence Constitution with extensive human rights protections 
and provided countervailing legislative powers “was too ‘idealistic’ since the Kyrgyz 
people are not prepared for democracy and said that a ‘transitional period’ was needed. 
He decreed referendums in 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2003 that whittled away legislative 
power” (p.2).  However, it was with Putin’s election as Russian president that the 
managed democracy came to use as a term. Lipman and McFaul explained well the 
managed democracy Russian style for Western readers: 
…Putin seeks to undermine Russia’s fragile and weak democratic institutions.  
Putin’s spin doctors call the project ‘managed democracy.’  The system they seek 
to create will have all the formal institutions of democracy: elections, parties, 
media, civil society, and so on.  But the real autonomy of these institutions and, 
therefore, their real capacity to influence the actions of the state will be severely 
limited. (2001, p.116) 
 
                                                 
14 Papp (2005) suggests that Chair of Effective Politics Foundation Gleb Pavlovsky, the Kremlin’s key political 
strategist, and Director of the Political Research Institute Sergei Markov are the main ideologists of the 
managed democracy in Russia. They also often serve as political consultants to other post-Soviet quasi-
democratic regimes. 
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Shevardnadze’s Georgia before 2003 and Kyrgyzstan of the later Akaev’s tenure in 2001-
2005 represent examples of the managed democracy model.  The 2006 Countries at the 
Crossroads report describes typical processes in these countries the for the case of 
Kyrgyzstan:  
During the last five years of his rule [2000-05], Akaev steadily consolidated 
power and misused it to neutralize rivals, intimidate independent media, and 
manipulate the judiciary.  As the international spotlight moved to Central Asia in 
the aftermath of September 11, 2001, both the United States and Russia established 
airbases in Kyrgyzstan as responses to the war on terrorism.  These developments 
raised Akaev’s profile on the world stage and emboldened him to clamp down on 
his domestic opposition still further.  Meanwhile corruption, nepotism and graft 
flourished, blurring the boundaries between government and organized crime.  
The president’s family and allies took control of many of the country’s prime 
economic resources, hiding assets through dozens of shell companies, but their 
rapacity was growing blatant and their support was dwindling.  Rigged elections, 
in which two of Akaev’s children won seats in parliament, hinting the possibility 
of a dynastic succession, were the last straw [causing the revolution].   
Freedom House, Countries at the Crossroads, 2006 
 
Similar processes took place in the other two revolutionary countries – Georgia and 
Ukraine, and their leaders were using the democratic rhetoric and institutions in a 
similar way to cover up their pseudo-democratic practices.  Indeed, the elections in all 
the three countries were regular and contested but manipulated so skillfully that even 
outside observers experienced trouble in collecting the evidence of fraud.  Political 
parties existed and proliferated, but either had little effect in the legislature because the 
candidates preferred to run on a single-mandate rather than party-list tickets like in 
Kyrgyzstan, or represented a deal-lock, confrontational parliamentary oppositions in 
Ukraine and Georgia.  The local media in all three countries were allowed certain 
degrees of freedom, but the national media were tightly controlled either through direct 
ownership or through state subsidies and harassment of independent media.  The civil 
societies were represented by numerous and diverse NGOs, many of which were quasi-
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NGOs created by pro-government circles to channel the grant money.  At the same time, 
the citizens were free in their consciousness (religion), thinking, expression, and travel 
within and outside the country.  In short, what was promoted as a democratic political 
system was in essence a weakened, semi-consolidated authoritarian rule. 
2.2 Beyond Managed Democracy and Toward Consolidated Democracy 
According to the classical democratic theory, the obvious discrepancy between 
what is allowed to individual citizens in terms of civil liberties and the abridged political 
rights, as well as the gap between the formal political systems with democratic rights 
and the actual political practices will inevitably result into internal tensions (Dahl, 1971, 
1998).  In the three “revolutionary” countries, these tensions and frustration with the 
manipulated parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan and Georgia and presidential 
election in the Ukraine resulted into popular uprisings.  
First was the 2003 “Rose Revolution” in Georgia, followed by the 2004 Ukrainian 
“Orange Revolution,” and, finally, the 2005 “Tulip Revolution” in Kyrgyzstan.  Again, 
an evaluation of the Ukrainian revolution by Freedom House provides a good 
illustration of how these changes were welcomed in the democratic world: “The 
extraordinary return of Ukraine to the path of freedom in 2004 may have opened the 
door to a new democratic spring in the 12 non-Baltic post-Soviet states” (NIT 2005, p.6).  
In Russia, the fear of “the orange plague,” as the leadership refers to the three 
revolutions cumulatively, was so strong that the Kremlin ideologists dropped the usage 
of the compromised term “managed democracy” and started to use more and more the 
term “sovereign democracy,” emphasizing Russia’s right to a unique democratic path 
and independence from democratic standards imposed by Western democracies. 
It is widely believed now that the color revolutions represented the second way of 
democratization in the post-Soviet space, where the impoverished, disillusioned and 
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frustrated citizens lead by opposition toppled the semi-authoritarian and authoritarian 
rulers in the desire to change the regime toward building a true democracy.  Currently, 
numerous questions and doubts are raised about the progress of these countries in the 
second democratization attempts.   
In particular, concerns were raised by the “divorce” of the two revolution leaders 
in Ukraine in 2006 – President Yuschenko and Prime-Minister Timoshenko, who 
subsequently became a parliament member and one of the most active opponents to 
Yuschenko.  Even though Timoshenko eventually became the prime-minister again 
through a power-sharing agreement, the obvious tensions between her cabinet and 
President Yuschenko over the stalling economic reforms and privatization of 
infrastructure do not add to strengthening of the Ukrainian democracy.   
In Georgia, theorists and practitioners of democracy were concerned about the 
transparency of the 2007 presidential election that re-elected President Saakashvili 
amidst massive opposition protests.  Additional concerns are raised by the fact that most 
of the seats in the parliament elected in May 2008 were taken by the ruling pro-
presidential party, effectively shifting the political system from the parliamentary to a 
presidential one.   
Finally, in Kyrgyzstan, the fight over the constitutional reform resulted into a 
violation of the power-sharing agreement between President Bakiev and Prime-minister 
Kulov (both had been elected to power on a united ticket in July 2005) as the latter 
resigned in 2006.  The recent events with the October 2007 Referendum and pre-term 
parliamentary elections also raised concerns about the direction the Kyrgyzstan’s 
leadership is taking. More and more analysts today agree that Kyrgyzstan under the 
President Bakiev is farther from a true democracy than it ever was under the weak 
authoritarian leadership of President Akaev.  
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Figure 2.2.1 below is designed to demonstrate the chronological movement of the 
three countries on the democratic path in three stages: 1) toward democracy through a 
transitional order in 1991-1996, as a result of independence and rigorous democratic 
developments; 2) back to authoritarianism between 1996-2003, when the leaders in those 
countries usurped the power, amended the constitutions and manipulated elections; 
and 3) back to the democratic transitional order after the color revolutions starting in 
2003 till present.  To reflect the concerns formulated above, the projected movement 
toward consolidated democracy is shown with a dotted line and a question mark.   
 
Figure 2.2.1.  Actual Movement of Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan on 
Democratization Path 
 
Despite considerations and concerns about the recent developments in the political 
arena, the rhetoric of revolutionary achievements and democratic reforms in all three 
countries is still strong and the governments continue to express their commitment to 
building a true democracy.  As the content analysis of the Constitutional Referendum in 
Kyrgyzstan presented in Chapter 1 shows, such rhetoric can be quite effective in 
achieving the government’s goals. 
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2.2.1. Government, Citizens and Reality Gaps 
One helpful explanation of why managed democracy fails to work is a combination 
of the cognitive dissonance theory and Albert Hirschman’s theory of response to 
declines in firms, organizations, and states.  In a pseudo-democratic, semi-authoritarian 
regime the gap between the reality that people experience and the desired reality that 
the government projects with its democratic rhetoric is so large that it creates a mental 
discomfort, or cognitive dissonance, in citizens’ minds (Festinger, 1947).  The people 
know what is real as they have to face corruption, disrespect and violations of their 
rights and freedoms by the government on a daily basis, so the government-imposed 
view of reality does not settle with them well.  Thus, the citizens may employ one of the 
three available options to remove the source of discomfort, in this case the government’s 
lies and promises. 
One of the options is to ignore the government-projected reality, which is only a 
temporary solution as what the government says defines so many societal processes that 
cannot be mentally put away, and sooner or later the people will have to either accept or 
reject this reality imposed on them.  To accept the projected reality is an option exercised 
by many citizens hoping that life will become better if not with the current government, 
then with the one that will come to power in the next elections.  It can be argued that it 
is this dashed hope caused by the governments’ manipulation of elections that took 
many citizens to the street protests, thus turning to the third option for removal of 
dissonance – rejection of its source, i.e. false reality. 
These options roughly correspond to Hirschman’s responses to declining states – 
exit, voice and loyalty.  Hirschman’s theory is derived from economics, and exit is best 
understood as a metaphor for consumers’ stopping to buy the product or service when 
its quality declines and there is competition in the market.  Voice is exercised when the 
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consumers are so accustomed to the product and value it so much that they are ready to 
express their dissatisfaction in the hope that it will result into an improvement.  If 
competition stimulates diversity of the products in the market, it is much easier for the 
consumers to exercise exit rather than voice – they simply start buying a better product 
and stop using the declining one.  As Hirschman (1971) puts it, “the presence of exit 
option can sharply reduce the probability that the voice option will be taken up widely 
and effectively” (p.76). 
Since a country is not a supermarket, the exit from it is more limited than an exit 
from a simple buying and selling relationship: “exit is ordinarily unthinkable, though 
not wholly impossible, from such primordial human groupings as family, tribe, church, 
and state” (Hirschman, 1971, p.76). However, such an exit is easier for ethnic minorities 
in a multi-ethnic state that have a “mother” country in which they can resettle.  The fact 
that between 1992-2005 more than 400,000 Russians left Kyrgyzstan for Russia, about 
40,000 Germans left for Germany and 27,000 Jews immigrated to Israel suggests that 
people do exercise this option.  In Georgia, where the population is much more 
homogeneous, the exit option was exercised only by ethnic Russians, who always 
comprised less than 10 percent of the entire population and the separatist minorities – 
Osetins and Abkhaz, and in smaller numbers. 
What decreases the possibility of exit and increases the possibility of voice is 
loyalty, or the feeling of attachment and affection, and in case of the states – patriotism.  
Loyalty and voice are interdependent, Hirschman argues, as a member loyal to the 
organization or the state 
will often search for ways to make himself influential, especially when the 
organization moves in what he believes is the wrong direction; conversely, a 
member who wields (or thinks he wields) considerable power in an organization 
and is therefore convinced that he can get it ‘back on the track’ is likely to develop 
a strong affection for the organization in which he is powerful. (1971, p.78) 
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Hirschman further argues that loyalty is an extremely important element for a state 
as it not only holds exit constant and facilitates voice, but also because it can limit the 
tendency of the most quality-conscious citizens to be the first to exit.  As a result of 
loyalty, these potentially most influential citizens  
will stay on longer than they would ordinarily, in the hope or, rather, reasoned 
expectation that improvement or reform can be achieved “from within.”  This 
loyalty, far from being irrational, can serve the socially useful purpose of 
preventing deterioration from becoming cumulative, as it so often does when 
there is no barrier to exit. (1971, p.79) 
 
In the case of Kyrgyzstan, it can be argued, the massive exodus of ethnic minorities 
in 1992-2005, the brain drain of the most talented and capable youth and migration of 
laborers to the neighboring Kazakhstan and Russia testifies to the fact that loyalty in an 
impoverished and corrupt state can keep citizens at bay only temporarily, especially 
when the exit is not restricted by the state. 
Thus, Hirschman’s explanation for the revolutions that took place in Georgia, 
Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan would be that the citizens’ loyalty activated massive voicing of 
dissatisfaction as a result of broken hopes for the change of power elites through honest 
elections and therefore any improvement of their experienced reality.  The popular 
dissatisfaction was strong and significant enough to drive the entrenched presidents out 
of power, and in the case of Kyrgyzstan – out of the country. 
2.2.2.  Importance of Good Governance in a Democracy 
A brief overview of the contemporary democratic consolidation theory presented 
above equips this research project with at least one useful assumption about the 
democratic and communicative processes in the post-Soviet countries that recently went 
through the second wave of democratization.  This assumption is that shaking off the 
authoritarian rulers is not enough to become a democracy and the color revolutions 
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marked at best a return to the transitional phase rather than a step toward consolidated 
democracy. 
If the three post-revolution countries – Georgia, the Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan – 
want to consolidate democracy, they must meet the three minimal conditions for an 
institutionalized electoral democracy, as suggested by Linz and Stepan (2001). First, they 
must establish and enforce true “stateness,” expressed in a strong, confident government 
resting on the majority’s support and rule of law. Second, they must complete the 
democratic transition by establishing fair and contested elections and efficient and 
separated executive, judicial, and legislative powers.  Finally, they must develop a high 
level of culture of democratic governance, wherein the governing elites observe the 
constitution and rights of individuals and minorities, respect the legislature, tolerate 
criticism and pluralism of opinions, etc. (Linz & Stepan, 2001, p.94-95). 
A considerable body of research in political science in general and transitology in 
particular focuses on the first two conditions – stateness and completed democratic 
transition – by analyzing the electoral and other political processes, development of 
democratic institutions and agents and their interrelations with the state, evolution and 
enforcement of rights and freedoms for individuals, etc. Volumes have written on the 
problems of democratic transition, comparative democratic progress and 
democratization in general through the prism of development of the state and civil 
society institutions (e.g, Vanhanen, 2003; Doorkenspleet, 2005; Lane & Ersson, 2003; 
Pinkney, 2005; O’Kane, 2004).   
These studies of processes and political institutions provide useful insights into 
why most of the former Soviet republics found themselves “lost in transition.” 
However, they pay little attention to the culture of democratic governance, partly 
perhaps because this element is less quantifiable, not easily measurable and more 
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subjective.  Based on the theoretical assumption that democratic consolidation is 
impossible without a high culture of democratic governance, or in simpler terms, good 
governance practices, the proposed study will focus on this last minimal condition for 
democracy as it requires the perceptual, attitudinal and behavioral changes that are the 
subject of interest for political communication researchers. 
Some scholars and post-Soviet experts argue that the high level of culture of 
democratic governance may require a generational change in power elites, i.e. 
replacement of old “partokrats” with new democratically minded leaders.15 However, it 
is also reasonable to believe that good governance requires a shift in mentality and 
behavior on the part of not only the governing elites, who should strive for better 
performance and accountability, but also the governed themselves, who need to develop 
the sense of what good governance is and what kind of demands it puts on the power 
elites.  Therefore, probing and monitoring of good governance perceptions among 
citizens is essential for new democracies so that the governments know how their 
citizens evaluate their performance and take corrective actions as necessary.   
Based on the foundational concept of culture of democratic governance developed 
by Linz and Stepan and described above, as well as in consultations with the advisors 
for this project, the following elements of good governance have been identified as 
important in the post-Soviet context and essential for this study: 
 Understanding, by both the power elites and the citizens, that the government in 
a democratic system is to serve rather than to rule the people; 
 Accountability, transparency and openness of undertaken actions and initiatives;  
                                                 
15 Among the three color revolution countries, the generational change in power elites took place only in 
Georgia, where President Mikhael Saakashvili, a lawyer by education with a degree from Columbia University, 
brought in a team of young democratically-minded Western-educated and reform-oriented professionals to the 
highest government structures of the country. 
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 Observation of the Constitution and rights of individuals and minorities;  
 Trust with the governed;  
 Commitment to fight corruption;  
 Tolerance to criticism from the media, civic groups and individuals;  
 Fair and speedy treatment of citizens’ grievances; and  
 Public scrutiny of performance and campaign promises (usually translated into 
approval ratings in established democracies). 
Obviously, many of these elements are interconnected and interrelated.  For 
example, effective accountability is impossible without transparency and openness and 
has to deal with the trust by the governed.  By the same token, commitment to fight 
corruption is useless without tolerance to criticism and public scrutiny of the 
government’s performance, etc.  None of these elements, however, is fully replaceable 
with another element as they all provide a unique dimension to good governance.  
Therefore, all of these elements were incorporated into good governance scales and 
indexes of the survey instrument to be used in this study (see Appendix C). 
2.2.4. Role of Internet-Based Media in Democratization 
The debate about the role of the Internet in democracy is ongoing.  Some analysts 
suggest that by providing the virtually unlimited space for any information, the Internet 
encourages users to be researchers of information who have access to diverse and 
opposing points of view, thus encouraging the public debate on issues of importance 
(Burnett & Marshall, 2003, pp.159-161).  Others object that the central features of the 
Internet such as anonymity and dispersion over time and space undermine the sort of 
the public sphere and political interaction that is required for genuine democratic 
participation and deliberation (Shapiro, 1999; Sunstein, 2001).  Lasch, for example, 
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argues that it is exactly because of the vast and unlimited nature of the Internet that the 
content most important for public debates – news – is the least sought for, and since the 
Internet provides mostly raw, unprocessed, and often unverified news, it impedes 
rather than encourages the public debate (cited in Burnett & Marshall, 2003, p.160).   
In this respect, it is useful to draw on Bohman’s distinction between the intrinsic 
features and qualities of the Internet (hardware) and the space of publics, or people’s 
uses and goals for the Internet (software).  The hardware itself may be more conducive 
for the public debate compared to other media, but it will be a dead network of wired 
computers if the people do not fill it with meaning and actually engage in the debate 
(cited in Bucy & Newhagen, 2004, pp.131-132). In this sense, the researchers arguing that 
Internet has a potential for mobilizing people’s agency in building strong communities, 
fostering civic participation through secure networks and even undermining the 
authoritarian regimes, are right (Davis et al., 2002; Kalathil & Boas, 2003).  Further, it is 
reasonable to argue that where the governments control the traditional media through 
direct ownership, third persons or other means such as subsidies, but encourage or at 
least do not impede the development of Internet technologies, Internet-based media and 
their audiences may become a viable source of alternative information contrasting the 
official view transmitted by the government through the controlled media. 
In the context of Kyrgyzstan, there is documented evidence that the websites of 
political movements, an opposition newspaper Gazeta.kg and advocacy blog Akaevu.net 
played a significant role in the March 2005 Revolution (Kulikova & Perlmutter, 2007).  
For the country with the Internet penetration rate of about 10-15 per cent,16 this impact 
                                                 
16 Internet World Statistics (http://www.internetworldstats.com), Freedom House, and CIA World Factbook 
report the 2005 Internet penetration rates in Georgia at 4%, in Kyrgyzstan – 5%.  However, for Kyrgyzstan the 
reports by the major national ISPs such as KyrgyzTelecom and Asiainfo estimate the penetration rate of 10-15%.  
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may seem overestimated. However, the materials published on these oppositional sites 
were circulated in print and re-inserted into the off-line world, which makes the 
estimation of the true impact complicated. 
With the Internet penetration rates in Kyrgyzstan slowly growing and the 
democratic rhetoric still a significant part of the public debate, it is reasonable to expect 
that the Internet will be playing an increasingly important role in constructing a reality 
alternative to the one projected by the government and closer to the reality actually 
experienced by the citizens.  This understanding of the Internet media is key for the 
design and implementation of this project. 
2.2.5. Synthesis: A Model of Governance, Realities and Options for Actors 
The theoretical foundations from political science, mass communication and 
psychology presented in the literature review allow to synthesize the theories of good 
democratic governance, cognitive dissonance, information seeking, and citizens’ 
behavioral options in a declining state into a single model.  The model as applied to 
Kyrgyzstan is presented in Figure 2.2.2. 
The government, whose goal is to stay in power and govern rather than resign 
before the term (the bracketed option), imposes its view of reality on the citizens. It does 
so with the help of the traditional media it controls through direct ownership, shield 
companies, subsidies, and unofficial agreements with the media managers.  This 
imposed view of reality is molded by the normative understanding of good governance 
in a democratic system and the government’s desire to appear as serving the needs and 
tending to expectations of the citizens.  Since the government and its media are quite 
trained and experienced in democratic rhetoric, this constructed reality may in fact hold 
for some time until the citizens start to contrast it with their own experienced reality and 
alternative sources of information. 
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In constructing the good governance reality, the government appeals to the 
citizens’ loyalty, often blaming the previous regime, and evoking the feelings of 
patriotism and hope for a better future: ‘the Akaevs have left the country in a mess.  We 
are going through tough times, but this is our land and we need to overcome obstacles. 
We also need to be patient because any revolutionary change takes time to yield 
improvements.’  A thick blue line in the model represents this relationship. 
The government-constructed view of reality conflicts with the reality the citizens 
experience daily, as they continue facing pervasive corruption, decreasing living 
standards, rising consumer prices and unemployment rate, and other deteriorating 
conditions caused by bad governance practices.  Many Internet forum commentators 
point out that the current government has not learned the lessons from the previous 
regime and continues doing what the Akaevs were doing, but with more greed and the 
heightened fear of being overthrown.  However, they still use the rhetoric of the 
revolution and democracy as a shield and often appeal to citizens’ feeling of loyalty and 
their own legitimacy (“the people have elected us in 2005, so we are a legitimate power 
acting in the interests of the people”). The two red wavy lines in the model symbolize 
the gap between the two realities, which creates a cognitive dissonance, or mental 
discomfort, in the citizens’ minds.  According to the cognitive dissonance theory, one of 
the three behavioral possibilities can help remove the dissonance. 
The first one is to accept the view of reality imposed by the government (thin blue 
line in the model).  This is the activated loyalty option, often taken up by those coming 
from the same clan as the ruling elite or having a relative in the government structure.  
This is not to say that this option is only for those who have some sort of personal stake 
in the government. Some people may activate the loyalty option because they believe in 
the government’s good intentions (albeit accompanied by inexperience and inability to 
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govern) and the need to give it some time.  Activating loyalty is probably the easiest 
way to remove the dissonance, as it only requires a mental effort of bridging the two 
realities together through self-persuasion.  
The second option, represented by the purple lines in the model, is to reject the 
projected reality by exiting the system either physically by leaving the country or 
mentally by withdrawing into one’s own life-world or focusing on something else, like 
education, family or making money. The real exit is more difficult both psychologically 
and physically as people are deeply rooted in the country’s traditions, culture, language, 
and are reluctant to leave behind their family and networks.  Nonetheless, the ethnic 
minorities still exercise this option: after March 2005 revolution, 45,000 ethnic Russians 
left for Russia – the second largest wave after 1991-93 exodus of over 200,000 Russians.  
In addition, an estimated 500-800,000 ethnic Kyrgyz are migrant workers in Kazakhstan 
and Russia. Even though for them it is a temporary exit from the system, it is an exit 
nonetheless, perhaps even better testifying to the country’s economic problems. 
Individuals with high income, high levels of education and foreign language skills 
often exercise the option of mental exit.  They usually are relatively unaffected by the 
realities and hardships other people face.  Such individuals either construct their own, 
more cosmopolitan reality with access to the outside world through the Internet and 
BBC and CNN in their cable package or withdraw from public affairs because they are 
completely disinterested in politics or simply too cynical about it.  As citizens, such 
individuals have little value because they do not participate in many societal processes. 
They are effectively equal to those who exited physically, and many of them eventually 
leave the country when opportunity presents itself.  The mental exit is equal to the 
option of ignoring the projected reality, which is the third behavioral option according 
to the cognitive dissonance theory. 
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Rejection of the government-constructed reality may result into the third option for 
citizens who cannot or will not leave the country and are not able to ignore or put up 
with the problems they face in their daily lives.  This option is to voice dissatisfaction 
with either the experienced reality (green lines in the model) or the projected reality 
(yellow lines in the model), or both.  The voice option is the most time- and effort-
consuming and requires a certain degree of activism and courage to go against the 
entrenched and unforgiving government. Therefore, not many individuals pursue this 
option.  Before such citizens voice their dissatisfaction or frustration with the current 
state of affairs, they seek more information to understand where the gap is coming from, 
to find facts supporting their view of reality and to establish contacts with other truth-
seeking individuals.  This active form of gap closure, represented by a red line in the 
model, is rooted in the uses and gratifications theory that views audiences as active 
seekers of information rather than in the cognitive dissonance theory per se, whose 
selective exposure, attention and perception suggest that people simply avoid or tailor 
the information causing dissonance.  For this reason, uses and gratification approach 
proposed by Kaye (2007) will be adopted to explore the Internet media users’ 
motivations in Kyrgyzstan. 
This is where the Internet with its uncontrolled and uncensored information is 
coming into play.  Several political sites in Kyrgyzstan, such as news agency 24.kg 
www.24.kg, opposition newspaper Bely Parohod www.parohod.kg, non-profit Institute 
for Public Policy www.ipp.kg, Bishkek Press Club www.bpc.kg, and Diesel political 
forums on public platform www.diesel.elcat.kg extensively publish analytical 
information on political events and the government’s policies and actions.  These sites 
usually serve as sources of alternative information and often support readers’ forums 
with unedited comments from the participants.   
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Most of these sites are not reaching wide audiences: their counters usually show 
30-50 visitors at a time and up to 3,000 hits a day.  However, the government 
understands their importance and significance as they reach the most educated and 
advanced audiences and tries to impose its view on the virtual world as well (thin 
dotted blue line in the model suggests that these efforts are not as successful as in the 
offline world).  It is widely known in Kyrgyzstan’s web space that the presidential 
administration appointed dozens of “monitors” who follow the information on these 
sites and write comments as if they were ordinary citizens.  In their comments, they 
always voice support for the government and often use dirty tricks such as personal 
insults and attacks on the journalists and other users who criticize the government. 
One recent example is illustrative of the significance the government attaches to the 
information published on the Internet sites.  On March 15, 2007 one of the commentators 
on Bely Parohod online newspaper presented himself as a clerk at a major Kyrgyz bank 
that is known to serve all businesspeople and famous individuals, including the first 
family.  He wrote that in two previous days, he personally had processed two transfers 
– one of $10 million and one of $20 million to a Swiss bank and suggested that the 
president’s son transferred the money in store of the anti-government demonstrations 
scheduled by the opposition for April 2007. “They are afraid of another revolution and 
are getting ready to flee the country,” the commentator concluded.   
This comment was copied on many other political websites the same day and the 
next day and became a subject of heated discussions.  In the evening of the next day, 
AKI-press website published an extensive and detailed press-release from the National 
Bank, titled “National Bank on ‘runaway’ capital.” Its whole purpose was to explain that 
in the country where the annual budget is a little over $720 million, huge money 
transfers would inevitably plummet the foreign exchange rate and cause major troubles 
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in the market.  Since no dip like that took place in the recent days, the article concluded, 
the major transfers to foreign banks could not have happened.  The press-release never 
referred to the rumored amounts of the alleged transfers and their origin.  However, 
those users who followed the discussion immediately understood why the press-release 
came out and dismissed it as a cover-up technique. 
It should be noted that the eye-opening information available on the Internet can 
push people who are frustrated with their experienced reality to use the exit option, 
especially when the Internet also provides an opportunity for contact with the outside 
world.  It is not rare to see comments from people like “I quietly lived my comfortable 
life until I walked into your chat room. Now I can’t sleep because I know we are being 
ruled and robbed by a clique of kleptomaniacs.  It’s time to leave the country.”  
Kyrgyzstanis residing abroad often post notes such as “I am now studying in Europe 
and a year ago I couldn’t wait to go home and help out the revolutionaries but now I 
can see that they are even worse than the Akaev clan.  I need to find a way to stay here 
as Kyrgyzstan has no future with the ‘elites’ that are at power now.” 
However, when people use the voice option, they have two tracks available for 
them.  The first one is represented by the yellow lines in Figure 2 and may be referred to 
as “destructive” as its main goal is to expose the government’s lies and bad governance 
practices. This track usually results into the demands for the government to resign.  An 
example of activity that represents this track through the media-constructed world 
would be writing a letter to the editor in response to false or distorted information or 
participating in a demonstration demanding the government’s resignation.  The 
exposure track has more potential for impact on the Internet, as it has no gatekeepers 
who decide which letters get published and the readers’ comments usually remain 
intact.  However, the Internet information exposing the government lies and distortions 
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can only be effective when it spills over into the off-line world, i.e. when the Internet 
users share what they learned from online media with non-users.  Otherwise the 
information is relatively ineffective because it can reach at best only 10-15 per cent of the 
country’s population who have the Internet access. 
The second voice track is represented by the green lines in the model and can be 
referred to as “constructive” because its main goal is to improve the experienced reality 
or the bad government practices.  Civic groups working within the law use this track. 
An example of activity representing this track would be participation in a peaceful 
demonstration demanding reforms or working with civic groups to help the 
disadvantaged.  Since this form of voicing the dissatisfaction is less confrontational than 
the destructive exposure and is an integral part of any system claiming to be a 
democracy, it often happens in the open, real world.  However, such enlightened and 
advanced civic groups and individuals still use the Internet to share the information, 
mobilize their base, and foster connections, especially with the outside world.  For 
instance, Edil Baisalov, the leader of the NGO Coalition, maintains his personal blog 
read by many of his supporters and adversaries both inside and outside Kyrgyzstan. 
The main focus of this project is the red and yellow lines as they present the most 
interest for the formation of public sphere on the Internet and its realization in the off-
line world.  The green line representing voice in the form of political involvement will 
be explored as well.  The methodology section below spells out how these relationships 
will be operationalized in the study. It is necessary to note at the outset that the quality 
of governance will be measured by the variables evaluating government performance 
and understanding of democratic norms. Experienced reality will be tapped by the 
perceptions of the changes in individual economic situation and political rights and 
liberties after March 2005, while media approval variable is a proxy for the attitudes 
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toward the constructed reality.  On the exit-voice dimension, civic activity index will be 
a proxy for voice, and the variable “Your future in Kyrgyzstan” with several leave-stay 
options will serve as a measure of readiness to exit.  Finally, the variables tapping into 
frustration with the government performance and system of governance will serve as a 
measure of the gap between the constructed and experienced reality (see Figure 2.2.2).   
Based on this theoretical model of government-citizen interaction as well as the 
view of the Internet as a facilitator of the public sphere, the following hypotheses and 
research questions are formulated: 
Hypothesis 1:  Compared to traditional media users, Internet-based media users will 
have: (a) higher political interest, and (b) higher levels of political knowledge. 
Hypothesis 2: Compared to traditional media users, Internet-based media users will 
have more negative evaluations of traditional media performance (a proxy for 
constructed reality).  
Hypothesis 3: Government performance controlled for demographics, especially 
such as income and employment, will predict the respondents’ experienced 
reality, expressed in satisfaction with a change in (a) current economic situation 
and (b) the political rights and freedoms after March 2005. 
Hypothesis 4:  Internet-based media users will have (a) lower evaluations of 
government performance, and (b) higher levels of frustration with the current 
government of Kyrgyzstan than the traditional media users. 
Hypothesis 5:  Given the high levels of frustration with the government, two 
options:  (a) Internet-based media users will show higher levels of civic activity 
(“voice”) than traditional media users, or, alternatively (b) when considering 
their own future in Kyrgyzstan, Internet-based media users will be more 
oriented to leaving the country (“exit”) than the traditional media users. 
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Research Question 1:  What are the patterns (if any) of sharing information between 
Internet-media users and those who have no Internet access? 
2.3 Methods and Instruments 
To test the hypotheses and answer the research questions formulated above, both 
qualitative and quantitative research methods and techniques were employed.  
Specifically, the set of research methods implemented included the following: 
1.  Observation of Internet-users in their natural environment (Internet cafés and 
university computer labs) allowed determining their use patterns, skills, and habits.  A 
total over 300 hours of observation was completed in June-November 2007.  Some of the 
observed participants were interviewed in the Internet cafés, but follow-up interviews 
were not a necessary element of the research design. 
2.  Semi-structured focus groups with Internet users and traditional media users.  A 
total of 10 focus groups, seven with Internet users and three with non-users with 3-8 
participants in each, were conducted in October-December 2007.  The participants were 
recruited among the respondents in the face-to-face survey, as well as through flyers 
posted at universities and Internet-cafés.  
3. Face-to-face survey of 176 Bishkek residents and group surveys of 124 students of 
American University – Central Asia (AUCA), Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University 
(KTMU), Kyrgyz-Russian Slavonic University (KRSU), and Kyrgyz Technical University 
(KTU) on elements of good governance and assessment of the government performance.  
The survey was designed to identify the respondents’ level of political knowledge, 
behavioral options for coping with reality and media and Internet use patterns (see 
Appendix C, also presenting the variables’ coding scheme).  With no donor funding 
available, the face-to-face survey was conducted by a group of 12 trained student 
volunteers from AUCA and KTMU.  They have made a total of 489 approaches, and in 
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313 cases were turned down for the reasons of lack of time, unwillingness to participate 
in political surveys, or the length of the survey (on average, it took 25-30 minutes to 
complete one interview).  The following data were collected on non-respondents: 
gender, approximate age, and ethnicity.  Thus, the response rate of the face-to-face 
survey was 36 per cent. 
A mail and phone surveys were also attempted, with the response rate of .03 and 
.05 per cent respectively (400 phone calls yielded 20 completed interviews and 500-letter 
mailing – 14 filled out questionnaires).  The mail survey was based on a sampling frame 
provided by the National Statistics Committee from the latest available 1999 census, and 
58 letters returned as undeliverable, which testifies to the problems with the sample 
addresses.  In general, mail surveys in Kyrgyzstan are not common practice and it is 
inevitable that the addressees were suspicious about the political nature of the survey.   
The phone survey had similar problems: the first question the many hostile and 
unwilling respondents always asked was an angry “Where did you get my number?” or 
“I am not interested in politics,” followed sometimes by insults.  In many cases, people 
said they didn’t have time to answer questions or directly stated they were not going to 
discuss government and politics.  Due to the low response rates, the results of these 
surveys were not included into the final dataset. 
4.  Internet survey of web-based media users using the same instrument as in the 
face-to-face survey, with some questions replaced to measure Internet use patterns (see 
Appendix C).  The survey employed a snowball self-selected sample initiated on the 
online political forums and sites of the leading on-line media and passed on by the 
respondents to their friends and acquaintances.  A total of 115 people started the survey, 
and 10 responses were excluded because they answered only 3-7 questions of the 
questionnaire.  Thus, the total N for the online survey is 105.  The online survey has 
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produced the largest proportion of missing demographics data: 19 respondents dropped 
the survey as they reached the demographics section. These responses were still 
included into the final data set since the substantive questions had been answered and 
the demographics had been skipped perhaps for the fear of possible identification. 
With the three modes of collection combined, the total number of responses in the 
final dataset of the survey is 405.  While not representative, the survey still reflects 
accurately the opinions of younger Bishkek residents, especially students, and allows for 
comparisons between the users and non-users of Internet. 
2.3.1. Survey Instrument 
Some of the items in the questionnaire in Appendix C were designed specifically 
for the purpose of this research and therefore are original.  Other items, such as 
demographics, government performance approval, and media use, were formulated 
based on commonly used formats in Pew and other surveys, especially surveys that had 
been conducted in the post-Soviet environment.  The following subscales were 
borrowed from Gibson, Duch, and Tedin (1992): 
Support for the Norms of Democracy Subscale 
1. No matter what a person’s political beliefs are, he/she is entitled to the 
same legal rights and protections as anyone else 
2. It is necessary that everyone, regardless of their views, can express 
themselves freely 
 
Support for the Value of Dissent Subscale 
1. Kyrgyzstan’s government should become much more open to the public 
2. If an unjust law is passed, I could do nothing about it 
3. People should be able to participate in any organization even if this 
activity opposes some current laws 
4. We are more likely to have a healthy economy if the government allows 
more freedom for individuals to do as they wish 
 
Support for Independent Media Subscale 
1. The press should be protected by the law from persecution by the 
government 
2. Private radios, television, and newspapers should exist alongside state-
owned media. 
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In addition, the following scale was borrowed from Olsen (1969): 
Political Incapability Scale  
1. The public officials do not care much about what people like me think of 
their performance 
2. There is no way other than voting that people like me can influence 
actions of the government 
3. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that I can’t 
really understand what’s going on 
4. People like me don’t have much say about what the government does. 
 
 
These scales were selected because they have been reported to have high validity 
and because they have been earlier used in surveys conducted in Russia and other post-
Soviet republics, which are similar to Kyrgyzstan in terms of political systems and the 
characteristics of the population. 
The questionnaire was pretested in two focus groups with senior AUCA and 
KTMU journalism students, where they filled out the questionnaire and asked questions 
about the wording and meaning of the items.  Several adjustments to the questionnaire 
were made based on their comments, mostly in terms of the wording and better 
rendering of concepts in Russian.   
As a second step, a pre-test survey of 112 AUCA students was conducted in groups 
of 12-22 students at the end of classes.  The dataset produced by this pre-test was used 
to conduct factor analysis to make sure that the borrowed indexes worked correctly and 
to construct new indexes.  The preliminary factor analysis alerted to some differences 
with the original scaled borrowed for this project, as well as to the existence of the 
overall frustration with government index. 
After all the data were collected, another factor analysis was run on Items 10-38 of 
the final questionnaire presented in Appendix C. The analysis produced 29 components, 
with nine components explaining 53 per cent of variance and Eigen values of higher 
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than 1.00. On all 29 components, Eigen values range from the highest of 3.912 to the 
lowest of .388.  Such a disparity can be due to the fact that the variables measured 
various issues relating to good governance, tapping into both normative understanding 
and subjective perceptions, and at different points of time.   
For the purposes of constructing the indexes for this project, only the first three 
components were selected.  These components produced the following indexes: 1) level 
of frustration with the government, 2) support for norms of democracy, including free 
expression and independent media, and 3) understanding of own political incapacity 
(see Table 2.3.1.1). Although these three components explain cumulatively only 28% of 
the variance in the data, they loaded most of the variables from the original indexes 
borrowed for this project and the new variables of interest. 
As Table 2.3.1.1 shows, not all items from the original indexes loaded on the three 
extracted components for this study’s sample as it was expected. 
First, the original Value of Dissent Scale did not come out as a separate component.  
Two of its items (8 and 9 in the Table) loaded heavily on the Norms of Democracy 
component, which is logical because democratic norms include requirement for the 
government’s transparency and support for dissent.  Item 18, originally the second one 
from the Value of Dissent Scale, loaded better on Political Incapacity component, while 
Item 23 (third in the original scale) has low coefficients on all three components.   
This was the item that raised most questions in the pre-tests, focus groups, and 
group interviews, and many respondents pointed out that it went against their beliefs 
that law-abiding citizens cannot oppose the current laws, so such activity is illegal by 
definition.  In future surveys to be conducted in the post-Soviet space, this item should 
be reworded more clearly to tap at the concept of dissent or freedom of association. For 
the purpose of this paper, the item was left out from all scales. 
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Table 2.3.1.1.  Principal Component Factor Analysis 
#  
Questionnaire Item/Original Scale 
Frustration 
with Govt 
Norms of 
democracy 
Political 
Incapacity 
1. 
23. 
Q.38.  I believe my parliament representative would 
follow up on my concern if I express it 
.576   
2. 
5. 
Q.18.  The current government of Kyrgyzstan is 
committed to fight corruption 
.572   
3. 
4. 
Q.17.  Generally, the government can be trusted to 
implement policies that will improve people’s situation 
.552   
4. 
17. 
Q.31.  Those who are in power today understand that they 
were elected to serve rather than to rule the people 
.482   
5. 
 
Q.33.  The courts in Kyrgyzstan make decisions 
independently, without government officials’ interference 
.518   
6. 
 
Q.32.  I feel that if I had to seek a court’s protection I 
would receive a speedy and fair trial 
.515   
7. 
 
Q.25.  Anyone with appropriate skills and qualifications 
can enter a government agency and work for it 
.415   
8. 
 
Q.22.  Kyrgyzstan’s government should become much 
more open to the public/Value of Dissent Scale, Item 1 
 .487  
9. 
 
Q.16.  We are more likely to have a healthy economy if the 
government allows more freedom for individuals to do as 
they wish/Value of Dissent Scale, Item 4 
 .425  
10. 
 
Q.11.  No matter what a person’s political beliefs are, 
he/she is entitled to the same legal rights and protections 
as anyone else/Norms of Democracy Scale, Item 1 
 .400  
11. 
 
Q.34.  It is necessary that everyone, regardless of their 
views, can express themselves freely/ Norms of 
Democracy Scale, Item 2 
 .593  
12. 
 
Q.30.  Private media should exist alongside state-owned 
ones/ Independent Media Scale, Item 2 
 .480  
13. 
 
Q.20.  The press should be protected by the law from 
persecution by the government/Ind. Media Scale, Item 1 
 .318  
14. 
 
Q.21.  Today it is less dangerous for individuals to 
criticize the government than before March 2005 
 .267  
15. Q.29.  In Kyrgyzstan, demonstrations and protests are 
effective in influencing a government decision 
 .241  
16. 
 
Q.19.  Generally, the government is tolerant to criticism 
from opposition and media 
 .221  
17. 
 
Q.36.  People like me don’t have much say about what the 
government does/Political Incapacity Scale, Item 4 
  .575 
18. 
 
Q.23.  If an unjust law is passed, I could do nothing about 
it/ Value of Dissent Scale, Item 2 
 .049 .523 
19. 
 
Q.35.  Sometimes politics and government seem so 
complicated that I can’t really understand what’s going on 
/Political Incapacity Scale, Item 3 
  .409 
20. 
 
Q.10.  There is no way other than voting that people like 
me can influence the actions of the government/ Political 
Incapacity Scale, Item 2 
  .348 
21. 
 
Q.27.  As an individual, I can do something to improve 
the current situation in Kyrgyzstan for the better 
.369  -.395 
22. 
 
Q.28.  The public officials do not care much about what 
people like me think of their performance/ Political 
Incapacity scale, Item 1 
-.369  .158 
23. Q.26.  People should be able to participate in any 
organization even if this activity opposes some current 
laws/ Value of Dissent Scale, Item 3 
-.029 .061 .126 
Eigen Value 3.912 2.243 1.858 
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Second, Item 22 (originally from the Political Incapacity Scale) loaded much better 
on Frustration with Government component, where it is a negative equivalent of Item 21 
(measure of individual political capacity).  It was ultimately left out from the final 
Political Incapacity Index, which included four items (Items 17-20 in the Table). 
The Norms of Democracy component was subdivided into three 3-item indexes:  
Support for Norms of Democracy (Items 8-10), Independent Media and Free Expression 
(Items 11-13), and Tolerance of Dissent (Items 14-16).   
Finally, the Frustration with Government component was divided into two 
subscales: Frustration with Performance (Items 1-4) and Frustration with the System 
(Items 5-7).  These two subscales were also combined into one Overall Frustration with 
Government Index and used in subsequent regression models. 
In addition to these scales, three composite indexes were created to capture 
political knowledge (five items, Questions 4-8 in Appendix C), media use (five items, 
dummy variables in Question 53), and citizen activity, or political involvement (three 
items, Questions 63-65 in Appendix C).  For the variables, indexes and their coding 
schemes see Appendix D. 
2.3.2. Sample Characteristics 
The samples for the three methods used in this study were slightly different.  The 
observations, naturally, allowed for no sample selection techniques, and only estimated 
guesses could be made about the observed users’ age and ethnic origin.  The level of 
comfort and observed speed of working on the Internet allowed to estimate how 
experienced the users are, however, no visible association was observed between the 
skill level and types of Internet activities the users were involved in.  It was observed 
that there was no dominance of a particular ethnicity among the users: Kyrgyz, Russians 
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and other ethnic minorities were represented in the observed sample.  There were 
slightly more men than women in the observation sample, and males tended to 
populate the Internet cafés more than females in the evenings. Younger people were 
clearly dominating the Internet cafés compared to older people.  
Since the focus groups were aimed at understanding how the Internet users 
process and share information, the participants were mostly students and staff (ages 18-
25) of American University – Central Asia, Kyrgyz-Turkish Manas University, Kyrgyz-
Russian Slavonic University, Kyrgyz Technical University, Bishkek Humanitarian 
University, and Kyrgyz National University.  Females dominated the sample: in 7 focus 
groups of 3-8 participants, a total of 28 females participated and 15 males.  In terms of 
ethnic composition, the focus groups were diverse (with Russians, Koreans, Uzbeks, and 
Tatars in the sample), although there were more Kyrgyz (20 of 42) than other ethnic 
group representatives.  The three focus groups with non-users of the Internet included 
13 participants (five males and eight females) and were more diverse in terms of age 
(ranging from early 20s to mid-50s), and ethnicity, with Russians, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and 
Tatars represented.  
As for the survey sample, it includes a total of 405 respondents.  In terms of the 
gender composition, it is roughly reflective of Kyrgyzstan’s general population, where 
females comprise about 53 per cent.  In the sample, of 385 respondents, whose gender 
was identified or indicated (20 cases with missing gender data come from the online 
survey), 164 (42.6 per cent) are males, and 221 (57.4 per cent) – females.   
A total of 373 respondents in the sample identified their ethnicity.  Of them, 243 
(65.1 per cent) are Kyrgyz, 85 (22.8 per cent) – Russians, 6 (1.6 per cent) – Uzbeks, and 39 
(10.5 per cent) identify with other ethnic groups, such as Kazakhs, Ukrainians, Tatars, 
Uigurs, Dungans, Jews, and Germans.  According to the recent National Statistics 
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Committee estimates, Kyrgyzstan’s population currently consists of about 52 per cent 
Kyrgyz, 30 per cent Uzbeks, 12 per cent Russian, and the rest – other ethnic minorities.  
The sample for this study, then, slightly over-represents Kyrgyz and Russians and 
substantially under-represents Uzbeks.  However, given that the sample was drawn in 
Bishkek, the capital city in the north, while most Uzbek population is concentrated in 
the southern regions of the country, the sample actually reflects accurately the ethnic 
composition of the capital city, where Russians are estimated to comprise about 25 per 
cent and Kyrgyz – about 60 per cent, with the remaining 15 per cent represented by 
other ethnic minorities. 
Due to the subject availability, the sample over represents young people: a total of 
233 respondents (60.1 per cent of 388 who reported the age) are within the first two 
categories of 25 and younger.  The other age groups are distributed more or less evenly, 
from 2.1 to 9.8 per cent of respondents in each category.  This variation still allows for 
meaningful age comparisons, especially when it comes to comparisons between the 
traditional and Internet-based media users, who are generally younger than those who 
do not use the Internet. 
The two largest income groups lay on both extremes of the sample: of 337 people 
who indicated income, 65 (19.3 per cent) reported income of $700 or more, while 63 
respondents (18.7 per cent) - $100-199.  Twenty-nine of 65 high-income respondents 
filled out the online survey from higher-income countries like the USA, Great Britain, 
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Russia and Kazakhstan, thus skewing the sample considerably.   
Overall, the income variable presents significant problems with 68 (16.8 per cent) 
cases with missing data and cumulative percent of the three lowest categories of about 
47.  In a country like Kyrgyzstan, which is a cash economy with many economic 
activities “in the shadow,” it is inevitable that income will be under-reported or not 
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reported at all. This is also indirectly confirmed by the fact that in many personal 
interviews respondents asked if the data on income would be reported to the 
government.  Even with these problems, however, the income variable reflects the 
general tendency that there is no middle class majority in Kyrgyzstan, and most people 
fall on either of the two ends – poor or well-off.  This is why the concept of “average” 
income does not make substantive sense and creates difficulties for statistical analysis.17  
When the missing values are substituted with the mean in the regression models, many 
variables that were significant lose statistical significance. 
Related to income, 177 respondents, or 46.5 per cent of those who reported their 
employment status are students, and another 46.4 percent – employed at least part-time, 
with 4.7 and 2.4 per cent of unemployed and pensioners respectively.  Finally, the 
sample over represents educated people, with 47.8 per cent reporting incomplete higher 
education (this category includes student respondents), 34.3 per cent – completed higher 
education, and 6.8 per cent – an advanced academic degree. 
Proceeding to political interest, the largest category of the respondents – 135, or 
34.8 per cent of 388 who answered this question – indicated that they had a moderate 
interest in politics.  Those whose interest is at the two lower levels comprise 20.6 per 
cent, and those with higher levels of political interest – combined 44.6 per cent.  This, in 
fact, is congruent with the actual levels of political knowledge: those who answered 
correctly three questions of the 5-item scale comprise 22.5 per cent of the sample, while 
those with high and highest levels of knowledge combined make up 54.6 per cent of the 
sample.  Only two respondents (.5 per cent) did not answer a single question correctly. 
                                                 
17 The National Statistics Committee of Kyrgyzstan reported that the average salary at the end of February 2007 
was 2.869 som, or about $80, and as of February 2008 – 4.407 som, or $115 (24.kg, Economic news (April 22, 
2008), http://eng.24.kg/business/2008/04/22/5197.html).  
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The distribution of the media consumption falls mostly on the lower end: 46.7 per 
cent of respondents identified that they use only one or two media outlets as a source of 
political information, 25.4 per cent – three media sources, and 12.6 and 7.9 per cent – 
four and five media respectively.  However, this is at least partly compensated by the 
Internet use: out of 271 (66.9 per cent of the total sample) Internet users, 260 reported 
that they use Internet-based media to obtain information on politics and public affairs.  
In subsequent analyses, both variables – Internet use in general and Internet-based 
media use will be used, depending on the purpose of the model. 
2.4 Results and Discussion 
This section presents the results of various regression models based on the 
relationships identified in Figure 2.2.2, as well as results of focus groups and 
observations to provide depth and detail on the survey findings.  The models will 
correspond to the key elements in Figure 2.2.2, starting with evaluation of government 
performance, evaluation of media performance, perception of the respondents’ 
economic situation and rights and liberties after March 2005, and ending with the 
respondents’ political involvement and perceptions of their future in Kyrgyzstan. 
However, it is necessary to start with the understanding of the factors driving the 
political interest and political knowledge since they are key for understanding 
differences between various media users.  
2.4.1 Political Interest and Political Knowledge 
These two variables are key to understanding of people’s perceptions of good 
governance.  Thus, the analysis will start with exploration of what demographic 
variables drive them in the sample of this study.  Many earlier research studies showed 
that political interest is driven by such demographic factors as age, gender and 
education, as well as income and media use patterns.   
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For the purposes of this study, it is reasonable to assume that the political interest 
may be a function of how satisfied the citizens are with their economic situation and 
rights and liberties because higher levels of frustration with own current situation can 
lead to either higher political interest and involvement out of protest or higher levels of 
alienation from politics.  Political interest, in its turn, should determine political 
knowledge, which is key to understanding of good governance. 
To test Hypothesis 1, I started with political interest, coded from 1=not interested 
at all to 5=extremely interested. Table 2.4.1.1 presents the regression analyses results.  It 
should be noted that the demographic variables explain only about 13 and 17 per cent of 
the variance in political interest in Models 1 and 2 respectively, which means that there 
must be something else, most probably on the experiential side, that influences to what 
extent people are interested in the political matters.  In the focus groups, however, it 
consistently came out that those who struggle economically are more alienated from 
politics.  One participant, pensioner Elena18, for example, stated the following:  
When you have to… uh, always think about how to put bread on your table 
and uh… not to become a burden for your children, you think about politics the 
last.  I am happy when I live through the day without thinking what I will eat 
tomorrow or… how to pay the utility bills that eat up one third of my pension…  
And you are talking about politics… our politicians don’t care about us, why 
should I think about them? 
 
 
Another participant, a part-time saleswoman at a struggling cosmetic store, also 
noted that the government’s indifference deters her from paying attention to politics: 
I work only because my pension is miserable.  I would be much happier, at my 
age, to sit at home and babysit my grandkids.  But if I don’t work, I will die of 
hunger – no one can survive on 765 som [about $18] a month…  I wish our 
politicians tried to live on such a pension.  They are either clueless or don’t care.   
                                                 
18 Names of focus group participants are changed for confidentiality reasons. 
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I am OK, though, because I still can work.  Many people my age and older have to 
live on their pension.  I have a neighbor, baba Valya, whose children left for 
Russia… she refused to go, and now she is alone. She literally survives on bread, 
milk, and water, tea on a good day.   When I think about people like her… and she 
had worked all her life, her husband got killed in World War II and this is how the 
government now is paying her back, when she is old and sick… it makes me really 
angry.  Why should I care about politics when the government couldn’t care less 
about people? I simply stopped reading or listening to them… I read newspapers 
for crossword puzzles only… 
 
 
Income catches some of this relationship between the economic situation and 
political interest, showing that indeed as income increases by one unit, the interest in 
politics increases by .06 units (Model 2).   
Table 2.4.1.1. Determinants of Political Interest 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Independent 
variables 
B SE t B SE t B SE t 
(Constant) 2.177*** .247 7.959 2.056*** .288 7.139 2.338 .400 5.846 
1. Media Use .199*** .044 7.959 .236*** .045 5.207 .240*** .046 5.221 
2. Education .151* .082 2.118 .093 .085 1.092 .068 .087 .782 
3. Age .018 .029 .609 .029 .030 .328 .042 .031 1.390 
4. Gender -.255** .116 -2.206 -.288** .119 -2.418 -.305** .120 -2.533 
5. Internet use .362** .143 2.282 .317** .159 1.999 .355** .162 2.191 
6. Kyrgyz .424** .164 2.585 .294* .167 2.060 .320* .168 2.187 
7. Russians -.044 .191 -.016 -.103 .195 -.525 -.123 .196 -.628 
8. Income    .055** .024 2.272 .052** .025 2.120 
9. Government 
works for people 
      .025 .054 .466 
10. Public officials 
are indifferent 
      -.002 .053 -.030 
11. Perceptions of 
rights and liberties 
      -.115* .065 -2.045 
12. Perceptions of 
economic situation 
      -.042 .053 -.782 
Model summary N=382,  R2=.127,  
F=7.752*** 
N=334,  R2=.165,  
F=8.029*** 
N=333,  R2=.177,  
F=5.741*** 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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Since the income variable is problematic in the sample, three perceptual variables 
were introduced in Model 3 to see if perceptions of the government’s indifference as 
well as perceptions of own economic reality and political rights may play a role in 
political interest.  However, this did not increase the explained variance in political 
interest significantly and of the four variables, only the perception of rights and liberties 
turned out significant, indicating, as it was hypothesized, that the higher levels of 
frustration with own economic situation results into lower levels of political interest 
(alienation from political matters).  
The findings from this analysis are significant for this project, as they show that 
using the Internet media is strongly and positively associated with the political interest: 
being an Internet media user increases the political interest by .362.   
Thus, the data from this sample fully supports Hypothesis 1 (a) that use of the 
Internet-based media increases political interest.  Moreover, several participants in focus 
groups pointed out that their political interest was stimulated by the use of Internet.  
The following is what one of the students described: 
Zulfiya: “I didn’t care about politics until I was given a task for my polisci class 
– to make a presentation on the system of governance in Kyrgyzstan… basic stuff: 
who is the president, what his authorities are, how the balance of powers works, 
something like that…  Before that assignment, I didn’t even know that my country 
was a presidential republic.  So, I started to do the Internet search and stumbled 
upon a discussion about President Bakiev on Diesel forum.  I got hooked and now 
am totally addicted.  There are so many people on that forum, and they all know 
so much more, it is amazing.  I always go there when I don’t understand 
something about politics… or just want to learn something new.” 
 
 
Another participant, a Turkish University student, had a similar experience with an 
Internet-based newspaper: 
Maria: “I wanted to find “Bely Parohod,” Chingiz Aitmatov’s novel, on the 
Internet.  The first link Google gave me was… the Bely Parohod newspaper.  I never 
heard about it before and, uh…, as a student of journalism I got interested and 
decided to have a look. Oh, the comments the people leave there for each article!.. 
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It is like a micro cosmos of our entire society – those who love the president and 
those who hate him, and they fight all the time.  Sometimes they leave offensive 
comments, but I think this is exactly what attracts other readers, as well as the 
rumors they spread and discuss there.  It’s like the gossip column on politics run 
by the people themselves… I now start my day by reading this site, and when I 
share it with my friends, they always ask now if I read this on Bely Parohod…” 
 
 
Several more participants pointed out that their political interest was stimulated by 
links to stories and political analyses that friends had sent to them by email.  Thus, both 
the survey and the focus groups show that Internet use is strongly and positively 
associated with political interest.   
In addition, the survey shows that, consistent with many other studies, being a 
woman decreases political interest, persistently in all three models in Table 2.4.1.2.  
Media Use Index is also highly significant in all models, showing that with every new 
type of medium added to the user’s mix, political interest increases by .199, .236 and .238 
in the three models respectively.   
Another interesting finding is that being a Kyrgyz matters for political interest.  
Being Russian, on the other hand, decreases political interest, although this relationship 
is not statistically significant.  This may be explained by the fact that as a titular nation 
Kyrgyz have more vested interested in the political matters.  Russians, on the other 
hand, are becoming more and more excluded from the governance system, and 
therefore feel alienated and lose interest to the political matters and public affairs. 
Surprisingly, education has a statistically significant effect only in Model 1 and no 
effect in Models 2 and 3, while age has no effect in any of the three models.  This can be 
explained by the homogeneity in the variables: perhaps they behave this way because 
they do not vary much due to dominating students in the sample.   
However, in the focus groups it often came up that age matters for political interest 
and younger people are less interested in politics than older and more mature citizens.   
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As an example, consider this exchange between AUCA students in a focus group: 
Aida: “I think young people are simply not interested in politics.” 
Moderator: “Hmm…Why do you think this is the case?” 
Aida: “I don’t know… being young we are not burdened by children, families 
and other responsibilities, I guess…  When you have those responsibilities, uh, 
you start thinking about the government in a different way.  I look at my sister 
who has a baby, and she is now totally different.  She is concerned about the 
health care because the baby gets sick, and is thinking about quality of education.  
I guess the next step for her will be thinking, like, ‘what does the government do 
to improve these things?’ Yeah, I am far from this, personally.” 
Olga: “A-ha, at this point we think more about how to study well…” 
Bermet, interrupting: “and how to party well.” [laughs] 
Olga: “Yes, exactly… we all have friends we want to hang out with, and 
honestly, we rarely talk about politics…” 
 
 
In another focus group with non-users of Internet, and older participant reiterated 
the same idea: 
Ainagul, accountant, 45: “My daughter is a student, and she studies so hard she 
has no time to take a break…  When I start talking with her about politics and 
government, she… she knows a lot because she has access to Internet and they 
discuss things in their classes, but she is not interested at all.  She thinks politics is 
boring… I guess I am not like that – I always go to vote and want to know what is 
going on… She just wants to have fun, and sometimes it is frustrating how 
indifferent she is…” 
Sergei, high school sports coach, 26: “Do you remember yourself at that age? 
Were you interested in politics then?” 
Ainagul, pausing: “Hmm… Good question. I guess, not. I also wanted to spend 
time with my friends and, uh, have fun more than anything else. But those were 
different times [Soviet Union]. The government took good care of us…  now 
everything is so uncertain… I think about my job, my family, my country all the 
time… I hope my daughter will come around and grow up as well… It is 
impossible not to be concerned when life is so hard…” 
Sergei: “Yeah, but right now she is not concerned because she has you… You as 
parents take care of her, feed her, clothe her, so why should she be concerned?  
Give her some time… or kick her out of the house [laughs].  Then she’ll definitely 
start looking at everything from a different angle, when she is independent.” 
Natalia, Sergei’s girlfriend: “Someone speaking from his own experience…” 
Sergei, smiling: “Yeah, I moved in with you two years ago, remember?” 
 
 
The theme that young people are not mature and responsible enough to be deeply 
interested in politics came up in the focus groups again and again.  However, during 
debriefing at the end of the focus groups, when asked whether they learned something 
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new and useful, many of the younger participants emphasized that their interest in 
politics was renewed.  One of the participants formulated her feelings this way: 
Aigul, a KRSU student: “This was really refreshing.  I didn’t know what focus 
groups were, so I came only out of curiosity… and it wasn’t a time wasted.  
Usually, the teachers ask us questions only to test our knowledge, and are 
interested in what we say only as long as it is a correct answer in their minds, to 
put it nicely.  Here, it felt like, uh, you were genuinely interested in our opinions, 
and wanted us to discuss things…  I liked the discussion, and, uh, that we all had 
such different opinions and views and didn’t fight about them, but simply 
talked… I will think about politics in a different way now, and will be more 
curious about the government and governance issues…” 
 
 
Returning to the survey results, they should be considered with caution in terms of 
the causal direction.  Even though the results show that the political interest is driven by 
Internet use, it may be also that the people who are more interested in political matters 
move to the Internet because they cannot find sufficient information in the traditional 
media and are attracted by the Internet resources and communities where the 
discussions are much more open.  Indeed, as Table 2.4.1.1a below shows, the regression 
models with the same variables as in Table 2.4.1.1 with the exception that the dependent 
variable (political interest) becomes an independent one, and the Internet Use variable is 
the variable of interest, have higher levels of explained variance and much higher F-
values than the models with political interest as a dependent variable. 
As the table shows, political interest indeed determines Internet use.  Internet use is 
also driven by education, income, and age: higher educated respondents, respondents 
with higher levels of income, and younger people use Internet more.  Finally, Internet 
use is also determined by the respondents’ perceptions of their economic situation and 
rights and liberties: those people who disagree more that their situation improved after 
March 2005 use Internet in contrast to non-users, who are associated with lower levels of 
frustration with the personal economic situation and rights and liberties. 
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Table 2.4.1.1a. Determinants of Internet Use 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Independent 
variables 
B SE t B SE t B SE T 
(Constant) .490*** .103 4.748 .288** .106 2.701 .033 .147 .226 
1. Media Use -.010 .016 -.587 .004 .016 .228 -.001 .016 -.090 
2. Education .155*** .029 5.410 .109*** .029 3.754 .117*** .029 4.004 
3. Age -.109*** .009 -12.394 -.099*** .009 -11.384 -.098*** .009 -10.920 
4. Gender .014 .042 .343 .003 .042 .082 .017 .042 .405 
5. Political interest .042* .018 2.282 .038* .019 1.999 .040* .019 2.095 
6. Kyrgyz -.033 .059 -.547 -.003 .058 -.056 -.007 .058 -.116 
7. Russians .032 .069 .465 .063 .068 .929 .070 .067 1.033 
8. Income    .054*** .008 6.730 .051*** .008 6.348 
9. Government 
works for people 
      -.002 .018 -.105 
10. Public officials 
are indifferent 
      .020 .018 1.101 
11. Perceptions of 
rights and liberties 
      .037* .022 1.985 
12. Perceptions of 
economic situation 
      .034* .016 2.202 
Model summary N=382,  R2=.310,  
F=24.030*** 
N=334,  R2=.421,  
F=29.582*** 
N=333,  R2=.440,  
F=20.921*** 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
These results suggest that the causality between the political interest and Internet 
use is two-directional, but this study does not provide sufficient data to test it further.  
One of the recommendations for future research is to conduct the same survey at 
different points of time so that the true causality could be established through the 
dynamic statistical models. 
Returning to the relationships central for this study, political interest should 
influence political knowledge.  Indeed, the two variables have a meaningful correlation 
coefficient of .21, significant at .01 level. As the results of multiple regression analysis 
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show, a one-unit change in political interest indeed increases political knowledge by 
.113 units (see Table 2.4.1.2). To explore what other variable are associated with political 
knowledge and to test Hypothesis 1 (b), the same demographic and perceptual variables 
as in Table 2.4.1.1 were included into regression models as independent variables. 
Table 2.4.1.2. Determinants of Political Knowledge 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Independent 
variables 
B SE t B SE t B SE t 
(Constant)  2.159*** .309 6.961 2.585*** .450 5.741 2.474*** .412 6.003 
1. Media Use .100** .047 2.119 .084* .051 1.634 .114** .047 2.415 
2. Education .137 .087 1.587 .191* .093 2.047 .152^ .087 1.749 
3. Age .071** .031 2.340 .061^ .033 1.869 .073** .031 2.378 
4. Gender -.202^ .122 -1.657 -.116 .130 -.894 -.167 .121 -1.375 
5. Internet Media 
Use 
.416** .150 2.769 .438** .175 2.510 .426** .151 2.833 
6. Kyrgyz .107 .173 .043 .112 .181 .619 .103 .172 .596 
7. Russians -.253 .200 -1.265 -.234 .210 -1.116 -.254 .198 -1.285 
8. Income    -.016 .026 -.623    
9. Government 
works for people 
   .090 .058 1.558 .093^ .054 1.720 
10. Public officials 
are Indifferent 
   -.132* .056 -2.351 -.128* .052 -2.454 
11. Perceptions of 
rights & liberties 
   -.133* .070 -1.897 -.146* .065 -2.224 
12. Perceptions of 
econ. situation 
   .066 .057 1.150 .074 .054 1.373 
13. Political Interest .113** .054 2.095 .096^ .060 1.597 .109* .054 2.038 
Model Summary N=382,  R2=.105,  
F=5.457*** 
N=333,  R2=.125,  
F=3.508*** 
N=381,  R2=.141,  
F=5.032*** 
^p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
In this set of models, income behaves differently than in the models with political 
interest as a dependent variable.  When added in Model 2, due to missing cases, income 
drives the proportion of explained variance down compared to Model 3 with the same 
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variables where it was excluded.  In addition, it is not statistically significant, therefore I 
will focus on Models 1 and 3. 
In these models, there are tendencies similar to the determinants of political 
interest: again, media use index and Internet media use are positively and significantly 
associated with political knowledge, providing support for Hypothesis 1 (b).  Some 
differences are present as well: in contrast to political interest, political knowledge is not 
driven by either ethnic origin or gender.  Another difference is that age becomes highly 
significant: as age moves up one unit (five years), the political knowledge increases by 
.073 units (Model 3).  Also, education is positively associated with political knowledge, 
although this relationship is only marginally statistically significant. 
The most intriguing findings in this model are that political knowledge is 
determined by the belief that public officials do not care about what people think of 
their performance and by the perception of current political rights and liberties.  As the 
regression coefficients show, the more people agree that their rights and liberties are 
better than before March 2005, and the more the respondents disagree that public 
officials are indifferent, the less is their political knowledge.  In other words, less 
knowledgeable and rights-conscious citizens have a stronger belief that the government 
actually cares about what they think of its performance (ignorance is bliss?).  It is logical 
to assume that if the government does not perform well, the relationship will also run in 
the opposite direction: the higher political knowledge will enforce the belief that the 
government does not care about what citizens think of its work.  This model will be 
considered later in the section on perceptions of government performance.  
To sum up, by providing strong support to Hypotheses 1 (a) and (b), the findings 
that both the media use index and Internet use are strong predictors of political interest 
and political knowledge allow for further exploration of other variables central for this 
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study, namely, respondents’ perceptions of experienced and imposed reality, evaluation 
of government performance, and their future in Kyrgyzstan.  
We will start by exploring how the respondents assess the imposed reality 
constructed by the traditional media and how they evaluate their rights and economic 
situation after March 2005 (experienced reality).  Then we will move to how the 
respondents evaluate the government performance from various angles. Finally, we will 
conclude with how the respondents see their future in Kyrgyzstan (“exit” options) and 
whether civic activity plays the role of “voice.” 
2.4.2 Perceptions of Constructed Reality 
The content analysis of referendum coverage presented in Chapter 1 earlier has 
shown that different types of media create different realities of good governance for the 
citizens.  It is important to understand how the citizens on the receiving end evaluate 
these constructed realities.  To measure the evaluations of the “imposed” reality, or 
reality constructed by the traditional media, I selected the variable “Do you believe that 
the TV channels, radio and newspapers you use do a decent job in covering national 
politics?” assuming that the high levels of disapproval will be serving as a proxy for 
negative evaluation of constructed reality.   
A logical assumption here, based on the theoretical model in Figure 2.2.2 is that if 
through the use of the traditional media and Internet-based media people are exposed to 
both constructed realities – those that promote the official point of view and those that 
provide an alternative view – they will have more negative evaluations of the officially 
imposed reality because they have an opportunity to compare and contrast information.  
Political interest and political knowledge should also play the role in this process: more 
politically interested and knowledgeable citizens should be more critical of the reality 
constructed by the state-controlled media. 
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The results of regression analysis for the media performance evaluation presented 
in Table 2.4.2.1 show that the model is quite weak.  It explains only eight per cent of 
variance in the media approval variable and has an F value significant at p=.013.  There 
must be some other independent variables, not available for this sample, which would 
explain the media performance better. One factor explaining the difficulties with this 
variable may be relating to self-esteem: people would most probably have hard time 
admitting that they consume the media performing their job poorly.  For future studies, 
better variables should be designed to measure the perceptions of reality constructed by 
the traditional media. 
Table 2.4.2.1. Approval of Media Performance 
Independent Variables B SE t 
(Constant) -.018 .184 -.097 
1. Internet media use  -.057 .073 -.778 
2. Media Use Index  .013 .021 .619 
3. Complexity of Politics and Political Incapacity  -.025 .021 -1.186 
4. Education  .048 .038 1.249 
5. Age -.005 .014 -.364 
6. Income -.009 .011 -.856 
7. Gender .009 .054 .166 
8. Political Knowledge -.007 .022 -.303 
9. Political Interest -.002 .025 -.067 
10. Kyrgyz .272*** .075 3.637 
11. Russians .167* .086 1.929 
12. Civic Activity Index .039 .039 .999 
13. Governments’ tolerance to criticism from 
opposition and media .059** .023 2.595 
Model summary N= 326,  R2=.081,  F= 2.114* 
^p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
However, even this weak model shows that the relationship between the Internet 
media use and media job approval is negative, albeit statistically insignificant. That is, as 
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it was suggested in Hypothesis 2, Internet media users are more critical of traditional 
media’s performance.  A strongly significant factor in this model is ethnic origin: both 
Russians and Kyrgyz evaluate the media they consume positively.  Another significant 
predictor is the government’s tolerance to criticism from opposition and media: those 
who agree that the government is tolerant approve of media performance.  
In short, this analysis provides no support for Hypothesis 2 that Internet media 
users would have more critical and negative evaluations of media performance than the 
traditional media users. 
At least a partial explanation was provided by focus groups with non-users of 
Internet.  The exchanges there showed that when the difference between the official, 
constructed reality and experienced reality is big, the people do not need a referent 
alternative reality constructed by independent online media to make negative 
evaluations.  One of the focus groups illustrates this very well in this exchange: 
Moderator: There is so much information on the Internet about the government 
and politics that is not available in the traditional media… aren’t you interested? 
Sergei: Not really.  I don’t need the Internet to understand that the government 
lies.  A simple example: Bakiev may tell me all he wants that, uh, the school 
education improved because… uh, if you can believe it, he now provides free milk 
and cookies to the pupils, like in Soviet times (scoffs).  My niece is in the second 
grade… I know how much my sister pays every month for her “free” education: 
for school repairs, textbooks, contribution to teachers’ salaries, mentors, and what 
not… 
Ainagul: And the hospitals? Bribes to the doctors and nurses, meals for the 
patients, medicine and, uh, tools that you need to bring in for any simple 
treatment… and they are talking about free health care… 
Sergei:  Exactly! Wherever you look – corruption, decay and lies everywhere… 
Of course newspapers, they… will not write about this… or if they do, they 
always blame some small-time bureaucrat, a scapegoat.  I am not a fool, I can see 
through the government’s lies.  I just feel powerless to do anything about it… 
Moderator: Why? 
Sergei:  How do you talk to the people who are sitting so high above you, you 
can’t just knock on their door… and even if you could, how do you explain to the 
people who tell you that this is white when it is indeed black?  Sometimes I think 
they convinced themselves that black is white… 
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This conversation illustrates not only that people are capable of contrasting their 
realities with the lies the government feeds them, but also that they are highly skeptical 
about their own capacity to change anything.  Another example from a focus group also 
shows that people maintain a certain sense of humor about the situation: 
Ivan, martial arts coach, early 20s:  You know, I don’t believe the government 
tales.  I heard that people in Uzbekistan now call their country… “Karimov’s 
fairytale land” because the tales he tells are so different from the reality people live 
in… we are not far from this… I guess our country can be called a “field of 
miracles,” like in that famous song from childhood, “field of miracles in the 
country of fools…” except that we are in the country of no fools.  Only our 
government thinks we are fools and continues to feed us bullsh… I don’t think I 
am a fool, and I don’t buy the government’s lies, I am just tired of them and don’t 
believe them… 
Moderator: Do you think you can do anything about it? 
Ivan: Like what? Protest, participate in the demonstrations, you mean (scoffs)? 
Moderator: Why not? 
Ivan: We all know what the March 2005 protests led too… 
Elmira, state employee, mid-50s:  Yeah, Bishkek residents were really scared 
then, especially when looting started… that alone would prevent reasonable 
people from participation in any demonstrations, even for May 1 [Labor Day 
celebrations with famous workers’ parades in the Soviet Union]… 
Tatiana, music teacher, early 20s: I guess people are just tired of all these 
political actions and protests, and are afraid that there will be violence again… all 
these spring and fall ‘side effects’ of democracy [most of protest activity in 
Kyrgyzstan between 2005 and 2007 fell for spring and fall] are just too much for 
the people… 
Moderator: All right, how about voting? 
Ivan: Yeah, that’s like what… uh, once in four years?  What can the voting 
change?  Those who want to stay in power will find a way without my vote… 
 
Thus, as these exchanges show, people with an ability to think critically can 
deconstruct the reality created by the government and the media it controls by 
contrasting it with what they see and experience every day.  It should be noted that in 
focus groups it was usually the people with higher levels of education and more life 
experiences (older respondents) who demonstrated this ability. 
It is important now to understand what determines the perceptions of the reality 
people experience in their daily lives, which will be considered in the next section. 
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2.4.3 Perceptions of Experienced Reality 
Perceptions of the respondents’ current reality were measured with two questions: 
“My economic situation today is better than before March 2005” and “As an individual I 
have more rights and freedoms today than before March 2005,” both with answer 
options ranging from 1 = “strongly agree” to 5 = “strongly disagree.”   
While it is more difficult to assess the changes in personal rights and liverties, the 
economic situation is something that the people were more comfortable with evaluating. 
Kyrgyzstan’s economic situation worsened after the March 2005 Tulip Revolution: there 
is no improvement in economic growth, the country’s external debt is increasing, and 
for the first time in 17 years of independence the country with abundant hydro energy 
resources is facing a deep energy crisis.  It is important to explore whether the citizens of 
Kyrgyzstan understand how this overall situation affects their individual life by 
measuring their perception of economic wellbeing and rights as citizens.   
According to the model in Figure 2.2.2, the perceptions of experienced reality will 
be shaped by the government’s performance, including the approval ratings for the 
president and the parliament, spread of corruption and to what extent citizens are 
involved in it, directly and indirectly, as well as normative understanding of democracy 
and the key demographic variables. 
The first set of regression analyses presented in Table 2.4.3.1 looks at how satisfied 
the citizens of Kyrgyzstan are with their current economic situation. At the outset it 
should be noted that the majority of the respondents – 260, or 64.2 per cent – disagreed 
(39.5 per cent) or strongly disagreed (24.7 per cent) that their economic situation 
improved after March 2005.  By the same pattern, 317 (78.3 per cent) of respondents 
strongly disagreed (31.1 per cent) or disagreed (47.2 percent) that their rights and 
liberties improved after the March 2005 Revolution.  
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As Table 2.4.3.1 shows, the extent to which the respondents think their economic 
situation today is better than before March 2005 is indeed determined by several 
demographic variables and the factors related to government performance (Model 1). 
The first one of such factors is the spread of corruption: as people’s evaluation of 
corruption moves from “corruption is pervasive” toward “corruption is rare” by one 
unit, the agreement that their current economic situation is better than before March 
2005 increases by .230 units.  This means that lower levels of corruption are associated 
with better economic situation, which is logical.  
The second variable relating to government performance that affects perceptions of 
current economic situation is the evaluation of the government’s effort to solve current 
problems the country is facing (coded from 1=they do everything possible, to 5=they 
don’t care).  As the values of this variable move from positive to negative by 1 unit, the 
satisfaction with the current economic situation decreases by .157 units, which is also 
logical and expected. 
The third variable behaves similarly: as President Bakiev’s approval rating 
(0=disapprove, 1=50/50, 2=approve) moves from negative to positive, the evaluation of 
the respondents’ own current economic situation increases by .292. It is interesting that 
even though marginally significant at p=.103, the parliament approval rating has the 
negative effect on agreement about improved economic situation, perhaps because the 
Parliament was considered to be in opposition to the president. 
Surprisingly, income is not statistically significant in this model, although it is 
considered to be one of the major factors, along with education, which drives the 
satisfaction with the economic situation.  Education behaves in the expected direction: 
its association with the perception of current economic situation is positive, i.e. higher 
educated people agree that their economic situation after March 2005 improved.  
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Table 2.4.3.1. Satisfaction with Current Economic Situation  
Model 1 Model 2 
 Independent Variables 
B SE t B SE t 
 (Constant) 2.439*** .583 4.186 1.980*** .585 3.386 
 1.  Appropriateness of democracy for 
Kyrgyzstan .003 .151 .019 -.021 .148 -.143 
 2. State function is to serve people .016 .106 .154 .023 .104 .217 
 3. Spread of corruption .230* .112 2.057 .184^ .110 1.671 
 4. Relatives and friends gave bribes 
in the last 3 months -.087 .148 -.588 -.043 .145 -.298 
 5. You personally gave bribes in the 
last 3 months? .113 .175 .647 .080 .172 .464 
 6. Government’s effort to solve 
current problems -.157* .062 -2.533 -.141* .061 -2.318 
 7. President Bakiev’s approval rating .292*** .086 3.385 .223** .087 2.583 
 8. Parliament’s approval rating -.163^ .100 -1.635 -.170^ .098 -1.739 
 9. Political interest -.071 .061 -1.152 -.050 .060 -.836 
 10. Political knowledge index  .074 .057 1.285 .086 .056 1.524 
 11. Media use index -.026 .051 -.509 -.046 .051 -.908 
 12. Civic activity index -.025 .098 -.250 -.033 .096 -.347 
 13. Internet use .500** .185 2.698 .434* .183 2.377 
 14. Education -.226* .098 -2.305 -.197* .097 -2.044 
 16. Age .036 .038 .950 .013 .038 .339 
 17. Employment status .049 .071 .693 .043 .069 .619 
 18. Income -.006 .028 -.215 -.001 .028 -.053 
 19. Gender -.238^ .134 -1.782 -.221^ .131 -1.687 
 20. Kyrgyz .381* .187 2.040 .301^ .184 1.633 
 21. Russians .052 .219 .240 .093 .215 .436 
 22. Perceptions of rights and liberties    .251*** .068 3.663 
 Model Summary N = 325,  R2 = .157,  
F = 2.828*** 
N = 325,  R2 = .193,  
F = 3.442*** 
^p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Among other demographic characteristics, gender is associated with perceived 
economic situation only marginally, at p=.076, indicating that women are more satisfied 
with their economic situation than men are.  Another variable that is of interest is ethnic 
origin: being Kyrgyz significantly increases the satisfaction with the current economic 
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situation, perhaps reflecting the loyalty to the idea that revolution was all about the 
people and improvement of their lives.  
Finally, the variable of most interest for this study, Internet media use, came out 
not significant at all in the model not shown here, but Internet use in general is 
significant.  Internet use is positively and significantly associated with the respondent’s 
perception of economic situation: the users agree that their economic situation has 
improved since March 2005 more. This is most probably explained by the fact that 
Internet users generally have higher-paying jobs and other opportunities that make their 
economic situation better compared to non-users. 
Even more interesting is that the satisfaction with the economic situation is 
strongly connected with perceptions of individual rights and freedoms.  When this 
variable is introduced in Model 2, the explained variance in “my economic situation 
today is better than before March 2005” increases by 3.6 per cent.  The political rights 
and freedoms variable shows a high level of statistical significance, although decreases 
significance of some variables, such as the spread of corruption and being Kyrgyz. It 
also takes away some of the significance from the president’s approval ratings and 
Internet use, but these variables still stay highly significant and in the same direction. It 
is important, however, that the perception of rights and liberties drives the perception of 
economic situation: as the satisfaction with individual rights and freedoms increases by 
one unit, so does the satisfaction with economic situation by .251 units. 
In their turn, respondents’ perceptions of their rights and liberties after 2005 also 
strongly depend on President Bakiev’s approval ratings: president’s approval is 
associated with higher levels of respondent’s agreement that the situation with the 
rights and liberties improved. However, neither the government performance in 
general, nor the parliament approval ratings affect the perception of rights (see Table 
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2.4.3.2).  Spread of corruption has the same negative effect on perception of rights and 
liberties as on the perception of economic situation described above, but in the second 
model it loses significance with the introduction of perception of economic rights as an 
independent variable.   
Table 2.4.3.2. Satisfaction with Political Rights and Freedoms 
Model 1 Model 2 
 Independent Variables 
B SE t B SE T 
 (Constant) 1.831 .478 3.828 1.418 .482 2.942 
 1.  Is democracy appropriate for 
Kyrgyzstan? .096 .124 .777 .096 .121 .789 
 2. State function is to serve people -.025 .087 -.286 -.028 .085 -.324 
 3. Spread of corruption .182* .092 1.984 .143 .091 1.581 
 4. Relatives and friends give bribes 
in the last 3 months -.174 .121 -1.432 -.159 .119 -1.336 
 5. You personally gave bribes in the 
last 3 months .133 .144 .927 .114 .141 .810 
 6. Government’s effort to solve 
current problems -.063 .051 -1.241 -.037 .050 -.726 
 7. President Bakiev’s approval rating .272*** .071 3.849 .223** .071 3.157 
 8. Parliament’s approval rating .028 .082 .341 .055 .080 .688 
 9. Political interest -.081 .050 -1.601 -.069 .049 -1.388 
 10. Political knowledge scale  -.048 .047 -1.026 -.061 .046 -1.313 
 11. Media use index .079^ .042 1.874 .083* .041 2.018 
 12. Civic activity index .035 .081 .438 .040 .079 .500 
 13. Internet use .264^ .152 1.732 .179 .151 1.186 
 14. Education -.116 .081 -1.434 -.077 .080 -.970 
 16. Age .093** .031 2.975 .087** .031 2.831 
 17. Employment status? .024 .058 .420 .016 .057 .283 
 18. Income -.018 .023 -.792 -.017 .023 -.763 
 19. Gender -.068 .110 -.620 -.028 .108 -.257 
 20. Kyrgyz .318* .153 2.080 .254^ .151 1.682 
 21. Russians -.164 .179 -.912 -.172 .176 -.981 
 22. Perceptions of economic situation    .169*** .046 3.663 
 Model Summary N = 325,  R2 = .184,  
F = 3.424*** 
N = 325,  R2 = .218,  
F = 4.033*** 
^p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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In contrast to Table 2.4.3.1, in these models media use and some demographic 
variables are playing a significant role.  First, as age increases, respondents agree more 
that their rights and freedoms are better than before March 2005, but this is, perhaps, 
due to overrepresentation of young people (students) in the sample.  Second, the more 
media people add to their media use mix, the more satisfied they are with the status of 
their political rights and freedoms, and this variable is more significant in Model 2.   
This finding is difficult to explain by anything but the propaganda effect aimed at 
enforcing the loyalty: most of the local media in Kyrgyzstan are government-controlled 
and if people are not capable of thinking critically and are not exposed to other sources 
of information, they may support the government’s point of view, as it was shown in 
the content analysis chapter.  However, to test for the propaganda effect, a more refined 
media use variable is needed to differentiate between the state and independent media 
consumption, which was not available for this study.  
As in the previous model, being Kyrgyz again increases the level of satisfaction 
with the rights and freedoms, but loses statistical significance with the introduction of 
perceptions of economic situation as an independent variable in Model 2. 
In contrast to the perceptions of economic situation, Internet use has only a 
marginal positive effect on the perceptions of the political rights and freedoms in Model 
1 and becomes insignificant in Model 2. 
Finally, Model 2 in Table 2.4.3.2 shows again the connection between the 
satisfaction with the status of individual rights and freedoms and the respondents’ 
economic situation: as the agreement with the statement that the economic situation 
improved after March 2005 grows, the satisfaction with the status of individual political 
rights and freedoms increases by .169 units.  The interconnectedness of the perception of 
rights and liberties and economic situation may be an indicator that these variables are 
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endogenous, but as it was pointed out earlier, this particular sample lacks the data to 
address the potential questions of endogeneity properly.  
Overall, the models testing the relationship between the respondents’ perceptions 
of their current situation on the one hand and the variables assessing government 
performance on the other hand, when controlling for demographic factors, show that 
individual perceptions of experienced reality depend strongly on evaluation of the 
government’s performance, thus providing support for Hypothesis 3.   
Therefore, the subject of the next section is what factors determine the evaluation of 
government performance. 
2.4.4 Perceptions of Government Performance 
Perceptions of government performance have been demonstrated to influence the 
individual perceptions of reality, or status of rights and economic situation after March 
2005.  It is important now to test what drives the perceptions of government 
performance, and whether use of Internet media plays a role here (Hypothesis 4).   
Three different variables were designed to measure the perceptions of government 
performance.  The first one is the belief that the “government officials do not care much 
about what people think of their performance” (ranging from 1=“strongly agree” to 
5=“strongly disagree”), the second is the direct question, “Does the government make 
enough effort to solve current problems?” (varying from 1=“yes, they are doing 
everything possible” to 5=“no, they don’t care about how people live”), and the third – 
the Overall Frustration with Government index derived from the factor analysis, with 
values ranging from 7 – the highest level to 29 – the lowest level of frustration. 
The theoretical assumption behind all these models is that the evaluation of 
government performance will be determined by the appropriateness of democracy, 
approval ratings of the executive and legislature, spread of corruption as a measure of 
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the government’s capacity, and perceptions of citizens experienced reality, in addition to 
the demographic variables. 
Table 2.4.4.1. Belief that Public Officials Are Indifferent to What People Think of 
Their Performance 
Model 1 Model 2 Independent Variables 
B SE t B SE t 
(Constant) 3.396*** .356 9.551 3.677*** .502 7.321 
1. Political interest  .023 .060 .383 .018 .058 .309 
2. Political Knowledge  -.140** .055 -2.560 -.160** .054 -2.987 
3. Civic Activity Index  .017 .095 .183 .106 .092 1.151 
4. Media Use Index  .106** .051 2.099 .109** .049 2.231 
5. Internet Media Use .214 .173 1.236 .202 .174 1.164 
6. Education .131 .093 1.414 .084 .090 .927 
7. Age -.033 .033 -.993 -.032 .033 -.949 
8. Gender .154 .129 1.201 .126 .125 1.010 
9. Income .016 .026 .617 .010 .025 .378 
10. Kyrgyz .101 .181 .559 .001 .177 .003 
11. Russians .168 .209 .802 .098 .204 .481 
12. Appropriateness of Democracy for 
Kyrgyzstan 
   .017 .140 .121 
13. Perception of rights and liberties    -.031 .068 -.465 
14. Perception of economic situation    -.010 .056 -.184 
15. Spread of corruption    -.215** .105 -2.044 
16. Government’s effort to solve 
current problems 
   .159** .059 2.707 
17. President Bakiev’s approval rating    -.165** .083 -1.995 
18. Parliament’s approval rating    -.336*** .095 -3.519 
Model summary N= 333,  R2=.067,  F= 2.086* N=328,  R2=.186,  F= 
3.913*** 
^p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
Results presented in Table 2.4.4.1 demonstrate that among sample demographic 
characteristics, only the political knowledge and media use affect the belief that the 
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public officials do not care about what people think of their performance.  As the 
respondents add more media to their mix, they disagree more that the public officials 
are indifferent to people’s evaluation of their performance.  This may seem to contradict 
logic, however it should be kept in mind that the media use index measures the use of 
traditional media, so with adding more media, the users add to the quantity rather than 
to the quality or diversity of information they receive.  This is also supported by the 
finding from the same model that people who demonstrate higher levels of political 
knowledge agree with the statement more, suggesting that it is the quality of knowledge 
rather than the quantity of it that determines how critical the respondents are of 
government’s attitudes toward the people’s opinions. 
Adding variables relating to government evaluation increases the explained 
variance in the dependent variable (citizens’ perceptions of how much the government 
cares about their evaluations) by almost 12 percent.  Model 2 shows that the 
respondents’ perceptions of government officials’ indifference are driven by other 
measures evaluating the government’s performance.  These relationships are all in the 
expected direction: as the respondents’ evaluations of President Bakiev’s and 
Parliament’s performance moves from approval to disapproval, the belief that the 
government officials do not care about what people think of their performance only 
enforces.  By the same token, as the spread of corruption moves from “corruption is 
pervasive” to “corruption is rare” by one unit, the belief that the government officials do 
not care about the people’s evaluation of their performance increases by .215 units. 
Finally, as the evaluation of the government’s effort to solve current problems 
moves from “yes, they are doing everything possible” to “no, because they don’t care 
how the people live,” by one unit, the belief that the government officials are indifferent 
to the people’s opinions about their performance reinforces again by .159 units. 
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The regression analysis of the second variable “Does the government make enough 
effort to solve current problems?” is presented in Table 2.4.4.2.   
Table 2.4.4.2. Evaluation of Government’s Effort to Solve Current Problems 
Independent Variables B SE t 
(Constant) 3.994*** .740 5.394 
1. Political interest  .117* .057 2.068 
2. Political Knowledge  -.031 .052 -.594 
3. Civic Activity Index  -.088 .090 -.979 
4. Media Use Index  -.028 .047 -.592 
5. Internet Media Use -.226 .169 -1.336 
6. Education -.139 .086 -1.612 
7. Age .030 .032 .916 
8. Gender .173 .123 1.414 
9. Income -.037 .025 -1.460 
10. Kyrgyz .006 .169 .038 
11. Russians .079 .199 .398 
12. Appropriateness of democracy for Kyrgyzstan -.158 .140 -1.130 
13. Perception of rights and liberties -.010 .079 -.129 
14. Perception of economic situation -.174** .062 -2.805 
15. Spread of corruption -.171 .104 -1.644 
16. President Bakiev’s approval rating -.113 .083 -1.366 
17. Parliament’s approval rating -.172^ .094 -1.834 
18. Individual political capacity .064 .052 1.244 
19. Norms of Democracy Index .056 .037 1.530 
20. Tolerance of Dissent Index -.042 .028 -1.503 
21. Independent Media and Free Expression Index .007 .038 .179 
22. Political Incapacity Index .022 .021 1.091 
23. Overall Frustration with Government -.032^ .017 -1.896 
24. State function is to serve people .047 .097 .479 
Model summary N= 323,  R2=.166,  F= 2.471*** 
^p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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The results of this regression analysis show that the strongest predictors of how the 
government performance is evaluated are the people’s political interest and perception 
of economic situation. A one-unit change in the political interest results into a .117-
change in negative evaluation of the government performance, while stronger 
agreement that the respondent’s economic situation improved after March 2005 results 
into a better evaluation of government performance. 
It should be noted that introduction of the indexes relating to normative 
understanding of democracy, as well as the variable measuring individual political 
capacity and normative expectation of the state function did add about 4 percentage 
points to the explained variance in the model, but remained not statistically significant.   
The parliament approval rating and overall frustration with the government have a 
marginally significant negative affect on the evaluation of government performance, 
indicating that the lower levels of frustration and higher levels of approval of 
parliament’s performance are associated with higher levels of government performance 
evaluation.  Internet media use is in the expected direction: those who use Internet-
based media are more critical of the government performance, but the relationship is not 
statistically significant, thus providing no support for Hypothesis 4 (a). 
Finally, the third variable relating to government performance is frustration with 
the government, a composite index constructed from the seven items that loaded 
heavily on the first component in the factor analysis.  The index runs from 7 – highest 
level of frustration to 29 – the lowest level of frustration.  Conceptually, the frustration 
with government is a proxy for the gap that exists between the constructed and 
experienced reality (see Figure 2.2.2), the depth of which will define the options 
available for citizens, namely exit and voice. 
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From the outset it should be noted that the respondents in this sample were highly 
frustrated with government performance and the system. Of the 400 scores in the index 
(five respondents did not answer at least one question, resulting into missing data in the 
entire index), 351 (87.8 per cent) fell below the mid-point of 21, and only 32 (eight per 
cent) scores were above the mid-point, i.e. lower levels of frustration with government. 
Table 2.4.4.3 presents the results of the regression analysis where Overall 
Frustration with Government is a dependent variable. This model is most robust in the 
entire analysis: the independent variables explain almost 44 per cent of variance in the 
Overall Frustration with Government and nine variables in the model are highly 
significant statistically, with two more marginally significant, while all of the variables 
show the expected direction of relationship. 
The strongest predictors of frustration with government are spread of corruption, 
Norms of Democracy Index, and Independent Media and Free Expression Index.  The 
relationship between the spread of corruption and frustration is positive, i.e. with every 
one-unit change in perception of corruption spread from “pervasive” to “rare” the 
frustration with government decreases by 1.347 units.  With Norms of Democracy, 
however, the relationship is negative: as the respondents answer more that they agree 
with the normative statements regarding democracy, their frustration with the 
government increases by .455, which is reflective or the government’s poor performance 
discussed above.  The Independent Media and Free Expression Index runs in the 
opposite direction: as the respondents agree stronger that the media and expression 
should be free, their frustration with the government decreases by .566.  
This relationship is in the same direction as Tolerance of Dissent Index, which is 
significant at a slightly lower but still high level of p=.011: the agreement that the 
government tolerates criticism and dissent is associated with lower levels of frustration.   
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Table 2.4.4.3. Overall Frustration with Government 
Independent Variables B SE t 
(Constant) 11.880*** 2.664 4.460 
1. Is Democracy Appropriate for Kyrgyzstan?  -.327 .479 -.682 
2. State Function is to Serve the People  -.619* .333 -2.170 
3. Perception of Rights and Liberties  .547* .231 2.371 
4. Perception of Economic Situation  .089 .184 .484 
5. Norms of Democracy Index -.455*** .124 -3.668 
6. Tolerance of Dissent Index .246* .096 2.551 
7. Independent Media and Free Expression Index .566*** .128 4.436 
8. Political Incapacity Index .012 .071 .167 
9. Spread of Corruption 1.347*** .360 3.742 
10. Relatives gave bribe in last three months -.451 .466 -.967 
11. Yourself gave bribe in last three months .015 .548 .027 
12. Government’s effort to solve current problems -.309 .200 -1.547 
13. President Bakiev’s Approval Rating .703* .286 2.457 
14. Parliament’s Approval Rating .760* .321 2.367 
15. Individual Political Capacity .485** .177 2.743 
16. Political Interest .168 .196 .855 
17. Political Knowledge Index .116 .181 .638 
18. Media Use Index -.167 .164 -1.021 
19. Civic Activity Index .079 .311 .255 
20. Internet Media Use -1.856** .592 -3.137 
21. Education .079 .313 .251 
22. Age .005 .123 .041 
23. Employment Status -.106 .224 -.472 
24. Income  -.138 .090 -1.533 
25. Gender -.064 .432 -.149 
26. Kyrgyz -.102 .591 -.173 
27. Russians -1.256* .688 -2.126 
Model summary N= 319,  R2=.437,  F= 8.368*** 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
This is indeed reflective of the current situation in Kyrgyzstan as it is still 
considered to be one of the most permissive and tolerant states in Central Asia in terms 
of democratic norms of free expression and dissent.  In laws, freedom of expression and 
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dissent is guaranteed and the government always uses it as a trump card when it is 
accused of becoming more authoritarian.  In practice, however, the government found a 
better way to suppress the media freedom through ownership and other forms of 
control but is still unable to control dissent effectively, which is confirmed by the 2.5 
years of demonstrations and protests after March 2005 Revolution.19 
Other highly significant variables in the model include individual capacity and 
perception of own rights and liberties: people who agree more that they can improve the 
situation in the country for the better and those who believe more that their rights and 
liberties improved after March 2005 have lower levels of frustration.  The same is true 
for the government approval ratings, as the respondents who approve President 
Bakiev’s and Parliaments’ performance are less frustrated with the government. 
Two more significant variables are indicative of interesting relationships.  The first 
one is the understanding of the state’s function: as the variable moves from “to rule” to 
“to serve,” the level of frustration with the government increases. This is similar to the 
Norms of Democracy Index discussed above, indicating that there is a gap between the 
normative understanding of the state’s function and the actual government’s 
performance.  The second variable indicates that Russians have higher levels of 
frustration with the government, which may have negative implications for Kyrgyzstan 
if the level of frustration translates into Russians’ leaving the country, given, of course, 
that the government of Kyrgyzstan wants to preserve its ethnic heterogeneity.20 
                                                 
19 The frequency of protests and demonstrations decreased in 2007-2008, after the police forces used tear gas to 
disperse the mass protests demanding to speed up the Constitutional reform in April 2007. 
20 Russian-speaking population has been leaving the country steadily since Kyrgyzstan acquired independence. 
Before the Soviet Union fell, Russian speakers comprised about 25 per cent of the population.  The peak of 
immigration was in 1993-94, when in one year about 100,000 Russians left the country.  After the 2005 
Revolution, the immigration varies at the level of 30,000-45,000 people a year, having shrunk the estimated level 
of Russian-speaking population in Kyrgyzstan to about 12-15 per cent. 
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Finally, the variable of most interest for this study, Internet Media Use, is 
significantly and negatively associated with the overall frustration with government, 
indicating that those who use Internet-based media have higher levels of frustration.  
Thus Hypothesis 4 (b) is fully supported by this model. 
To sum up, the level of frustration with the government is greatly affected by the 
factors relating to government performance (the poorer the performance, the higher the 
frustration) and normative understanding of how the democracy should work, where 
the Kyrgyz government performance does not meet the respondents’ expectations. 
According to the main theoretical model of this project presented in Figure 2.2.2, 
frustration should result in either higher orientation toward leaving the country, or exit 
option for the citizens, or higher civic activity, whereby they voice their dissatisfaction 
with the current situation (Hypothesis 5).  The next portion of the analysis is to explore 
whether the levels of frustration with government and Internet media use are 
determinant factors in these two options available for the citizens of Kyrgyzstan. 
2.4.5 Respondents’ Civic Activity and Perceptions of Future in Kyrgyzstan 
According to the project’s theoretical model presented in Figure 2.2.2, the civic 
activity (voice) should be the function of not only the demographic characteristics such 
as age, gender, political interest and knowledge, but also such factors as satisfaction 
with experienced reality, government performance, own capacity to change things for 
the better, and in particular frustration with the government, that may move people to 
express their protest energy.   
However, as the results of multiple regression analysis for civic activity index 
presented in Table 2.4.5.1 show, most of these relationships are statistically insignificant 
for this sample.  First, Hypothesis 5 (a) is not supported: Internet media use has no 
significant effect on the respondents’ civic activity.  Moreover, it runs in the opposite 
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direction, similarly to Overall Frustration with Government Index, indicating that civic 
activity decreases with higher levels of frustration and use of the Internet media, 
perhaps testifying for the “exit” option.  
Table 2.4.5.1. Determinants of Civic Activity 
Model 1 Model 2  
Independent Variables B SE t B SE t 
(Constant) -.299 .208 -1.439 -.470 .381 -1.232 
1. Media Use Index .020 .030 .668 .012 .030 .407 
2. Education .079 .056 1.395 .083 .058 1.430 
3. Age .088*** .021 4.259 .087*** .022 3.948 
4. Gender .018 .076 .239 .040 .078 .519 
5. Internet Media Use -.006 .103 -.060 -.033 .109 -.301 
6. Kyrgyz .185^ .107 1.734 .200^ .108 1.846 
7. Russians .093 .124 .747 .104 .128 .809 
8. Income -.017 .016 -1.064 -.015 .017 -.896 
9. Employment Status .053 .040 1.331 .053 .041 1.300 
10. Political Interest .054 .035 1.524 .047 .036 1.312 
11. Perceptions of Rights and Liberties    .033 .043 .776 
12. Perceptions of Economic Situation    -.012 .034 -.350 
13. Political Knowledge Index    .028 .033 .848 
14. State Function is to Serve People    .028 .062 .452 
15. President Bakiev’s Approval Rating    .102* .053 1.936 
16. Parliament’s Approval Rating    .030 .060 .508 
17. Government’s Effort to Solve 
Current Problems 
   -.042 .037 -1.151 
18. Appropriateness of Democracy for 
Kyrgyzstan 
   -.083 .089 -.933 
19. Individual Political Capacity    .063^ .032 1.929 
20. Overall Frustration with 
Government Index 
   -.005 .010 -.484 
Model summary N=330,  R2=.174,  
F=6.715*** 
N=371,  R2=.195,  
F=4.479*** 
^p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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Another problematic variable is the marginally significant (at p=.054) President 
Bakiev’s approval rating indicating that as the approval increases, so does the civic 
activity. There may be two explanations for this. One is that those who support Bakiev’s 
policies are more politically active than his opponents, especially in 2005 presidential 
elections when Bakiev ran as a revolutionary leader.  Second, a simpler explanation, is 
that the civic activity index itself is problematic due to the respondents who were not 
eligible to vote in 2005 presidential election, which is the first item in the scale.  
In both models, age is the strongest statistically significant demographic predictor 
of civic activity.  This can be at least partly explained by the fact that many student 
respondents in the sample were not of age during the 2005 presidential election, which 
would bring their entire civic activity index score down.  However, this finding again is 
consistent with other studies reporting that young people are usually detached from 
politics and public affairs and are not as actively involved as older people. 
The variables approaching significance in Table 2.4.2.3 are ethnic origin (being 
Kyrgyz increases activity by .200) and belief in own political capacity: as people agree 
more that they can do something to improve the situation in the country better, their 
civic activity index increases.  
Focus groups also showed that older citizens are generally more conscientious 
about being involved in public affairs and performing their civic duty, especially when 
it comes to voting.   Consistently with patterns of voting in other countries, in 
Kyrgyzstan the most active voters are those who are older than 40.  They also try to 
encourage younger people to vote and even influence for whom they will vote.  
Consider this exchange from a focus group with those who do not use the Internet: 
Moderator: “Where do you usually get the information on important political 
events? To be more specific, for example, the parliamentary elections are coming 
soon, as you know.  How will you decide for whom you will vote?” 
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Elmira, mid-50s, state agency employee: “I mostly look at the party members, 
who the leaders are.  If I like the leaders, if I know them and trust them, I will vote 
for the party…  We have heated debates about this in our family, my daughter has 
a totally different opinion about this, and it is very bad when your own child goes 
against you.  For example, I am going to vote for the communists, because they 
are… what’s the word I am looking for? uh, predictable?, and I know what they 
are about.  My daughter will never vote for them because she is from the new 
generation and she does not trust communists at all.” 
Ivan, early 20s, martial arts coach:  “I trust communists.  They are very well 
known, and predictable, as you said.  So I support them.  But I don’t know if I will 
vote for them.  I don’t know if I will vote at all.” 
Elmira:  “Oh, but you should… It is important to vote, otherwise your vote will 
be used by someone else.” 
Tatiana, music teacher, early 20s:  “Exactly, it is important to vote.” 
Ivan:  “I am perhaps prejudiced, but I believe that my vote will not change 
anything.” 
Elmira:  “It won’t if you don’t use it.  Because by not voting, you give your vote 
to someone else.” 
Tatiana:  “Yes, we have this… uh, perhaps the only, opportunity to change 
things once in four years, so we really must use it. This is why you should vote…” 
Ivan: “Well, I don’t know… I’ll think about it…there is still time to decide…” 
 
This exchange illustrates not only the generational differences, but also that young 
people vary greatly in their understanding of civic duty and actual civic activity. Below 
is another illustrative example from a focus group with Internet users (KTMU students): 
Ainura: “I just don’t see any point in voting.  No matter how you vote the 
government always comes up with the numbers they need.” 
Bakhtiyar: “But this is exactly why they get the numbers they need – because a 
lot of people think like you and don’t vote.” 
Ainura: “What do you mean?” 
Bakhtiyar: “Have you ever heard of the administrative resource?” 
Ainura: “Of course I have. That’s …uh, when the state manipulates the vote 
with the resources they have… like making students from state schools vote the 
way the government needs. This isn’t a state university, I will vote any way I want 
to, so I just don’t understand how the administrative resource can use my vote…” 
Bakhtiyar: “It’s very simple, really.  You are on the voter list, right? [Ainura 
nods].  So you don’t come to vote and closer to the end of the voting day they, uh, 
just put a signature across your name and stuff the ballot on your behalf.” 
Ainura: “But what about the observers who are supposed to… uh, prevent this 
stuff from happening?” 
Almaz: “I worked as an observer once.  This is exactly how they do it.  But they 
do it so quickly and skillfully that it is really difficult to catch them in the act.  
Besides, uh, as an observer you cannot really ‘prevent’ anything… you can report 
the violations, but who would pay attention? Many observers, especially local 
ones, were also threatened to write the ‘needed’ reports.” 
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Ainura: “But what if, as a citizen, I want to check how my vote was used? Can I 
see the lists with the voters’ signatures to verify that one of them is really mine?” 
Almaz: “As an individual, I doubt it.  You can get together with other citizens 
who feel their votes were abused and put in a court claim, but, uh, as far as I 
know, you have to have the evidence… and no one will show you the voters’ lists 
once they are done, without a court decision… so it is like a vicious circle…” 
Baktiyar: “So, as a citizen you’d better vote so that your vote is not used against 
your will.  The best abused vote is an uncast one…” 
 
This exchange also indicates that civic activity may increase with negative personal 
experiences: when asked later how he came to work as an observer, Almaz said that as a 
first-time voter in 2005 parliamentary elections he saw some things he “was not 
supposed to see,” as he put it, and joined a political party “to work with like-minded 
people for the betterment of our society.”  
Overall, the range of opinions on voting expressed in focus groups varied from “I 
don’t vote because my vote does not matter” to “I vote because it’s my duty as a 
citizen,” but mostly revolving around “the last two years showed that the government 
does not listen any way, so why bother?”  Disillusionment with the governance and 
frustration with the voting process were the factors most often cited in response to the 
question “Why do you think young people are reluctant to vote?” When the results of 
the focus groups and survey are considered together, it may be concluded that voicing 
dissatisfaction through increased civic activity is not an appealing option for this 
particular sample, even though for the reasons of young age. 
As for the second, “exit” option (see Table 2.4.5.2), in the model it pulls together 
influences from most other elements: perceptions of experienced reality and constructed 
reality, government performance and normative understanding of democracy, as well as 
the overall frustration with government and demographics.  From the model it can be 
seen that the exit option seems to be more appealing for those with lower employment 
status, those who have lower income, and the Internet media users, thus supporting 
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Hypothesis 5 (b).  All these variables have a negative association with the respondents’ 
future in Kyrgyzstan, which is expected and logical. 
Table 2.4.5.2. Respondents’ Perceptions of Their Own Future in Kyrgyzstan 
Independent Variables B SE t 
(Constant) 1.925 1.452 1.325 
1. Appropriateness of Democracy for Kyrgyzstan  .105 .255 .411 
2. State Function is to Serve the People  -.158 .179 -.882 
3. Perception of Rights and Liberties  -.135 .123 -1.097 
4. Perception of Economic Situation  .221* .099 2.229 
5. Norms of Democracy Index -.042 .067 -.628 
6. Tolerance of Dissent Index -.119 .052 -2.295 
7. Independent Media and Free Expression Index .046 .070 .657 
8. Political Incapacity Index .041 .038 1.071 
9. Overall Frustration with Government .052* .031 2.231 
10. Media Performance Approval .527* .254 2.077 
11. Spread of Corruption .035 .195 .180 
12. Government’s Effort to Solve Current Problems -.146 .106 -1.378 
13. President Bakiev’s Approval Rating -.047 .155 -.303 
14. Parliament’s Approval Rating .240 .171 1.400 
15. Individual Political Capacity .357*** .096 3.729 
16. Political Interest .228* .105 2.181 
17. Political Knowledge Index .231* .095 2.423 
18. Media Use Index .214* .086 2.482 
19. Civic Activity Index -.092 .164 -.561 
20. Internet Media Use -.603* .320 -2.283 
21. Education .042 .168 .252 
22. Age .079 .065 1.204 
23. Employment Status -.208* .119 -2.041 
24. Gender .215 .227 .945 
25. Income  -.085* .048 -2.077 
26. Kyrgyz  .443 .327 1.355 
27. Russians -.482 .372 -1.295 
Model summary N= 314,  R2=.248,  F= 4.833*** 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
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Overall Frustration with Government index is also significant in a one-tail test at 
p=.046 and indicates a negative relationship (the higher the frustration, the stronger the 
intent to leave).  This may mean that such respondents’ intent to leave is associated with 
the hopelessness of their situation in Kyrgyzstan and the hope for better opportunities 
elsewhere.  
In addition to these variables, higher levels of agreement that the government of 
Kyrgyzstan is tolerant of dissent are also associated with intent to leave the country, 
which is more difficult to explain by anything else but the association of dissent with 
anarchy and disorder and respondent’s fatigue of protests and demonstrations over the 
2.5 years after the 2005 Revolution. 
On the positive end of the scale, the option to stay in the country and make 
contribution to its development is more appealing for those with higher political 
interest, higher political knowledge, more diversified media use, and the respondents 
believing that they can do something to improve the situation in the country for the 
better.  Those who agree that their economic situation has improved since March 2005 
also tend to associate with higher levels of intent to stay in Kyrgyzstan.   
Not surprisingly, those respondents who agree that the traditional media are 
performing a decent job in covering the politics and public affairs (i.e. positively assess 
the constructed reality), also have higher intent to stay in the country. Finally, being 
Kyrgyz enforced the intent to stay in the country, while being Russian on the contrary 
adds to the desire to leave, but these variables are not statistically significant.  
Such a neat distribution of expected relationships in the “your future in 
Kyrgyzstan” variable alerts one to the possibility of social desirability bias affecting the 
responses, especially given the fact that an estimated 500,000-800,000 Kyrgyz currently 
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reside in Russia and Kazakhstan as migrant workers.  However, the distribution of the 
“your future in Kyrgyzstan” variable shows that about a half (54 per cent) of 390 
respondents who answered the question opted for the socially desirable and patriotic 
higher end of the scale, while 180 (46.2 per cent) checked the exit option. Thus, this 
distribution, although perhaps still not reflecting the true picture of the exit intentions, is 
not as skewed toward the socially desirable answers as it could have been.  
In summary, this part of the analysis provides partial support for Hypothesis 5: 
Internet media use does not affect the civic activity index, or political involvement, for 
this sample, but it does increase the exit moods when it comes to the respondents’ 
potential to stay in Kyrgyzstan. 
2.4.6 Internet Use and Information Sharing Patterns 
One of the major goals of this project was to see whether the view of alternative 
reality constructed by independent online media has the potential to be transferred by 
the Internet media users into the off-line world through their sharing the information 
with those who have no Internet access.  To answer this question, we first need to 
understand what activities the Internet users actually are involved in and whether they 
indeed share the information with non-users.  The final part of analysis will explore 
whether and how the citizens seek the information online and share it with those who 
have no access to the Internet through three methods: observation of Internet users, 
survey results and focus group discussions. 
Observations of Internet users at the public Internet cafés showed that political 
news consumption is not high on their list of priorities. They mostly came to the cafés to 
check their email, chat in various social utility networks such as Odnoklassniki.ru (a 
rough equivalent of FaceBook in Russian), and conduct Internet research on various 
topics.  Younger users download music and movies and play computer games.  
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Computer video games are particularly popular among adolescents and teenagers, and 
when they come to the Internet cafés to play in teams they tend to oust other users who 
cannot tolerate their noisy presence.  In such cases, Internet café owners and managers 
do not mind other more serious users leaving – teens spend hours playing the 
videogames, and sometimes a group of nine playing in three teams can bring a profit 
equivalent to a day’s income in just a couple of hours.  
It should be mentioned that Internet use is quite affordable in Kyrgyzstan: the 
average fee in 2007 was 25 som ($.65) per hour during the day and 40 som ($1.05) for the 
whole night starting from 11 pm to 7 am.  The number of Internet cafés in proper 
downtown Bishkek (nearly 30 cafés serving the area of about eight blocks long and six 
blocks wide) is growing and they compete so much that some of them started to merge 
into chains.  However, as the Internet café managers admit, a lions’ share of their income 
comes from IP phone services and computer games rather than Internet services per se. 
Coming back to the use patterns, college and university students often work on 
their class assignments and term papers in Internet cafés.  Occasionally, they also 
conduct research for their professors – a female graduate student was observed to do the 
online search while talking with her advisor on the cell phone and asking if that was the 
information he needed.  From time to time, users came in for services such as printing, 
copying and scanning of documents, without spending any time on the Internet at all.  
Occasionally, people were observed to have come to the Internet cafés to fill out 
paperwork for visa applications to German and US Embassies.  
On several occasions, a couple of people were sharing one computer, obviously for 
the reason of one being more skilled in Internet use than the other.  In two of such cases, 
the person using the computer was also serving as a translator on match-making 
websites, putting up a personal ad for her counterpart.  On another occasion, two young 
 126 
males were having fun on a “meet other singles” website, coming up with fake 
identities, much older and more attractive than they were in real life. One of them was 
the “creative director” while the other served as a typist and commentator. 
One of the most popular activities of Internet users in Kyrgyzstan is downloading 
fiction and other literature.  Russian websites are extremely generous in providing and 
sharing the electronic versions of newly released novels and classics for free, and over 
the period of six months of observation, 74 users were observed downloading books, 
and sometimes reading novels by popular Russian writers such as Davlatov, Pelevin, 
and Akunin off the screen.  Very rarely users were observed to add to the shared 
knowledge online – only once a young male was working on a Kyrgyzstan-related entry 
in Wikipedia. 
For a cash-based economy like Kyrgyzstan online shopping is not only a novelty 
but also an opportunity accessible only for those people who have studied or lived 
abroad and maintained a western credit card or for Kyrgyz residents who can afford to 
use the expensive services of local banks issuing mostly debit cards.  This is why it was 
surprising on several occasions to see people browsing online book stores and 
merchandise websites, but in any case they would not complete the transaction in the 
Internet café, most probably for security reasons.  One young man was observed 
spending more than two hours on the websites selling used cars, which is also an 
unusual online activity in Kyrgyzstan. 
In general, it was observed that only a handful of the users in public Internet cafés 
browsed through the news.  Only on two occasions the users were observed to leave 
comments in political forums – one male on Diesel.elcat.kg and a female on 24.kg when it 
still had its forum open for comments.  On one occasion, two young males were 
observed reading the news from 24.kg news agency from one computer, but they left 
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five minutes later.  On one occasion, a male user in his early 30s was observed to read 
Bely Parohod newspaper website.  He stroke a conversation when he saw me bringing up 
the same site and said that not many people know about this website, unfortunately, 
and he is always curious about who reads it.  He admitted he was an avid consumer 
who couldn’t go a day without reading the website and to my question “why?” 
responded that this was the only website that “wrote the truth about the current affairs” 
and because “the forum there is very interesting to read.” When I told I was doing 
research on coverage of politics and invited him to participate in a focus group, he 
politely declined, citing lack of time. 
The survey results also show that using political news is not the first item on the 
list of online activities. Consistent with numerous uses and gratifications studies of 
Internet users, number one activity is still email (selected as such by 260 of 271 Internet 
users who answered this question), followed by general 180 people who marked “news” 
(often specified “non-political”) as their first priority, information search in the third 
place with 119 preferences, and entertainment, with 92 respondents ranking it as 
number one – in the fourth.  Political news is in the sixth place, selected by 39 
respondents as their number one activity.  The same patterns were confirmed by the 
focus groups with the Internet users, except for one focus group with trainees of the 
Bishkek Press Club, who are much more knowledgeable and politically aware than 
other student users. They listed political news as the second on their list, still after email. 
The results of the survey show that on average, respondents spend about 2.5 hours 
on the Internet per day, with the majority of 80.2 percent (207 of 258 respondents who 
answered this question) in the first three categories: less then an hour – 57, or 14.1 per 
cent; 1-2 hours – 101 people, or 39.1 percent, which is the largest category; and 49 
respondents, or 19 per cent – up to three hours a day.  Heavy users of the Internet are 
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quite rare in Kyrgyzstan: only 6 respondents, or 1.5 per cent, indicated that they spend 
on the Internet more than 6 hours a day, and two of them were a web designer and a 
computer programmer, and the other four – students in western universities. 
As it was described earlier, 260 of 271 Internet users in the sample indicated that 
they used Internet-based media to obtain information about politics and public affairs.  
The survey results also showed that both the users and non-users of the Internet agreed 
for the most part that Internet users know more about politics and public affairs: of the 
total 364 respondents who answered this question, 262 (68.2 per cent) agreed that the 
Internet users know more.   
Table 2.4.6.1. Agreement that Internet Users Know More About Politics 
Independent variables B St. Error Wald 
Media Performance Approval .216 .294 .541 
Political Interest .108 .126 .731 
Political Knowledge Index .005 .115 .002 
Media Use Index -.288** .106 7.361 
Civic Activity Index .872*** .243 12.855 
Internet Media Use .663* .372 4.207 
Education .011 .206 .003 
Age .056 .078 .527 
Employment Status .045 .148 .092 
Gender -.558* .276 4.091 
Income .052 .058 .804 
Kyrgyz .469 .374 1.573 
Russians .333 .428 .605 
(Constant) -.360 .777 .215 
Model summary N =320, Cox & Snell Pseudo R2 =.124,        
Χ2 =42.293*** 
^p<.10,  *p < .05,  **p < .01,  ***p < .001 
 
This agreement, of course, can be the result of Internet users thinking that being the 
Internet users they know more.  The results of a one-tail bivariate logistical regression 
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presented in Table 2.4.6.1 show that it is indeed the case: Internet users are more likely 
to think that those who use the Internet do know more about politics. 
The interesting finding here is that the more media people add to their media use 
index, the less likely they are to agree that Internet users are more knowledgeable than 
non-users about politics.  This is quite logical because the respondents feel that having 
diverse sources of information may broaden the knowledge.  The agreement that 
Internet users are more knowledgeable is also driven by the civic activity index: more 
politically involved citizens are more inclined to agree that the Internet users are more 
knowledgeable, as well as by gender: females are less likely to agree that Internet users 
know more about politics than non-users. 
Earlier it was established that political knowledge is preceded by political interest.  
Surprisingly, in focus groups, the participants often pointed out that they are not really 
interested in politics and that they sought political news on the Internet only when 
something extraordinary or “interesting” was happening.  Here is one example: 
Olga, senior journalism student: I am not really interested in politics, so I 
mostly use the Internet to get general news, like what’s going on, in like… 
economics, sports – I am a big sports fan, and celebrity gossip (giggles). 
Moderator:  But you just mentioned that you use the Internet media to get the 
political news. How do these go together? 
Olga: Oh, I mean, I use the political news only when something interesting or 
extraordinary happens.  For example, the Constitutional referendum is not 
something of interest for me… 
Irina, senior journalism student, interrupting: But this one is important… it 
should define what constitution we will live with… 
Olga: Not really, it has already been decided for us.  You’ll see, we will get the 
Bakiev constitution one way or another… 
Asia, senior political science student: But you can vote against it… 
Olga: Ye-aah, but it won’t change anything, they will still get the numbers they 
need for the approval.  We all know how it works, we’ve had these referenda a 
dime a dozen. 
Moderator: OK then, what would be an important political event for you then? 
Olga: Well, I don’t know… I remember I was following the Shanghai 5 
[Shanghai Organization for Cooperation, that includes Russia, China, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan] summits for quite some time because I was curious: 
will they be able to force Bakiev to kick out the Manas [US military] base… 
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Asia: For me, referendum is still important, especially because it will, uh, most 
surely precede the parliamentary elections.  I am particularly interested in the 
development of political parties because… uh my thesis is about political parties 
in Kyrgyzstan. So I will definitely watch what happens… 
Irina: I also follow the referendum, especially this standoff between the 
parliament and the Constitutional Court.  But for me it is more like, uh, watching a 
… circus performance, if you will,  – it’s so funny how all these clowns cling to 
power and pretend to be civilized… 
Moderator: Would you agree that the Internet has more information about 
these events than the traditional media? 
All in agreement: Oh, yeah.  
Irina: I forgot when I opened the real newspaper last time. Everything is online 
these days, and even more than anyone needs or can catch up with… 
 
 
This exchange shows that even though the students admit they have no or 
moderate interest in politics, they still have enough background information and critical 
skills to be skeptical and sober about the government practices and performance. This 
may also suggest that the participants have a higher interest in politics and public affairs 
than they give themselves credit for.  When asked how they make judgments about the 
government performance if they don’t actively consume political news, the focus group 
participants would again cite common sense and their experienced reality.  One of the 
economics students, Andrey, said the following: 
Bakiev and his team try to convince everyone, and especially, uh, the ordinary 
people, that after the Revolution we started to live better: the economy improved, 
the GDP grows 7-10 per cent a year, the industry is developing, the investments 
are coming in, uh, and all this blah-blah-blah… As an economist, I can tell this is 
bogus… first, because the numbers do not mean anything when you adjust them 
for the inflation, second, because I see how the people, uh, including my family, 
lose in the value of the som because their income is eaten up by inflation and 
rising prices for everything. 
 
Another student of public relations echoed the same idea in simpler, every-day 
terms and observations: 
Marina: I walk to school every day, and I see how many beggars and disabled 
people we have now in the city streets… and those heartbreaking old babushkas 
[ladies], always neat and clean, who are even ashamed to rise their eyes at you 
when you give them money because they have to beg – can’t survive on their 
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pensions… and another thing – Bishkek used to be so green and clean, and now… 
you’ll never find a trashcan and the entire city is simply trashed, like a big 
dumpster… the other day on my way from school I saw a fat big rat kind of, uh, 
leisurely strolling across the road– a RAT! Even three years ago this would be rare, 
but now they feel, uh, so safe and comfortable in this dirty and, uh, contaminated 
environment that they come out to the surface.  RATS in my capital city! And 
municipality does nothing about this, a zilch! 
Moderator: Can you do something about it as a citizen? 
Marina:  Well, I don’t know… the municipality always complains that they 
have no money in the budget… as a student, I am not making any money, but my 
parents have a small-scale business and they pay their taxes… I just don’t know… 
where all these taxes go and why the municipal services are not doing their job… 
we know they are all corrupt, but they should do at least something, otherwise 
why do they exist? 
Moderator: How about expressing your displeasure about the situation? 
Marina, puzzled: Well… 
Aida, advertising student: You mean, like, uh, protests and demonstrations? 
(scoffs) 
Moderator: Not necessarily. Filing a complaint with the municipality about the 
rats and trash might be an option… 
Aida, sarcastically: Oh, yeah, and the municipality would rush to follow up and 
send an exterminator and a dumpster truck… 
Moderator: Perhaps, if they got enough complaints they WOULD follow up… 
Aida, laughing: With all due respect, are you from this planet? ... I bet they 
already have more complaints than they care to read… 
 
 
This interaction shows that the participants are not only acutely aware of the 
worsening situation and poor government performance, they are also quite 
disillusioned about the citizen power, which in most cases is immediately associated 
with protests and demonstrations.  This is, perhaps, a result of the 2.5-year standoff 
between the government and the protestors that ultimately resolved nothing.  In most 
cases, protests and demonstrations now are the least desirable or respected forms of 
political involvement.   
At the same time, the power of such mild forms of citizens’ collective power as 
filing a complaint is greatly underappreciated, and the citizens thus truly believe that 
they cannot do anything in terms of citizenry beyond paying taxes and simply expecting 
that the government would perform at the minimum expected level.   
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These findings of high awareness of the situation, low awareness of rights and 
options as well as the diminished belief in individual political incapacity are distressing, 
given that the sample of this study consisted mostly of people who are on the higher 
end of the educational scale and therefore should be more aware of their rights and 
options as citizens, especially in the light of the hope that they would play the role of 
opinion leaders for the other citizens, less fortunate to have advanced education and 
Internet access, for that matter. 
Nonetheless, there are also Internet users with high political interest, knowledge 
and awareness of their citizen rights and duties.  Here is one participant of a focus 
group, an active member of a youth wing of a political party and a participant of such 
political forums as Diesel, talking about the importance of Internet in the political life of 
the oppositional parties: 
Almaz: Internet is very important these days, especially for political parties in 
opposition. For us, this is a way to communicate, to send messages to members 
and even to plan actions.  For example, we organize political flash mobs through 
our website’s blog accessible only to the party members… and of course we place 
our party documents for the public to see on our website… this would have been 
impossible to do in the traditional media controlled by the state… 
Moderator: What if tomorrow the government decides to close or block 
oppositional websites, hypothetically? 
Almaz: I don’t see why they would do it. They think that the impact of political 
parties’ websites is so small they don’t really care… 
Moderator: What about the oppositional media and networking websites that 
have large audiences, like Diesel? 
Almaz: Diesel appeared from nowhere, it is controlled by no one and belongs to 
no one. If for some stupid reason the government decides to crack down on it, it 
will just move to another domain, probably outside Kyrgyzstan, but I am sure it 
will maintain all its users – it is a very strong network now with a high sense of 
community and self-worth. As for the online media, they are also free to move to 
any other domain.  This is the beauty of the Internet – no government in the world 
can completely close it. 
Nazgul: The Chinese government is quite successful in blocking dissident sites… 
Almaz: Our government has neither the capacity nor the determination of 
China to do this… And even if they do, they will not be able to stop the political 
parties’ activities anyway. They squeeze us out of the Internet – we will use text 
messages and cell phones.  In the age of high communication technologies it is 
impossible to shut everyone up… 
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Young people like Almaz are rare in Kyrgyzstan, but they are extremely active in 
building the networks of influences through the web. In addition to them, there may be 
still hope if the educated citizens with the Internet access share their knowledge with 
their friends, relatives, and acquaintances without Internet access. The results of the 
survey show that there is sharing of information, recognized by the users and non-users 
of Internet on both end.  On the one hand, 53 (20 per cent) of the 271 Internet users in the 
sample admitted that they participated in political discussions and forums and of those, 
46 (86.8 per cent) said they share the information they obtain there with their friends, 
relatives and acquaintances with no access.   
On the other hand, of 134 non-users, 93 (75 per cent) said they had friends and 
relatives who use the Internet, and of them 63 (64 per cent) acknowledged that these 
users shared the information with them, which for 46 non-users (73 per cent) was 
different from the information they receive from the traditional media.  These results 
lack the data quantity to test for statistical significance, but the flow of information is 
obvious here: both the users and non-users state that the more knowledgeable Internet 
users share the information with non-users.   
The theoretical model of government-citizen interaction in Figure 2.2.2 can hint at 
what motivates the users to do so.  First, the users should have a relatively high interest 
in politics to seek information from the alternative reality available to them in online 
media and to contrast it with their experienced reality.  Second, they should realize that 
the alternative reality is different from the reality constructed by state-controlled media 
and it is not fair in relation to non-users that they do not have the access to it.   
Third, there should be a certain level of frustration with the government that 
would be an additional motivator to share the information with others, as people do not 
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like to be miserable alone.  Fourth, people should also know that they could do 
something to change the situation, i.e. believe in their political capacity, otherwise why 
bother? Finally, certain demographic characteristics such as media use, education, age 
and employment may also be contributing factors to the desire to share the information.  
The results of a bivariate logistical analysis reflecting these relationships are 
presented in Table 2.4.6.2.  The model has only 46 cases in the dependent variable and 
statistically not significant Chi-sq value; therefore it has only limited capacity.  
However, it has a relatively high Cox & Snell Pseudo R-sq, which testifies to its potential 
for explained variance. Even in this model, political interest is again a strong predictor 
of whether the Internet users are likely to share the information with non-users. 
Table 2.4.6.2. Sharing of Information between Internet Users and Non-Users 
Independent variables B St. Error Wald 
Political Interest 2.187* 1.138 3.791 
Political Knowledge Index -.534 .993 .289 
Media Use Index 1.740 1.318 1.745 
Civic Activity Index -.779 1.238 .396 
Education -.214 1.190 .032 
Age -.822 .596 1.903 
Employment Status -.055 .788 .005 
Gender 4.303^ 2.319 3.444 
Income .218 .384 .324 
Kyrgyz -4.134 5.021 .678 
Russians 16.914 11442.823 .000 
Media Performance Approval -.943 2.219 .181 
Individual Political Capacity .261 .701 .139 
Overall Frustration with Government 
Index .371 .296 1.571 
Perceptions of Rights and Economic 
Situation Index .482 .470 1.052 
(Constant) -10.911 8.554 1.627 
Model summary N =46, Cox & Snell Pseudo R2 =.351,        
Χ2 =20.354 
^p<.10, *p < .05,  **p < .01,  ***p < .001 
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Gender is another variable approaching significance at p=.063, indicating that 
women are more likely to share information obtained on the Internet than men.  The 
overall frustration with government is significant at p=.114, and media use index – at 
p=.134, so in a model with more cases they could become more significant.  
In the focus groups, participants admitted that some of them shared information 
with non-users and some did not.  There was no obvious pattern to why people shared 
or did not share information, it seemed to mostly depend on the participants’ individual 
characteristics such as the networks of friends and relatives, communicability, and 
availability of time.  On a couple of occasions, generational difference came up again.  
Below is one example of an exchange with journalism students illustrating this: 
Moderator: Do you ever share the information you find on the Internet with 
your friends and relatives who have no access? 
All participants: Oh, yeah… 
Bermet: I usually send a link with something I find interesting to my friends by 
email… 
Moderator: Actually, I meant those who have no Internet access… 
Bermet: Ah, well, no, because I don’t really have friends who have no access. 
Elena: Neither do I. May be some high school friends, who do not go to 
university, but I don’t really interact with them that much now… 
Asel: Yeah, these days everyone seems to be online… it’s great, especially when 
the friends leave the city and email is the only way to keep in touch… 
Natalia: I have some friends with no access, but we usually don’t talk politics… 
Moderator: Why is that? 
Natalia: Don’t know… they are not that really interested in politics and have 
totally different problems. 
Moderator: How about your parents or older relatives like aunts and uncles 
who have no access? Do you share the information with them? 
Bermet: No. My parents have a totally different world of problems.  We just 
don’t take about stuff like politics. I can’t, for example, even imagine that I will be 
talking with my father about politics. 
Moderator: Why? 
Bermet: Because he thinks he knows everything he needs to know… and he 
does know a lot, but he mostly talks about it in the context of how much better 
everything was 20 years ago and how everything is bad now… 
Elena: Right, people of the older generation have this nostalgia about the Soviet 
times I cannot understand.  Talking about politics with them makes me really mad 
and impatient – they cannot be convinced… 
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This exchange illustrates that young people are also aware of the generational 
differences that break the communication down.  However, in another focus group with 
Turkish University students, the participants said that they talked about politics with 
their parents, in an attempt to “enlighten them little by little and try to change their 
political views” (Azamat, communications student).  Thus, from the focus groups there 
is no conclusive evidence of how and why people share the information they obtain 
from online sources, and it seems that in most cases it depends more on individual traits 
and social networks than on particular trends across groups of people. 
2.5 Conclusions 
What this chapter has shown is that in a fragile and new democracy, the 
government of which fails more often than performs according to the citizens’ 
expectations, the citizens develop high levels of frustration with the government system 
and performance despite what the government communicates to the citizens through 
the state-controlled media. At the same time, disillusionment about the March 2005 
Revolution and its undelivered promise, as well as fatigue from the overly long protests 
against the government that did not bring any visible results translate into low political 
involvement and alienation of the citizens from the entire governance system.   
This chapter also provided support for an important, non-deterministic view of 
mass communication: a media technology is what the people make of it.  The theorists of 
democracy may argue all they want about whether the Internet facilitates or impedes 
the democratic processes and the development of a public sphere, but it is ultimately the 
users who shape and mold what the medium will become and what promises it can 
deliver.  In a country like Kyrgyzstan, where the government controls most traditional 
media, Internet indeed has a great potential and promise as a free and open medium.  
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However, if the citizens in the first place have a low political interest and motivation to 
participate in public life, the most wonderful and inviting medium will stay an 
uninhabited land with unfulfilled promise, albeit full of various sorts of information. 
As the observations, surveys, and focus groups under this research show, in 
today’s Kyrgyzstan, the Internet users vary greatly in terms of their use goals and 
political involvement.  On the one hand, there are users who are completely alienated 
from the public life and use the Internet to explore other country’s immigration 
programs and educational opportunities.  On the other hand, there are users who live in 
the virtual world of political forums and organize flash mobs for the young members of 
political parties.  Somewhere in the middle there are the users who “peek” the political 
forums without active participation, but spend a lot of time downloading music, 
movies, and novels.  This survey seem to have produced the estimates that the first and 
the middle group dominate in Kyrgyzstan, but in such a highly sensitive political 
environment many politically savvy Internet users may opt to stay anonymous and in 
the shadow, so their true number is difficult to estimate. 
It is clear that such politically savvy and involved citizens are crucial for a viable 
democracy.  However, for this group to grow in numbers, there must be support coming 
from not only the civil society but also from the government, if not in the form of 
encouragement then at least through non-interference.  Unfortunately, at this time such 
good will on the part of the government is lacking.  So the hope is still with the civil 
society, both domestic and international, that would develop and maintain a necessary 
level of citizen awareness and involvement. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
This research project was designed to explore the potential and role of the Internet-
based media in the Kyrgyz Republic after the 2005 March Revolution. It used a model of 
interaction between the government and citizens through various types of realities: the 
reality constructed and imposed by the state-controlled media, the reality created by 
alternative, independent sources of information online, and the realities experienced by 
citizens individually (see Figure 2.2.2).  The model pulled together various theories from 
political science, sociology, psychology, and mass communication and focused on the 
exit-voice-loyalty options available for the citizens in response to governance practices. 
Chapter 1 was devoted to exploration of the media space with its imposed and 
alternative realities through content analysis of an event, which provides a perfect 
example of how good governance is understood by state-controlled print media and 
independent online media.  The event in question was supposed to be a form of people’s 
democracy in action – the Referendum on Constitutional reform.  However, with the 
careful manipulation of public consciousness and the voting process, the Referendum 
became a legitimization tool for what many experts believe to be an authoritarian 
constitution establishing a super-presidential, pseudo-democratic regime in a country 
that in early 1990s was in the forefront of democratic reforms in the post-Soviet space.   
The content analysis showed that the realities constructed by the state-controlled 
media and independent media were vastly different but in a constant dialogue and 
reference to each other.  The frames and messages the media sources used in relation to 
what the Referendum initiative meant for the key players – the president, the 
parliament, and the people and democracy – were mirrored with precision and depth on 
three most important dimensions. 
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First, whereas the independent media expressed concern over the looming 
authoritarian regime and usurpation of power by the president, the state-controlled 
media were talking about the necessity of enlightened authoritarianism, the strict and 
disciplined executive, and responsibility for government actions and initiatives 
concentrated in one hands.   
Second, while the independent media were concerned about elimination of 
opposition and shrinking public space, the state-controlled media promoted 
homogeneity of the political space in support of benevolent presidential policies and 
political stability.  This was a message particularly appealing for the citizens in the 
protest-torn country with sharp divisions between the poor and the reach, and between 
the southern and northern regions.   
Finally, while the independent media tried to convey that one month was not 
enough for the citizens to make an informed decision about such a crucial initiative as 
the constitutional reform, the state-controlled media stressed that the constitutional 
reform was long overdue, has been discussed for months earlier and people were ready 
to make the decision. 
The statistical analyses in Chapter 2 show that while there are no significant 
differences between the print and online media in evaluating the Constitutional Court 
and Referendum decisions, the mode of production mattered for the overall evaluation 
of government actions in terms of good governance.  Online media were more critical 
and negative of the current government in their overall evaluation than the print media.  
These findings are sufficient to support the central hypothesis of Chapter 2 that online 
media are capable of constructing alternative realities that are more critical of the 
government and its performance than the traditional media with larger outreach, most 
of which are controlled by the state. 
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This presents a serious problem in for an emerging and struggling democracy like 
Kyrgyzstan because such an alternative reality is accessible only to those 10-15 per cent 
of the population who have access to Internet as well as residents of the capital city 
Bishkek, where circulate a few independent papers with the print run of 3,000-5,000 
copies.  The overwhelming majority of the country’s population was exposed only to the 
state TV and radio channels and state-controlled newspapers.  Therefore, the alternative 
reality created by independent online media is non-existent for most citizens. 
What citizens are left with as a measure for imposed reality is their own, currently 
experienced realities.  Chapter 2 of this dissertation was focused on how the different 
types of realities are perceived by the citizens in the light of good governance.  Through 
observation, surveys and focus groups with both traditional and Internet-based media, 
the research produced the results showing that the study respondents are acutely aware 
of the sharp differences between the experienced and imposed reality.   
In many cases, this realization comes without the reference to the alternative reality 
constructed by online media, through common sense and everyday experiences. The 
realization translates into high levels of frustration with the government and decreased 
forms of loyalty to the governance system and practices, pulling the pressure toward the 
exit and voice options.  As this research shows, the intentions to leave the country (exit) 
and to express concerns about the malfunctioning in the governance and to participate 
in the public life (voice) are equally available for the citizens. 
However, the research also showed that the level of citizens’ political involvement 
is quite low, perhaps in part due to the reason that the sample is skewed by over-
represented youth (students).  Nonetheless, coupled with the high “exit” moods, such 
low involvement of citizens in the country’s public life will almost inevitably negatively 
affect the prospect for a viable democracy.  To correct for this serious malfunctioning, 
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not only an effort to wake the public consciousness is needed, but also a certain amount 
of commitment from the government to perform better, to fight corruption, and to 
include citizens more in the decision-making process. Unfortunately, this reserve is 
simply lacking in the current government institutions and leadership concerned mostly 
with preserving the status quo. 
With the low levels of political interests and motivation to be involved in public 
affairs, the option of exit seems to be more appealing for the citizens of Kyrgyzstan, 
which is also supported by the high permanent and temporary immigration rates.  It is 
natural that the exit option is exercised mostly by the young, skilled and educated, 
whose political interest and involvement in the public life is traditionally low, similar to 
other democracies.  The Internet opens up new opportunities for them in the form of 
information about education and jobs outside of the country.  As one of the focus group 
participants noted, with the current rate of immigration and brain drain “Bakiev will 
soon become the president of babushkas and dedushkas [the elderly].”  To stop this 
trend, the government needs to open up to the young and qualified people and include 
them into the system of decision-making, which it is reluctant to do. 
This research project has produced valuable insights for some policy implications.  
It has shown that as far as online media are concerned, the strongest skeptics’ fears that 
Internet is divisive and elitist have not come true and the Internet media in Kyrgyzstan 
still have the potential to facilitate the public debate at least for the politically interested 
citizens.  Since the government of Kyrgyzstan does not seem to be interested in 
development of the public sphere, it is the task for the domestic and international civil 
society to provide more support for Internet-based media targeted at youth with the 
goal of changing the youth’s perception of political incapacity and turning them away 
from “easy exit” option toward higher political involvement in the country’s public life. 
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Further, the model developed for this project can be applied to other countries. 
Even in well-functioning democracies the gaps between the government performance 
and citizens’ experienced realities are inevitable, and the depth of frustrations and 
availability of information through the media can be an interesting research topic for 
mass communication and political science scholars.   
The next logical step for this project would be to see how this model applies to 
other countries that recently experienced the second wave of post-Soviet revolutions – 
the Ukraine and the Republic of Georgia. The potential comparative country analysis 
resulting from such research projects may produce an important contribution to the 
studies of Internet media effects and the second wave of post-Soviet democratization in 
the form of specific recommendations for facilitation of the public sphere development 
and support for Internet-based media that have the potential for “spilling over” their 
influence into the off-line world.  Even in its current form, focused on one country only, 
the research implemented under this dissertation has the potential to make an important 
contribution to the study of democracy and media in several forms and ways: 
 The project is a cross-disciplinary study of media processes and effects in a 
democratic transition (pulling together the current theories from mass 
communication, sociology, psychology and political science) 
 The project’s focus on new media and good governance in a “colored” revolution 
country is a unique set of research questions that has not been explored before 
with such a variety of methods and approaches 
 The results can be used by policy makers to support new media in remaining 
managed democracies and to facilitate educational efforts to increase awareness 
of and demands for good governance among the citizens in new democracies. 
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APPENDIX A: TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS – THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC 
 
1990 The president’s position is introduced in all Soviet Union republics. In October, the 
Parliament elects physicist Askar Akaev the first president of the Kyrgyz Republic for his 
first 5-year term 
1991 On August 31, days after the coup against USSR President Gorbachev, Kyrgyzstan declares 
its independence from the Soviet Union; large-scale market and democratic reforms start 
1993 The first Kyrgyz Republic’s Constitution defines the country as a “secular democracy” and 
establishes a parliamentary-presidential republic; national currency – som – is introduced 
making the country independent of the Russian rouble and markets; Kyrgyzstan joins WTO 
1994 President Akaev dissolves the largely Communist parliament after a long political stand-off 
over the country’s reformist policies and natural resources 
1995 February – new Parliament is elected; the first of five referenda is conducted on 
Constitutional Amendments; President Akaev is re-elected for the second (and last) 5-year 
term uncontested 
1996 First constitutional amendments introduced following the 1995 referendum tip the balance 
of power in favor of the president 
1998 Second constitutional referendum effectively transforms the republic into the presidential-
parliamentary republic by stripping the Parliament of some of its functions (including 
appointing the prime-minister) and expanding the president’s authority 
1999 August – Kyrgyzstan faces a serious external threat to national security when Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan guerillas penetrated the country and took civilian foreign 
hostages 
2000 July-August – IMU insurgencies repeat, Kyrgyzstan joins the international anti-terrorist 
agreement; Constitutional Court resolves that Akaev’s first presidential term did not count 
toward the two-term constitutional limit as he was elected by the parliament rather than the 
popular vote and term was served under the original, not the current Constitution; Akaev is 
elected for the third term through a highly manipulated election 
2001 Under the anti-terrorist agreement, the Unites States establish a military air base for the 
operations in Afghanistan.  Third referendum on constitutional amendments gives the 
president even more powers 
2002 In a southern village of Aksy, police opens fire at several-thousand-strong protest 
demanding to release an imprisoned parliament member and kills six protestors; under the 
pressure from the civil society, President Akaev establishes a broad Constitutional Council 
to develop amendments that would consolidate the society, move the reforms, and improve 
his eroded trust and reputation with the people 
2003 Fourth Constitutional referendum approves amendments allegedly developed by the 
Constitutional Council but effectively giving the president unlimited power; the 2003 
version is often referred to as the “Akaev super-presidential” Constitution 
2004 President Akaev’s proponents form a party “Alga, Kyrgyzstan!” (“Kyrgyzstan, Forward!”), 
the leaders of which include president’s daughter and son, to run in 2005 parliamentary 
elections 
2005 February 19 – highly manipulated parliamentary elections produce a parliament with 80% 
of members loyal to President Akaev, including his son and daughter; opposition labels it 
“Akaev’s pocket parliament” and mobilizes broad protests all over the country;  
March 24 – Akaev is ousted by a popular uprising – Tulip Revolution, third in the post-
Soviet space after the Georgia’s 2003 Rose Revolution and Ukraine’s 2004 Orange 
Revolution; Akaev flees to Moscow where he currently resides; 
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March-April – the country’s revolutionary leaders, now in power, are in turmoil over 
Akaev’s resignation and the legitimacy of two parliaments – old and newly elected; as a 
result of political compromises, the newly elected “Akaev” parliament is legitimized; Akaev 
officially resigns from the presidency on April 4 in exchange for immunity from any future 
prosecution; 
July 14 – one of the revolution leaders, Kurmanbek Bakiev, is elected the second Kyrgyz 
Republic’s president; his election program includes the promise to return the country to the 
parliamentary-presidential republic through a constitutional reform 
2006 President Bakiev fires several governments; the promised constitutional reform is stalled; in 
spring and fall the opposition mobilizes masses demanding to complete the reform 
October - the opposition presses President Bakiev to adopt the constitutional amendments 
restoring the parliamentary system, Bakiev signs in the new constitution in November 
late November – Bakiev threatens the parliament dissolution, and the pro-presidential 
parliamentarians force another version by putting pressure on the opposition;  the new 
constitution with more presidential powers is signed in on Dec.16; neither versions go 
through the Constitutional Court evaluation required by law 
2007 April – United Front opposition movement organizes a series of large-scale “no-term” (i.e. 
finishing only when their goals will be achieved) protests to demand the completion of the 
constitutional reform.  After three weeks of the stand-off, police disperses the protests using 
the tear gas 
September 14 – the Constitutional Court looks into a claim by two parliament members – 
Eshimkanov and Karabekov – and resolves that both 2006 Constitution versions are 
illegitimate since they were not adopted by a proper procedure and did not receive the 
Constitutional Court scrutiny; the country is effectively returned to 2003 “Akaev” 
Constitution 
 September 15-19 – the parliament contests the Constitutional Court decision and fires three 
of the five judges who made it; the Constitutional Court petitions President Bakiev to 
interfere and he schedules the fifth Referendum on Constitutional amendments for October 
21, leaving it for the people to decide whether they want to support him by approving his 
version of the Constitution along with the Election Code providing for parliamentary 
elections by party lists rather than individual tickets 
 October 21 – the Referendum approves Bakiev’s constitutional draft and the Election Code 
by a reported 75% vote in favor; opposition and NGOs contest the results claiming that the 
referendum was rigged and the voter turnout was only about 20-30% 
 October 22-24 – President Bakiev dissolves the parliament and schedules new 
parliamentary elections by party lists for December 16, 2007; simultaneously he fires the 
government leaving it acting until the new government is appointed by the new 
parliament’s majority party 
 October 24-December 16 – political parties mobilize and re-group; a number of pro-
presidential parties forms the Movement “For Constitution, Reform and Development” that 
became a foundation for the new pro-presidential party “Ak-Jol” (“Bright, Clear Path”); 
opposition parties fail to unite 
 December 16 – pro-presidential party “Ak-Jol” wins 80% of the seats in the new and 
enlarged parliament through what the opposition claims to be “doctored” elections; 
opposition organizes a series of protest actions under the slogan “I Don’t Believe It” which 
are dispersed by force and detainments; President Bakiev officially announces that the 
country has completed the constitutional reform and effectively become a parliamentary 
republic. 
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APPENDIX B: CODING SHEETS 
CS 1 – Coverage of Constitutional Court and Referendum Decisions 
Coder name_________________________________ Coding date__________________________ 
 
Story source___________________________ Date__________________ Length ________words 
 
Story headline______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Story genre (circle one):    news    analysis opinion    interview editorial      other________ 
 
1. Is the Constitutional Court decision assessed (check one): 
 Neutrally – no judgments, just facts and straightforward reporting 
 Negatively – as something that resurrects the old 2003 “Akayev” constitution, takes the 
country back to where it was before the Revolution, etc. 
 Positively – as something that will allow to move the Constitutional reform forward and 
overcome the political tensions, eliminate chaos, etc. 
 
2. Are there any reactions to the decision by the officials or experts?___________________  
If yes, please provide short descriptions: 
Quote 1 by __________________(name), ___________________(position): ________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Quote 2 by __________________(name), ___________________(position): ________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Quote 3 by __________________(name), ___________________(position): ________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. References to what this decision means for President Bakiev? Examples: opportunity to 
dissolve the Parliament and set new elections, push for a new Constitution, acquire even 
more power, etc. Please provide exact quotes from the story when available: ____________ 
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. References to what this decision means/does for the Parliament? Examples: early 
dismissal, new elections by party lists; all laws adopted by the Parliament from March 
2005 till now will be void, etc. Please provide exact quotes from the story when available: 
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. References to what this decision means for the people and democracy? If so, please give 
a quote: ________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Any references to possible developments (future referendum, etc.)? If so, please provide 
a quote: ________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Referendum: 
 
7. Date decision made and whose initiative is this? ____________________________________ 
 
8. What will be included on the ballot (check all that applies): 
 Election Code 
 New constitution 
 Both ________________________ 
 No mentioning 
 
9. Are the draft laws available for the discussion? 
 Yes 
 No 
 No, but will be available soon (date?)________________________________________ 
 No mentioning 
 
10. Reaction of any NGOs or political parties to the decision on referendum? 
 Positive 
 Positive, but with reservations/recommendations to improve 
 Negative, but with recommendations to improve 
 Negative 
 
11. Is there enough time for the people to think about the drafts and make an educated 
decision? 
 Yes 
 No 
 No mentioning 
 
12. Any references to how much the referendum will cost? 
 Yes_____________________ (cost estimate) 
 No 
 
13. According to the story, will the administrative resource be used during the referendum? 
 Yes 
 No 
 No mentioning 
 
14. Will the referendum be observed by international organizations? 
 Yes 
 No 
 No mentioning 
 
15. Overall in terms of good governance, does the story present the government actions as 
 Strongly negative 
 Negative, but indirect, implied 
 Negative, but with recommendations to improve 
 Neutral 
 Positive, but indirect, implied 
 Positive, but with reservations/recommendations to improve 
 Strongly positive, supportive of President Bakiev 
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CS 2 – Coverage of Referendum Results 
 
Coder name_________________________________ Coding date__________________________ 
 
Story source___________________________ Date___________________ Length ________words 
 
Story headline________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Story category (circle one):   news   analysis opinion   interview editorial      other___________ 
 
16. According to the story, what is the Referendum’s turnout rate? __(official – 0, lower – 1) _ 
 
17. Is there any mentioning if the turnout numbers are different for Bishkek and the 
regions?  If yes, describe the differences____________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. Reaction of any NGOs or political parties to the referendum results? 
 Positive (specify) ____________________________________________________________ 
 Negative (specify) ___________________________________________________________ 
 Neutral (specify) ____________________________________________________________ 
 None mentioned  
 
19. Any descriptions of how the process was taking place? 
 Yes (specify briefly) _______________________________________________________ 
 No 
 
20. Any mentioning of violations of the voting process? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
21. If violations are mentioned, please check all those that are: 
 Stuffing of ballots by local officials 
 Multiple voting by the same person 
 Threats and obstructions to 
observers 
 Violations of counting procedure 
 Voter buy-out and bribery 
 Abuse of the migrant and “budget” 
votes 
 Other (please specify)_____________________________________________________ 
 
22. Was the administrative resource used during the referendum? 
 Yes 
 No 
 No mentioning 
 
23. Was the referendum observed by international organizations? 
 If Yes, was their assessment positive or negative_________________________? 
 No 
 No mentioning 
 
24. Overall, is the referendum outcome presented as a positive or negative one? What will 
the referendum do for the democratic developments and good governance in the 
country? Please provide exact quotes from the story, if available: 
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ 
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APPENDIX C: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. In your opinion, what is the function of government in Kyrgyzstan? Is it to 
 (1) Rule the people 
 (2) Other (please specify)__________(“Both rule and serve” appeared most)__________ 
 (3) Serve the people 
 
2. In your opinion, is democracy an appropriate governance system for today's Kyrgyzstan? 
 (1) Yes (please skip Question 3) 
 (0) No 
3. If no, what do you think IS the appropriate form of governance for today’s Kyrgyzstan? _____________ 
4. Who is the president of Kyrgyzstan? _____(correct: Kurmanbek Bakiev)____________________________ 
5. Who is the prime-minister of the Kyrgyz Republic? ___(Almazbek Atambaev) _____________________ 
6. Please name the speaker of Kyrgyzstan's parliament. ___(Marat Sultanov) _________________________ 
7. Is Kyrgyzstan a presidential or parliamentary republic?  ___(presidential) _________________________ 
8. When was the last version of KR Constitution adopted? ____(December 2006) ______________________ 
9. What did the Russian intelligence services do in relation to Asia Universal Bank in 2006? 
__(put on black list of money-laundering banks and advised Russian businessmen not to deal with it) __ 
Questions 10-38 use the scale with various degrees of agreement with a given statement (3) – (don’t know, not sure):   
(1) – high degree of disagreement: «strongly disagree» 
(2) – moderate degree of disagreement: «disagree» 
(4) – moderate degree of agreement: «agree» 
(5) – high degree of agreement: «strongly agree» 
 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statements (please mark the appropriate answer box): 
 Strongly 
disagree 
 
Disagree   Agree Strongly 
agree 
10. There is no way other than voting that people like me can 
influence actions of the government 
    
11. No matter what a person’s political beliefs are, he/she is entitled 
to the same legal rights and protections as anyone else 
    
12. As an individual I have more rights and freedoms today than 
before March 2005. 
    
13. As an individual I have more rights and freedoms today than 
when the Soviet Union existed. 
    
14. My (my family’s) economic situation today is better than before 
March 2005. 
    
15. My (my family’s) economic situation today is better than before 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
    
16. We are more likely to have a healthy economy if the government 
allows more freedom for individuals and does not interfere with 
honest businesses’ affairs 
    
17. Generally, the government can be trusted to implement policies 
that will improve people’s situation 
    
18. The current government of Kyrgyzstan is committed to fighting 
corruption. 
    
19. Generally, the government is tolerant to the criticism from the 
opposition and media. 
    
20. The press should be protected by the law from persecution by the 
government 
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 Strongly 
disagree 
 
Disagree   Agree Strongly 
agree 
21. Today, it is less dangerous for an individual to criticize the 
government than it was two years ago. 
    
22. Kyrgyzstan’s government should become much more open to the 
public. 
    
23. If an unjust law were passed, I could do nothing about it.     
24. The government provides me with enough information about its 
initiatives, programs and actions. 
    
25. Anyone with the appropriate skills and qualifications can enter a 
government agency and work in it. 
    
26. People should be able to participate in any organization even if 
this activity opposes some current laws 
    
27. As an individual I can do something to change the current 
situation in Kyrgyzstan for the better. 
    
28. The public officials do not care much about what people like me 
think of their performance. 
    
29. Demonstrations and protests are an effective way to influence the 
government in Kyrgyzstan. 
    
30. Private radios, television, and newspapers should exist alongside 
state-owned media. 
    
31. Those who are in power today understand that they were elected 
to serve rather than to rule the people. 
    
32. I feel that if I had to seek a court’s protection I would receive a 
speedy and fair trial. 
    
33. The courts in Kyrgyzstan make decisions independently, without 
the government officials’ interference. 
    
34. It is necessary that everyone, regardless of their views, can express 
themselves freely 
    
35. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that I 
can’t really understand what’s going on 
    
36. People like me don’t have much say about what the government 
does 
    
37. I have the right and an opportunity to voice my concerns to my 
parliament representative. 
    
38. I believe that my parliament representative would follow up on 
my concern if I express it. 
    
 
39. Did you ever express a concern to your parliament representative? 
 (1) Yes  What was it about?_________________________________ 
 (0) No 
 
40. Many of the problems Kyrgyzstan is facing today are the result of 
 (1) President Akaev's rule 
 (3) President Bakiev's rule 
 (2) Both presidents are responsible 
 (4) Other (please specify)______________ 
 
41. Recently, Transparency International ranked Kyrgyzstan as one of the most corrupt countries in the 
world. Which of the following statements reflects your feelings about the spread of corruption in 
Kyrgyzstan? 
 (1) Corruption in the government is pervasive 
 (2) Most government structures are corrupt 
 (3) Only some government structures are corrupt 
 (4) Corruption in government agencies is rare 
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42. Did anyone among your relatives or close friends bribe a government employee in the last three 
months? If yes, in exchange for which service? 
 (2) Yes   Service___________________________________ 
 (0) No  (1) Would rather not tell  
 
43. Did you personally have to bribe a government employee recently? If yes, for what service? 
 (2) Yes   Service___________________________________ 
 (0) No  (1) Would rather not tell  
 
44. Do you believe the current government is capable of eliminating corruption? 
 (1) Yes  (0) No 
 
45. Where do you get information about the government’s performance (please rank all applicable options in 
the order of importance, where 1 is the most important source)? 
___ Media (TV, newspapers, radio) 
___ Internet 
___ Friends and acquaintances 
___ My relative(s) working for the government 
___ Government information (brochures, leaflets, meetings with officials, etc.) 
___ Other (please specify)______________________________ 
 
 
46. On the scale from 1 to 10, please rank in the order of importance the following problems that Kyrgyzstan is 
facing today (where 1 is most serious, 10 is least serious problem): 
___ Dishonest and irresponsible government 
___ Tribalism and nepotism 
___ Economic decline 
___ Poverty  
___ Migration of capable workers to Russia and Kazakhstan and exodus of ethnic minorities 
___ Increasing crime rate and “criminalization” of government structures 
___ Corruption  
___ Worsening social services (pensions, healthcare, education, etc.) 
___ Rising prices and decreasing living standards 
___ Other (please specify) __________________________ 
 
47. Do you think the government is doing a decent job in trying to solve these problems? 
 (1) Yes, they are doing everything possible 
 (2) They are trying but there are too many obstacles to overcome 
 (3) They are doing only what will help them stay in power 
 (4) No, because their main goal is to survive to the next elections 
 (5) No, because they don’t care much about how people live 
 (6) Other (please specify)________________________ 
 
48. Please select only one statement that best describes your feelings about your own future in Kyrgyzstan 
 (0) already left (option for online survey only) 
 (1) I will leave the country at the first opportunity 
 (2) I love my country but will have to leave because of the worsening situation 
 (3) I will leave temporarily (to study, earn money) but will come back 
 (4) I would like to leave, but realistically it is not possible right now 
 (5) I am not pleased with the way things are now, but I feel they will improve so I’ll stay 
 (6)This is my country and I will stay and do everything I can to make the life better here  
 (7) I love my country and will never leave it even if the things go worse 
 (8) Other (please specify)_______________________________ 
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 Approve 
(2)  
Disap-
prove (0) 
Other 
(1)  
49. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Kurmanbek Bakiev is handling his 
job as president? 
   
50. Do you approve or disapprove of the way the Parliament is handling its job?    
51. Do you approve or disapprove of the way Almazbek Atambaev is handling his 
job as prime-minister? 
   
 
52. On the scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is “most interested” and 5 is “not interested at all,” please indicate 
your interest in politics and public affairs (circle the applicable number): 
Not interested at all 1 2 3 4 5 Most interested 
 
53. Where do you get the information about political events in Kyrgyzstan (please check all that applies)?  
 Local newspapers  
 National newspapers 
 Kyrgyz TV channels 
 Russian and foreign TV channels 
 Local and national radio 
 Nowhere – I am not interested in politics 
54. What TV channels do you watch regularly? Please name: _________________________________________ 
 
55. Please name a newspaper you read at least once a week __________________________________________ 
 
56. What radio stations do you listen to? Names:  ___________________________________________________ 
 
57. In your opinion, which Kyrgyzstan's media openly criticize the government?  ______________________ 
 
 Yes  No (0) 
58. Do you know anyone who uses Internet?   
Skip to 
Q.61 
59. If yes, do they share with you the political information they receive on the 
Internet? 
  
 Skip to 
Q.61 
60. If yes, is this information different from the political information you receive 
through TV, newspapers and radio? 
  
61. Do you feel that in general those citizens of Kyrgyzstan who have Internet access 
are better informed about the political events in the country? 
  
62. Do you believe that the TV channels, radio and newspapers you use do a decent 
job in covering national politics? 
  
63. Did you vote in 2005 presidential election?   
64. Did you participate in any demonstrations or protests starting from February 
2005? 
  
65. Are you a member of any political party or civil society organization?    
66. Will (did) you vote in the constitutional referendum on October 21, 2007? 
 
  
 
67. What is the highest level of education you completed? 
 (1) Secondary/vocational school 
 (2) Technical/incomplete higher 
 (3) Completed higher education 
 (4) Degree (MA, PhD) 
 
68. What is your age? 
 18-20 
 21-25 
 26-30 
 31-35 
 36-40 
 41-45 
 46-50 
 51-55 
 56-60 
 over 60 
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69. What is your ethnic background? ________________________________________________________ 
 
70. What is your employment status? 
 (1) unemployed 
 (2) student 
 (3) employed part-time 
 (4) employed full-time 
 (5) self-employed 
 (6) other 
 
71. What is your profession? _______________________________________________________________ 
 
72. What is your monthly income (your family’s income if you do not make money) 
 Less $50 
 $50-99 
 $100-199 
 $200-299 
 $300-399 
 $400-499 
 $500-599 
 $600-699 
 over $700 
 
73. Your gender:    
 (0) Male     (1) Female 
 
Would you like to participate in focus groups on how various media cover public affairs in 
Kyrgyzstan? If yes, please provide your name and telephone number on the enclosed card. 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION! 
 
 
 
Questions for Internet Users (replace Questions 52-60): 
 
1) How much time do you spend on the Internet per day on average? (from less then an 
hour, 1-hour intervals to more than 7 hours a day) 
 
2) What are your primary goals in using the Internet (check all that applies): 
• Email 
• Communication (including social utility networks) 
• News, information (non-political) 
• Political news 
• Entertainment (download music, videos) 
• Information search (for studies or work) 
• Leisure (to kill time) 
• Other (please specify) 
 
3) Do you use Internet-based media to obtain information on politics and public affairs in 
Kyrgyzstan (yes-no)? 
 
4) Do you participate in the online political forums (yes-no)? 
 
5) If you answered “yes” to Question 4, do you share the information you receive from the 
Internet with your relatives and friends who have no access (yes-no)? 
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APPENDIX D: VARIABLES AND INDEXES – CODING SCHEME 
Content Analysis (Chapter 1) 
Variable Name Variable Description Variable Coding Scheme 
1. Source 
Independence 
 
Media source independence from 
government control, ranging from 
highest to lowest degrees of control 
(1) state 
(2) conformist 
(3) independent 
(4) foreign 
 
2. Offline Impact 
Potential 
Potential of the media source to 
make an impact in the offline (real) 
world, ranging from highest to 
lowest potential 
(1) print newspaper 
(2) online version of print paper 
(3) online news agency 
(4) online paper 
(5) analytical website 
 
3. Print/Online 
Source 
Distinction between online and print 
sources, dichotomous variable 
(1) print source 
(2) online source 
 
4. Originality of 
Material 
Originality of material published in 
media sources’ stories, ranging from 
least to most original 
(1) borrowed, reprinted material 
(2) borrowed material with own 
comment or analysis 
(3) mostly original material 
 
5. CC/Referendum 
Evaluation 
Media source’s evaluation of the 
Constitutional Court decision on 
Referendum 
(1) negative 
(2) neutral 
(3) positive 
 
6. Overall Evaluation 
of Government 
Actions 
Media source’s overall evaluation of 
the government actions in terms of 
good governance 
(1) strongly negative 
(2) somewhat negative 
(3) neutral 
(4) somewhat positive 
(5) strongly positive 
 
7. Reporting of 
Turnout Rate 
Media source’s reporting of the 
Referendum turnout rate, 
dichotomous variable 
 
(0) lower than the official 
(1) officially reported rate 
 
8. Reporting of 
Violations 
Media source’s reporting of the 
violations and irregularities during 
the Referendum, dichotomous 
variable 
 
(0) no violations reported 
(1) violations reported 
9. Reporting of 
Administrative 
Resource Use 
Media source’s reporting of the use 
of the administrative resources 
during the Referendum, 
dichotomous variable 
 
(0) no use reported 
(1) administrative resource use 
reported 
 
10. Evaluation of 
Possible 
Developments 
Media source’s evaluation of 
possible developments after the 
Referendum as pessimistic or 
optimistic 
(1) pessimistic 
(2) neutral 
(3) optimistic 
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Survey (Chapter 2) variables and indexes in order of appearance  
Variable Name Variable Description Variable Coding Scheme 
1. Political 
Interest 
 
Respondents’ self-reported interest in politics 
and public affairs (Q.52 in the Questionnaire), 
ranging from lowest to highest interest 
(1) not interested at all 
(2) low degree of interest 
(3) moderate interest 
(4) interested 
(5) extremely interested 
 
2. Internet Use Respondents’ use of the Internet, 
dichotomous variable 
(0) do not use Internet 
(1) use Internet 
 
3. Internet Media 
Use 
Internet users’ self-reported use of Internet-
based media to acquire information on 
politics and public affairs, dichotomous 
variable 
(0) do not use Internet-
based media 
(1) use Internet-based 
media 
 
4. Government 
Works for 
People 
Respondent’s agreement with the statement 
“Generally, the government can be trusted to 
implement policies that will improve people’s 
situation” (Q.17) 
(1) strongly disagree 
(2) disagree 
(3) uncertain/don’t know 
(4) agree 
(5) strongly agree 
 
5. Public 
Officials are 
Indifferent 
Respondent’s agreement with the statement 
“The public officials do not care much about 
what people like me think of their 
performance” (Q.28) 
(1) strongly disagree 
(2) disagree 
(3) uncertain/don’t know 
(4) agree 
(5) strongly agree 
 
6. Perceptions of 
Rights and 
Liberties 
Respondents’ agreement with the statement 
“As an individual I have more rights and 
freedoms today than before March 2005” 
(Q.12) 
(1) strongly disagree 
(2) disagree 
(3) uncertain/don’t know 
(4) agree 
(5) strongly agree 
 
7. Perceptions of 
Economic 
Situation 
Respondents’ agreement with the statement 
“My (my family’s) economic situation today is 
better than before March 2005” (Q.14) 
(1) strongly disagree 
(2) disagree 
(3) uncertain/don’t know 
(4) agree 
(5) strongly agree 
 
8. Perceptions of 
Rights and 
Economic 
Situation Index 
 
Composite index of Items 6 and 7 (Q.12 and 
14 in the Questionnaire) 
Ranges from 2 – “strongest 
disagreement” to 10 – 
“strongest agreement” 
9. Political 
Knowledge 
Index 
Composite Index of Questions 4-8: 
“Who is the president of Kyrgyzstan?” 
“Who is the prime-minister?” 
“Name the Parliament speaker” 
“Is KR a presidential or parliament. republic?” 
“When was the last version of KR 
Constitution adopted?” 
Ranges from 0 – “no 
question answered 
correctly” to 5 – “all 
questions answered 
correctly” 
 
 
10. Media Use 
 
Composite index of Q.53 items - respondents’ 
 
Ranges from 0 – “no 
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Index self-reported use of the following traditional 
media: (1) local papers; (2) national papers; (3) 
Kyrgyz TV channels; (4) Russian and foreign 
TV channels; and (5) local and national radio 
 
medium used” to 5 – “all five 
types of media used” 
11. Media 
Performance 
Approval 
Respondent’s answer to Question 62: “Do you 
believe that the TV channels, radio and 
newspapers you use do a decent job in 
covering national politics?” 
 
(0) no 
(1) yes 
12. Complexity 
of Politics and 
Political 
Incapacity 
Respondents’ agreement with the statement 
“Sometimes politics and government seems so 
complicated that I can’t really understand 
what’s going on” (Q.35 in the Questionnaire) 
 
(1) strongly disagree 
(2) disagree 
(3) uncertain/don’t know 
(4) agree 
(5) strongly agree 
 
13. Civic 
Activity Index  
Composite index of Q.63-65 - respondents’ 
self-reported political involvement: (1) voting 
in 2005 presidential election; (2) participation 
in demonstrations and protests starting from 
Feb.2005; and (3) being a member of a political 
party or civil society organization 
 
Ranges from 0 – “no type of 
activity reported” to 3 – “all 
three types of activity 
reported” 
14.Government’s 
Tolerance to 
Criticism from 
Opposition and 
Media 
Respondents’ agreement with the statement 
“Generally, the government is tolerant to the 
criticism from the opposition and media” 
(Q.19) 
(1) strongly disagree 
(2) disagree 
(3) uncertain/don’t know 
(4) agree 
(5) strongly agree 
 
15. Appropriate-
ness of 
Democracy for 
Kyrgyzstan  
Respondents’ answer to the question “In your 
opinion, is democracy an appropriate 
governance system for today’s Kyrgyzstan?” 
(Q.2) 
 
(0) no 
(1) yes 
16. State 
Function Is to 
Serve People 
Respondents’ answer to the question “In your 
opinion, what is the function of government 
in Kyrgyzstan? Is it to…” (Q.1 in the 
Questionnaire) 
 
(1) rule the people 
(2) both rule and serve 
(3) serve the people 
 
17. Spread of 
Corruption 
Respondents’ answer to Question 41: “Which 
of the following statements reflects your 
feelings about the spread of corruption in 
Kyrgyzstan?” ranging from the highest to the 
lowest levels of corruption 
(1) Corruption is pervasive 
(2) Most government 
structures are corrupt 
(3) Only some government 
structures are corrupt 
(4) Corruption is rare 
 
18. Personal 
Experiences with 
Corruption 
Respondents’ answer to Questions 42-43: “Did 
you personally(43)/anyone among your 
relatives or close friends(42) have to bribe a 
government employee in the last three 
months?” 
 
(0) no 
(1) would rather not tell 
(2) yes 
19.Government’s 
Effort to Solve 
Current 
Problems 
Respondents’ answer to Question 47: “Do you 
think the government is doing a decent job in 
trying to solve the current problems?” 
ranging from the most to the least effort 
(1) Yes, they are doing everything 
possible 
(2) They are trying but face too 
many obstacles 
 160 
(3) They do only what will help 
them to stay in power 
(4) No, their main goal is to survive 
to the next elections 
(5) No, they don’t care about how 
people live 
 
20. Government 
Approval 
Ratings 
Respondents’ answers to Questions 49-50: 
“Do you approve or disapprove of the way 
Kurmanbek Bakiev (49)/ Parliament (50) is 
handling his/its job?” 
 
(0) disapprove 
(1) 50/50 
(2) approve 
21. Individual 
Political 
Capacity 
Respondents’ agreement with the statement 
“As an individual, I can do something to 
change the current situation in Kyrgyzstan for 
the better” (Q.27) 
(1) strongly disagree 
(2) disagree 
(3) uncertain/don’t know 
(4) agree 
(5) strongly agree 
 
22. Norms of 
Democracy 
Index 
Composite index of the following 3 items: 
Q.11.  “No matter what a person’s political 
beliefs are, he/she is entitled to the same legal 
rights and protections as anyone else” 
Q.16.  “We are more likely to have a healthy 
economy if the government allows more 
freedom for individuals to do as they wish” 
Q.22.  “Kyrgyzstan’s government should 
become much more open to the public” 
 
Ranges from 3 – “highest 
level of disagreement” to 15 
– “highest level of 
agreement” 
23. Tolerance of 
Dissent Index 
Composite index of the following 3 items: 
Q.19.  “Generally, the government is tolerant to 
criticism from opposition and media” 
Q.21.  “Today it is less dangerous for citizens to 
criticize the government than before March ‘05” 
Q.29.  “In Kyrgyzstan, demonstrations and 
protests are effective in influencing a 
government decision” 
 
Ranges from 3 – “highest 
level of disagreement” to 15 
– “highest level of 
agreement” 
24. Independent 
Media and Free 
Expression 
Index 
Composite index of the following 3 items: 
Q.20.  “The press should be protected by the law 
from persecution by the government” 
Q.30.  “Private media should exist alongside 
state-owned ones” 
Q.34.  “It is necessary that everyone, regardless 
of their views, can express themselves freely” 
 
Ranges from 3 – “highest 
level of disagreement” to 15 
– “highest level of 
agreement” 
25. Political 
Incapacity Index 
Composite index of the following 4 items: 
Q.10. “There is no way other than voting that 
people like me can influence the actions of the 
government” 
Q.23.  “If an unjust law is passed, I could do 
nothing about it” 
Q.35.  “Sometimes politics and government 
seem so complicated that I can’t really 
understand what’s going on” 
Q.36.  “People like me don’t have much say 
about what the government does” 
 
Ranges from 4 – “highest 
level of disagreement” to 20 
– “highest level of 
agreement” 
26. Overall 
Frustration with 
Composite index of the following: 
Q.17.  “Generally, the government can be 
Ranges from 7 – “highest 
level of disagreement” 
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Government trusted to implement policies that will improve 
people’s situation” 
Q.18.  “The current government of Kyrgyzstan is 
committed to fight corruption” 
Q.25.  “Anyone with appropriate skills and 
qualifications can enter a government agency 
and work for it” 
Q.31.  “Those who are in power today 
understand that they were elected to serve 
rather than to rule the people” 
Q.32. “I feel if I had to seek a court’s protection I 
would receive a speedy and fair trial” 
Q.33.  “The courts in Kyrgyzstan make decisions 
independently, without government officials’ 
interference” 
Q.38.  “I believe my parliament representative 
would follow up on my concern if I express it” 
 
(denoting highest level of 
frustration) to 35 – “highest 
level of agreement” (lowest 
level of frustration) 
27. Future in 
Kyrgyzstan 
Respondents’ answer to Question 48: “Please 
select only one statement that best describes 
your feelings about your own future in 
Kyrgyzstan?” 
(0) already left (online survey) 
(1) I will leave the country at the 
first opportunity 
(2) I love my country but will 
have to leave because of the 
worsening situation 
(3) I will leave temporarily (to 
study, earn money) but will 
come back 
(4) I would like to leave, but 
realistically it is not possible 
right now 
(5) I am not pleased with the 
way things are now, but I feel 
they will improve so I’ll stay 
(6) This is my country and I will 
stay and do everything I can to 
make the life better here 
(7) I love my country and will 
never leave it even if the things 
go worse 
 
28. Internet 
Users Know 
More about 
Politics 
Respondents’ answer to Question 61: “Do you 
feel that in general those citizens of 
Kyrgyzstan who have Internet access are 
better informed about the political events in 
the country?”  
 
(0) no 
(1) yes 
29. Internet 
Users Share 
Information 
Respondents’ answer to Question 59: “Do 
you(they) share with them(you) the political 
information you (they) receive on the 
Internet?” 
(0) no 
(1) yes 
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